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Abstract
This thesis presents four research projects in the broader field of be-
havioural economics. In doing so, it aims to demonstrate the wide scope of
behavioural economics as a scientific discipline, and illustrate its diverse method-
ological toolkit. Chapter 1 provides a broad overview of the birth of behavioural
economics through the history of psychology and economics. Chapters 2–4 inves-
tigate context effects in decision making, while Chapter 5 describes an example
of the profound effect visceral factors can exert on human behaviour.
More specifically, in Chapter 2, we investigate context-dependent choice
behaviour within the framework of a popular cognitive model of decision making.
Based on results from three tests using data from a value-based and perceptual
choice experiment, we find that a mixture of absolute and relative valuation rules
describes subjective valuation most accurately across two vastly different choice
domains. In Chapter 3, we test whether the attraction effect, a well-known
cognitive bias is present in choices involving naturalistic, complex stimuli. The
results from two experiments suggest that the attraction effect does not extend
to real-world choices. This finding serves as the basis for the research question
we investigate in Chapter 4, where our aim is to explore the extent to which
the strength of the attraction effect depends on the separability of the attribute
dimensions. Potentially owing to the design of the experiment, the results of
this investigation are mixed and inconclusive, which prevents us from providing
a clear answer to our research question.
In contrast to the previous, laboratory-based experimental chapters, in
Chapter 5, we use a large observational dataset to investigate the link between
England’s participation in national football tournaments and the number of re-
ported domestic abuse cases recorded by the West Midlands Police. Using a
regression approach, we find that alcohol-related domestic abuse increases by
61% following and England victory. As well as exploring the characteristics of
this increase, we also re-analyse data from a previous study to reconcile our re-
sults with earlier findings from the literature, and demonstrate the robustness of
the win effect. Our study is the first to highlight the instrumental role alcohol
plays in the relationship between football and domestic abuse. Finally, Chapter




A selective history of
psychology and economics
1.1 Origins of modern psychology
Social and biological scientists have long been interested in exploring and under-
standing the factors shaping human behaviour. While the relative importance
of nature versus nurture has been a subject of debate for centuries (Pinker,
2004), there is now a broad scientific consensus that human behaviour emerges
as the result of the complex interactions between a range of external and inter-
nal factors, including genetic and environmental influences (Garcia Coll, Bearer,
Lerner, Bearer, & Lerner, 2004). These factors have a profound impact on our
personality, and exert a deep, often unconscious influence on our thoughts and
actions. Modern psychology is primarily concerned with the scientific investi-
gation of these factors, and aims to understand the pathways of their effect on
human behaviour.
Psychology finds its roots in the philosophical traditions of ancient West-
ern and Eastern civilizations and in the philosophy of the Enlightenment, but
the birth of modern psychology as a scientific discipline is generally associated
2
with the adoption of the experimental approach as a method of scientific inquiry
in nineteenth-century Germany (R. Smith, 2013; Hergenhahn & Henley, 2013).
Heavily influenced by the emerging scientific field of psychophysics, these early
experimental investigations were primarily concerned with understanding per-
ception and sensation (Mandler, 2007). In 1879, Wilhelm Wundt launched the
first coherent experimental psychological research programme, which involved
the measurement of choice reaction times and recording self-observations of
sensations (Rieber & Robinson, 2001). However, with the subsequent rise of
behaviourism in the twentieth century, the focus of experimental research in
psychology has shifted from the mental experience to directly measurable be-
havioural responses to stimuli (R. Smith, 2013).
The cognitive revolution in the 1950s facilitated a dramatic paradigm shift
in psychology, and ended the dominance of behaviourism. This transformative
change was greatly enhanced by technological developments after the war, and
the emerging fields of computer science and neuroscience equipped psychological
scientists with new methodological tools to study the cognitive processes under-
lying attention, language, memory, perception, judgment and decision making
(Miller, 2003). The nascent field of cognitive psychology followed the tradition
of the early experimentalists from the 1800s in focusing on mental processes,
but with strict scientific rigour (Leahey, 1979). In the 1970s, behavioural de-
cision research, a new branch of cognitive psychology emerged, concerned with
developing novel computational models of cognition to understand how cognitive
limitations affect human decision making. Behavioural decision research specifi-
cally aimed to incorporate psychological insights within its theoretical models of
decision making, in stark contrast with the dominant view on decision making
in economics at the time (Angner & Loewenstein, 2012).
3
1.2 The separation of psychology and economics
The historical origins of modern economics and psychology are inextricably
linked, and psychological states of the mind were central to the theories of early
economic thinkers deciphering the forces governing human behaviour and driving
economic activity. For example, in the eighteenth century, psychological insights
and concepts were deeply embedded in the moral philosophy of Adam Smith
(Ashraf, Camerer, & Loewenstein, 2005), and the psychological state of pleasure
was the cornerstone of the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart
Mill in the nineteenth century (Riley, 2008). Psychological hedonism was also
a key concept in the utility theory underpinning the thinking of the members
of the marginalist school of thought at the end of the nineteenth century, in-
cluding William Stanley Jevons, Carl Menger and Léon Walras (Drakopoulos &
Katselidis, 2017).
However, at the beginning of the twentieth century, mainstream economic
theory went through a transformative change, called the “Paretian turn” (Bruni
& Sugden, 2007). Vilfredo Pareto, who was heavily influenced by the positivist
scientific thinking prevalent at the turn of the century, argued that economics
should be a mathematical science, and that a theory of utility without any
psychological concepts was possible and desirable. Psychological assumptions
were deemed untestable and unscientific, and were feared to discredit economics
as a science. As a result, mainstream economic thinking started to turn away
from psychology, and neoclassical economists began to reformulate choice theory
in order to free it from psychological ideas (Bruni & Guala, 2001).
These reformulated models, subsequently developed by John Hicks, Roy
Allen and Paul Samuelson, postulated a rational, utility maximising decision
maker with stable preferences (Drakopoulos & Katselidis, 2017). The view of
the economic agent as a perfectly rational decision maker became the hallmark
of mainstream economic theory, which underlies the most influential models in
4
economic history developed at the time, such as the Arrow-Debreu general equi-
librium model (Arrow & Debreu, 1954), and Expected Utility Theory (Neumann
& Morgenstern, 1947).
However, the rationality assumption of mainstream economic theory faced
growing criticism immediately from its birth in the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury, and was widely deemed unrealistic by other social scientists (e.g., Bruni
& Luigino, 2013; Sen, 1977). The most famous defender of the rationality as-
sumption was economist Milton Friedman (Friedman, 1953), who took a truly
instrumentalist position to shield the rationality assumption from criticism, and
argued that the validity of a theory can only be tested through its predictive
power, and not through the plausibility of its assumptions (Drakopoulos & Kat-
selidis, 2017).
At the time of the cognitive revolution in psychology, a pioneering critic
of the rationality assumption of economic theory was Herbert Simon, who used
the term “bounded rationality” to describe a decision maker whose rationality
was restricted due to both external (environmental) and internal (cognitive) lim-
itations. His work is often referred to as the “old behavioural economics” (Sent,
2005). However, partly owing to the lack of a formalised approach to describe
his insights, his theory failed to have a transformative impact on mainstream
economics at the time, and had been subsequently misinterpreted in support of
mainstream economic theory (Sent, 2005; Angner & Loewenstein, 2012).
1.3 Reunification: the birth of behavioural economics
The birth of behavioural economics as we know it today (the “new behavioural
economics”) dates back to the emergence of behavioural decision research in the
1970s, and was facilitated by the contributions of Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff,
Sarah Liechtenstein, Richard Thaler, and especially Amos Tversky and Daniel
Kahneman (Sent, 2004). The development of Tversky and Kahneman’s Prospect
5
Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) marks the
“return” of psychological insights into mainstream economic theory.
Prospect Theory is a descriptive, formalised theory of decision making un-
der risk, which captures various, well-documented cognitive biases in choice. It
includes deeply psychological concepts, in the form of reference-dependence, loss
aversion, and non-linear probability weighting. The breakthrough of Prospect
Theory within economics partly stemmed from the fact that it retained the
highly formalised Expected Utility Theory framework to model violations of the
rationality assumption, and thus did not represent a radical departure from the
theoretical approach of mainstream economics (Angner & Loewenstein, 2012).
The popularity of Prospect Theory has turned economists’ attention to the abun-
dant empirical evidence about “irrational” choice behaviour, and psychological
concepts, such as regret, disappointment, self-control problems and social com-
parison processes were increasingly incorporated into economic models of deci-
sion making, whilst retaining the utility-based modelling approach of mainstream
economics (e.g., Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Thaler, 1981; Loomes & Sugden, 1982).
The popularity of Prospect Theory has established behavioural economics
as a new discipline, and the 1980s saw the institutionalisation of behavioural
economics as a separate academic discipline, with the foundation of the Society
for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics in 1982, and the launch of two
journals exclusively focusing on research in behavioural economics (Sent, 2004).
While the emergence of behavioural economics has highlighted the impor-
tance of employing an interdisciplinary approach to understand human judgment
and decision making, other, significant findings from cognitive psychology only
had a limited impact on the theoretical developments of mainstream economic
theory. For example, certain concepts, such as the role of intuition in decision-
making, and the wide range of heuristics and biases discovered by psychologists
that often lead to optimal choices are difficult to adopt in a coherent utility-
based model, which is still the standard approach to explain choice behaviour
6
within economics (Kahneman, 2003; Gigerenzer, 2016).
1.4 The methodological toolkit of behavioural eco-
nomics
Today, behavioural economics has an immense scope, and employs a vast range
of methodological apparatus. The benefits of utilising an interdisciplinary ap-
proach to understand and predict human behaviour in various contexts is il-
lustrated by the numerous proliferating subfields within behavioural economics,
including neuroeconomics, behavioural finance, behavioural development eco-
nomics, behavioural law and economics, and behavioural game theory (Angner
& Loewenstein, 2012). Owing to its deeply interdisciplinary nature, behavioural
economics has an eclectic methodological approach, and naturally borrows em-
pirical methods traditionally used in closely-related fields, such as psychology,
economics, and neuroscience (Angner & Loewenstein, 2012).
The popularity of the laboratory-based experimental method within be-
havioural economics is primarily inherited from psychology. It allows for inves-
tigations with high internal validity, while field experiments conducted in real-
world settings derive insights about human behaviour in the “wild”, with high
external validity (Levitt & List, 2007). In identifying the external and internal
factors influencing human behaviour in various real-world contexts, behavioural
economics also heavily relies on the econometric analysis of observational real-
world data, which often offers the opportunity to conduct a natural experiment
(Angner & Loewenstein, 2012). Randomised controlled trials are widely used
by developmental behavioural economists, and are indispensable methodologi-
cal tools for evaluating the efficacy of various real-world interventions (Demeritt
& Hoff, 2018). Insights delivered by these methodological approaches have in-
formed public policy in many countries, and contributed to the development
of various “nudges”, non-regulatory interventions aiming to influence individual
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behaviour by changing the choice environment (A. Oliver, 2013).
The rapidly growing field of neuroeconomics focuses on the biological pro-
cesses underlying decision making (Krajbich & Dean, 2015), and its methodolog-
ical toolkit includes eye-tracking, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI),
and electroencephalography (EEG). To analyse the vast amounts of physiological
data collected by these methods and accurately model the biological processes
underlying this data, neuroeconomists heavily rely on computational process
models of choice, an influential family of models originating from cognitive psy-
chology (Fehr & Rangel, 2011; Krajbich, Oud, & Fehr, 2014).
A promising future direction for behavioural economics is the adoption of
machine learning methods primarily used for the analysis of “Big Data”. In the
past two decades, the digital transformation has created ever-increasing sources
of vast datasets generated by humans (e.g., through social media, search engines,
financial transactions, location data generated by GPS), offering rich sources of
information to study human behaviour (Blazquez & Domenech, 2018). While
these datasets are typically too large to be analysed using traditional econometric
methods, the rapidly expanding field of machine learning is focusing on the
development of novel algorithms that can uncover generalisable patterns and
structure in these vast datasets, and can be ultimately used for prediction tasks
(Mullainathan & Spiess, 2017).
The research projects described in this thesis demonstrate the deeply in-
terdisciplinary nature of behavioural economics, the broad variety of phenomena
it studies, and the wide range of empirical approaches it employs. Across four
research programmes, we study a variety of topics, including value sensitivity in
perceptual and value-based choice, the boundary conditions for the attraction
effect (an influential decision bias in behavioural economics), and the link be-
tween football and domestic abuse in the context of England. These research
questions lie at the intersection of various disciplines, including cognitive psy-
chology, neuroeconomics, and economics, and therefore serve as ideal research
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areas for behavioural economics.
In studying these research questions, we also demonstrate the wide vari-
ety of methodological approaches used in behavioural economics. In one chapter,
we use eye-tracking data to fit a decision making model widely used in neuroeco-
nomics. In another, we use a vast text corpus and a machine learning technique
(natural language processing) to study the attraction effect. Finally, in contrast
to these predominantly experimental investigations, in the last chapter we use a
large-scale crime dataset and regression techniques to study the association be-
tween England football matches and the daily number of domestic abuse cases
reported to the police.
1.5 Thesis overview
The following four chapters revolve around two main themes. Using experimental
methods, Chapters 2–4 focus on violations of the rationality assumption in value-
based choice, while Chapter 5 uses statistical analysis of a large observational
dataset to explore an important example of the profound effects visceral factors
can exert on human behaviour. Below is a more detailed description of each of
the four chapters and the associated methodological approaches used.
Chapter 2 presents an extensive exploration of context-dependent choice
behaviour, within the computational framework of a process model of decision
making. Using data from two choice experiments with fundamentally different
task domains (preferential choice task in Experiment 1, and perceptual choice
task in Experiment 2), we assess the relative explanatory power of four distinct
forms of context-dependent choice behaviour in three empirical tests. In the first
test, we use eye-tracking data from Experiment 1 to implement a simulations-
based model fitting approach, which, compared to previous investigations, rep-
resents a methodological improvement in several respects. In the second test, we
describe an alternative, stochasticity-free method to derive choice probabilities.
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The third, and final test is a qualitative comparison of the empirical performance
of the four forms of context-dependency, using data from both experiments.
Chapter 3 also focuses on context-dependent choice behaviour, more
specifically, it explores the boundary conditions of the most well-known and
influential cognitive bias in decision-making research, the attraction effect. We
test whether the attraction effect extends to choices with complex alternatives,
as opposed to simplistic stimuli with numerical attributes so often used in ex-
perimental research. This research question was inspired by a previous debate in
the literature, and drawing insights from this primarily methodological debate,
we develop a methodology allowing us to conduct the first truly rigorous test
of the attraction effect in choices with naturalistic stimuli, using data from two
experiments. To create the stimuli, we use a machine learning technique, Latent
Semantic Analysis (LSA), to establish the similarity of complex text objects.
Chapter 4 explores the research question arising from the results of Chap-
ter 3. More specifically, our aim is to decipher the extent to which the attraction
effect depends on the stimuli presentation. Drawing on earlier literature from
the psychology of information processing, we design and conduct an experiment
to test whether the strength of the attraction effect depends on the separability
of the attribute dimensions.
While all chapters fall into the broad topic of understanding the factors
shaping human behaviour, Chapter 5 departs from the laboratory-based exper-
imental approach of the previous chapters. In this study, we use a large dataset
covering eight years of crime data from the West Midlands Police to analyse the
relationship between England’s participation in national football tournaments
(World Cup and European Championship) and the number of reported domes-
tic abuse incidents. Given the random allocation of England match days, and
the largely unpredictable outcome of each individual match, our crime dataset
lends itself to a natural experiment allowing us to investigate the causal effect
of the England national team’s victory or loss on the number of reported abuse
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cases. Our study is the first to explore the role of alcohol in this relationship
in the context of England. Using traditional econometric techniques, we present
an extensive analysis of the various characteristics of the link between football
and alcohol-related domestic abuse, and reconcile our results with seemingly








While there is ample evidence that our decisions are profoundly affected by
the decision context, how exactly the perceived subjective value of an option
changes as a function of the choice environment is still a matter of debate within
the decision-making literature.
Over the past decades, several theoretical models of context-dependent
valuation have been proposed. One of the earliest of these is Parducci’s range-
frequency theory (RFT; Parducci, 1963, 1965), a highly influential theory in
psychophysics, offering an account of how objective stimuli get translated into
subjective quantities. According to RFT, the perceived magnitude of the stim-
ulus depends on two components, its range and rank value within the stimuli
set. The range value of the stimulus captures its position with respect to the
highest and lowest stimuli in the set, whereas the rank value reflects its position
within the ordered set of stimuli. RFT has proven to be a powerful explanatory
framework for context effects observed in a range of domains, such as strategic
decision making (Vlaev & Chater, 2006), price judgments (Niedrich, Weath-
ers, Hill, & Bell, 2009), and even pain perception (Watkinson, Wood, Lloyd, &
Brown, 2013).
The range and rank principles have also been influential outside the RFT
framework. For example, the effects of stimulus range on discrimination perfor-
mance and magnitude judgments have long been the focus of perceptual psy-
chology (e.g., Lockhead & Hinson, 1986). More recently, range effects have been
increasingly incorporated into models emerging from the interdisciplinary field
of decision neuroscience. These models mostly focus on explaining patterns of
neural activity during decision making tasks in fMRI experiments. Given that
neural firing rates are bounded from above due to biophysical constraints, it is
a natural assumption that some sort of adaptive mechanism must take place to
accommodate differences in the range of stimulus values that can be experienced
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in the real-world (e.g., Padoa-Schioppa, 2009; Soltani, de Martino, & Camerer,
2012; Rangel & Clithero, 2012; Louie, Khaw, & Glimcher, 2013).
The rank principle has also been successfully applied in several choice
domains. For example, in an fMRI experiment where participants were shown
pictures of monetary amounts they could win, Mullett and Tunney (2013) found
that activity in certain brain regions reflected the current stimulus’ rank position
within the entire set of stimuli. In a socio-economic context, several studies
have shown that the rank position of one’s income within their respective social
reference group (e.g., workplace, neighbourhood), but not the absolute level
of income, is a significant predictor of a series of health outcomes, including
mental health, self-reported happiness, and job satisfaction (e.g., Clark, Frijters,
& Shields, 2008; Brown, Gardner, Oswald, & Qian, 2008; Boyce, Brown, &
Moore, 2010; Daly, Boyce, & Wood, 2015).
The range and rank principles are two distinct approaches to value nor-
malisation, where the transformed values are required to fall between 0 and 1.
These can be contrasted with simpler forms of normalisation, where the values
are divided by the maximum value in the set, which serves as a natural reference
point for a subjective valuation scale. In the context of a choice experiment,
this maximum can be represented by the highest value in the current choice trial
(the local maximum), or, equally, it can be the highest value experienced dur-
ing the entire experiment (the global maximum), which is equivalent to simply
normalising all values by a constant.
In this research project, we were interested in comparing the relative
explanatory power of these four different forms of subjective valuation (range,
rank, local and global maximum normalisation). Our empirical strategy was to
present participants with choice triplets in two experiments, in the form of com-
plex preferential stimuli in Experiment 1, and perceptual stimuli in Experiment
2. The “objective value” of each of the three choice options in every trial could
be quantified in both experiments, which allowed us to investigate how these
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four value transformation rules fare in predicting choice behaviour.
There exists a wide range of choice models in cognitive psychology, many
of which could serve as an equally suitable theoretical framework to investigate
context dependence in value-based choice. In this research project, we chose
to employ the theoretical framework of a hugely influential cognitive model of
choice, the drift diffusion model (DDM; Ratcliff, 1978) and one of its popular
extensions, the attentional drift diffusion model (aDDM; Krajbich, Armel, &
Rangel, 2010; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011), which incorporates the role of eye-
movements within the standard DDM.
Considering a trinary choice context, our empirical strategy can be briefly
described as follows. First, we identified four choice set manipulation rules (each
representing a modification of the three items’ values based on a given rule) for
which these four value transformation rules (range, rank, local and global max-
imum normalisation) yielded different predictions regarding choice behaviour.
All subsequent experimental stimuli in this research project were derived from
these four choice set manipulation rules. Second, using data from a preferential
choice experiment (Experiment 1), we obtained the best fitting parameter set
for each participant and value transformation rule from fitting the aDDM to
the choice and reaction time data. Using these best fitting parameter sets, we
then compared the resulting log-likelihoods to identify the value transformation
rule that best describes the choice behaviour of each participant. Finally, using
data from the perceptual version of Experiment 1, in Experiment 2, we derived
the best fitting parameters for each value transformation rule from fitting the
DDM to group-level choice data, and conducted a qualitative comparison of the
four value transformation rules’ overall ability to predict changes in the choice
proportions across the four choice set manipulation rules. The next section gives
a brief overview of the DDM and its extension, the aDDM.
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2.2 The drift diffusion model
How do people choose when facing multiple options? What happens exactly
during the choice process. What is the cognitive mechanism underlying the
comparison of the alternatives? These are the questions process models of choice
seek to answer. In cognitive psychology, one particularly influential type of
process models is the family of sequential sampling models.
The overarching idea behind these models is that the evolution of pref-
erence in a given choice process is the result of noisy accumulation of evidence
for each alternative throughout the decision process (hence the name “sequential
sampling”), and a response is made when the accumulated evidence exceeds a
certain threshold. There are many types of sequential sampling models, differ-
ing in whether the evidence is accumulated separately and independently for
each option, and whether the threshold is defined to be absolute or relative
(Teodorescu & Usher, 2013; Forstmann, Ratcliff, & Wagenmakers, 2016).
Of particular interest in psychology and cognitive neuroscience is a type
of sequential sampling model that assumes a relative decision rule, and a separate
and independent accumulation process for each choice option under considera-
tion. In discrete time, this is modelled as a random walk process, whereas in
continuous time it can be characterised by a diffusion process. The latter form
is called the DDM (e.g., Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008),
which is now the workhorse sequential sampling model in cognitive psychology.
In the drift diffusion framework, a key parameter of the model is the drift
rate, which determines the average rate at which one of the thresholds is being
approached during the choice process (Voss, Rothermund, & Voss, 2004). The
drift rate also reflects the degree of similarity between the two options, and thus
can be seen as a measure of task difficulty: when the options are very similar
and the task is difficult, the process will have a low drift rate, and therefore it
will take longer to reach one of the thresholds. Conversely, when the options are
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easily discriminable and the choice is “easy”, the drift rate will be high, and a
threshold is reached faster. Figure 2.1 illustrates one such evidence accumulation
process in the drift diffusion framework.
Figure 2.1: Illustration of the evidence accumulation process with options A and B.
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While the DDM in psychology was first used as a model of memory
retrieval (Ratcliff, 1978), it has since been applied to a wide range of choice
task domains, including lexical decision making (Ratcliff, Gomez, & McKoon,
2004), numerosity discrimination (Leite & Ratcliff, 2011) and emotional process-
ing (Mueller & Kuchinke, 2016). The popularity of the DDM in these various
research areas stems from a number of factors.
First, and most importantly, the DDM both predicts reaction time dis-
tributions and choice probabilities remarkably well (Ratcliff, McKoon, & van
Zandt, 1999; Forstmann et al., 2016). Second, it has been shown that manip-
ulations of the decision task (such as changing task difficulty, accuracy motiva-
tion and reward structure of the task) correspond to expected changes in model
parameters (drift rate, threshold distance and the starting point of the accumu-
lation process respectively), indicating that the model is successful in capturing
the cognitive mechanism underlying choice processes (Voss et al., 2004). Lastly,
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the model is inherently intuitive: it provides an elegant and plausible description
of the evolution of preferences during the deliberation phase of decision making.
In addition to providing a psychologically plausible model of choice be-
haviour, the drift diffusion model has also been successfully applied in the field
of cognitive neuroscience to explain both high- and low-level cognitive processes
(Forstmann et al., 2016). Studies measuring decision-related neural activity in
monkeys have found that over the course of a motion discrimination task, the
firing rates of neurons in the lateral intraparietal cortex (LIP; an area in the
brain responsible for attentional and decision-related processes, e.g. Shadlen
& Newsome, 2001) exhibit a pattern closely resembling to the accumulation of
noisy evidence (e.g. Churchland et al., 2011). In humans, studies using func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have identified distinct areas of the
brain whose activation changes following value manipulations of model parame-
ters (through changing the task design) in the DDM (for a review see Mulder,
van Maanen, & Forstmann, 2014).
Owing to the popularity of the DDM, several extensions of the model have
been proposed. One notable example is the incorporation of attentional processes
in binary and trinary value-based decisions, known as the aDDM (Krajbich et
al., 2010; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011). The aDDM modifies the standard DDM
drift rate that governs the accumulation process based on the pattern of visual
fixation during choice, resulting in a faster accumulation process for the option
that is being fixated at a given time point. The mathematical formulation of
the accumulation process in the trinary case with choice options left, centre and
right, when option left is fixated is as follows:
Eleftt = E
left
t−1 + d · rleft + ε
left
t (2.1)




t−1 + θ · d · rright + ε
right
t , (2.3)
where Et is the amount of evidence accumulated for a given option (the
value of the accumulator corresponding to an alternative) up until time period
t, θ is the penalty on the unattended items that can vary between 0 and 1 (θ = 1
corresponding to the standard DDM model with no role of visual fixations, and
θ = 0 corresponding to the case of maximum penalty, such that the accumulation
process is maximally dependent on the visual fixations), d is a constant that
governs the rate of accumulation, r is the subjective value of the given option,
and ε is the noise in the accumulation process. Therefore, for a given option, the
total amount of accumulated evidence in each time period is given by the sum
of the value of that accumulator in the previous time period, the value of the
option discounted by the penalty on the unattended item (if it is not currently
attended), and the noise component ε ∼ N(0, σ2) (see Equations 2.1–2.3). The
relative evidence position of each option at a given time period is then defined
as follows:
V leftt = E
left
t −max(Ecentert , E
right
t ) (2.4)












As can be seen from Equations 2.4–2.6, the aDDM implements a next
to best decision rule: at any given time step, each item’s accumulator competes
with the higher out of the other two. A choice is made when one of the relative
evidence accumulators reaches a given threshold. The free parameters in the
aDDM are θ, d and σ2. Figure 2.2 illustrates how the accumulation process
19
Figure 2.2: Illustration of the evidence accumulation process in the aDDM framework
(rleft = 4; rcenter = 3; rright = 6; d = 0.0002; θ = 0.3; σ2 = 0.001)
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depends on the pattern of fixations in the aDDM framework. In general, through
θ, the relative decision value for the fixated item increases, while it decreases for
the unfixated items. All else being equal, varying the value of any of the other
parameters also alters the accumulation process. For example, increasing d,
the speed of integration results in a faster accumulation process for all options,
reducing reaction times, while increasing σ2 results in a noisier, less deterministic
accumulation process. The speed of the accumulation also depends on the value
of the options, r, such that the higher the option’s value, the faster evidence
accumulates for that option.
How does the aDDM improve the explanatory power of the DDM in un-
derstanding preferential decision making? Several studies have demonstrated
the strong link between eye movements and subsequent choice behaviour. In
a preferential choice experiment with pairs of faces used as stimuli, Shimojo,
Simion, Shimojo, and Scheier (2003) have found that participants were more
likely to fixate on the item they ended up choosing, a phenomenon called the
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gaze bias, which has also been observed in other eye tracking experiments in-
volving preferential choice tasks (e.g. Armel, Beaumel, & Rangel, 2008; Bird,
Lauwereyns, & Crawford, 2012). This effect tends to be much more pronounced
towards the end of the decision: when retrospectively plotting how attention
changes seconds before the choice was made, there is a much higher likelihood
of the finally fixated item being the eventually chosen one too. This is called the
gaze cascade effect (e.g. Shimojo et al., 2003; Glaholt & Reingold, 2009) or the
late onset bias (Mullett & Stewart, 2016).
While these patterns provide strong evidence for the intimate link be-
tween attention and choice behaviour captured in the aDDM, the assumption
that eye movements have a casual effect on preference formation has proven
difficult to demonstrate. This difficulty stems from the fact that designing an
eye-tracking experiment that mimics real-life choice scenarios, whilst allowing for
exogenous manipulations of gaze in a non-invasive fashion is extremely challeng-
ing from a methodological point of view. Attempts to overcome this difficulty
included explicitly controlling for exposure time by displaying only one item at a
time (Armel et al., 2008), instructing participants to fixate on the item indicated
with a specifically coloured frame in a binary choice task (Lim, O’Doherty, &
Rangel, 2011), and prompting a decision once the target has been fixated for
a pre-determined amount of time (Pärnamets et al., 2015). While these stud-
ies have demonstrated that items that were fixated longer were also more likely
to be chosen, the artificial nature of these choice scenarios mean that they do
not provide unequivocal evidence that eye movements have a causal effect on
preferences in real-life choice scenarios.
However, in a recent study, Gwinn, Leber, and Krajbich (2019) directly
tested the causal effect of eye movements on preferences. They used probability
cueing, an elegant, non-invasive attentional learning technique, which induces
attentional biases that spill over to a subsequent choice task. Their results from
four studies lent support to the idea that attention has a causal effect on choice
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behaviour, providing the strongest evidence for this relationship yet.
While the causal role of fixations in choice behaviour is not a critical
assumption in the aDDM framework (Krajbich, 2019), the model can accom-
modate both the gaze bias and gaze cascade effect. First, fixating on one item
for longer means that the amount of relative evidence accumulated in favour of
this item will be higher, therefore it is more likely to be finally chosen (gaze
bias effect). Second, as evidence accumulation is faster when an item is being
fixated, it is more likely that the item’s relative evidence accumulator reaches
the threshold during a fixation on that item (gaze cascade effect).
In addition, a comprehensive investigation of six eye-tracking studies
found that attention amplifies the underlying value of the option under con-
sideration, as opposed to providing a value-independent boost in the form of
a constant added to the accumulation equation, supporting the multiplicative
formulation of the aDDM (S. M. Smith & Krajbich, 2019). Furthermore, com-
parisons of aDDM predictions and actual eye-tracking data have shown that the
aDDM provides a remarkably good fit to fixation, reaction time and choice data
(Krajbich et al., 2010; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011).
Owing to its high explanatory power, we decided to investigate context-
dependent choice behaviour within the aDDM framework. When fitting the
aDDM to actual choice data, the value of the options (and consequently the
drift rate) is usually defined as the item ratings given by participants in a rating
task that precedes the choice task (rleft, rmiddle, and rright in Equations 2.1–2.3).
These ratings are assumed to reflect the “objective value” of an option, evaluated
independently from the other options available. In this research project, our aim
is to incorporate the idea of context-dependent valuation (in the form of the
range, rank, local, and global maximum value transformation rules) within the
aDDM framework through these item ratings.
In other words, we compare four competing accounts of how the collected
evidence samples are defined within the model framework. In the original model,
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it is the absolute values of the options (preference ratings on a scale from -
10 to 10; e.g., Krajbich & Rangel, 2011) that govern the drift rates, whereas
in our formulation, it is the normalised, subjective values of the options that
feed into the accumulation equation at each time step. Importantly, we did not
explicitly modify how the options are contrasted and integrated within the model
(described in Equations 2.4–2.6).
2.3 Overview of Experiment 1 and 2
To test the relative explanatory power of various forms of context-dependent
valuation within the aDDM framework, we conducted two experiments. Exper-
iment 1 was a preferential choice experiment, where participants were presented
with choice triplets created from 100 movie posters, while their eye movements
were recorded. In a separate rating stage that preceded the choice task, we ob-
tained independent preference ratings from each participant on the set of 100
movies. We investigated how preferences change as a function of the choice con-
text by using these preference ratings as inputs to the four value transformation
rules. In Experiment 2, we were interested in the same question, but we used
perceptual stimuli, in the form of rapidly updating sequences of numbers drawn
from a normal distribution with a fixed mean (taken from Tsetsos, Chater, &
Usher, 2012). Analogously, we used these fixed means as inputs to the four value
transformation rules.
To compare the explanatory power of the four value transformation rules,
we used two fundamentally different methodological approaches. First, using
data on eye movements during choice from Experiment 1, we obtained the best
fitting set of aDDM model parameters for each valuation rule and participant,
and based on the resulting log-likelihoods, we determined which valuation rule
describes best each participant’s choice behaviour. In order to obtain these
best fitting parameters, we used two alternative methods to estimate the choice
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probabilities: a traditional simulations-based method, and a novel probability
distribution method, which circumvents a methodological problem arising from
simulating out a stochastic model. Second, using a DDM simulations approach
and choice data from both experiments, we compared the choice proportion
predictions for each value transformation rule, which served as a further test of
the explanatory performance of each rule.
Our contribution is twofold. First, we conduct a rigorous comparison of
the performance of the four subjective transformation rules, delivering insights
about context-dependent choice behaviour across multiple stimuli domains. Sec-
ond, we develop a novel probability density evolution approach for fitting the
aDDM to eye-tracking data.
2.4 Subjective Transformation Rules
We considered the four value transformation rules detailed in Section 2.1: the
range, rank, local, and global maximum rule. In the context of a trinary choice
experiment, each rule takes in three “objective values” x1, x2, x3 (these are the
“raw” independent preference ratings for each movie in Experiment 1, and the
mean of each distribution from which the rapidly updating sequence of numbers
are drawn in Experiment 2), and transforms these into normalised “subjective
values” (required to fall between 0 and 1).
Range Rule. The range value follows from the RFT and reflects the
perceived distance of the stimulus from the stimulus with the lowest value, as a
proportion of the overall distance between the highest and lowest valued stimulus
in the stimuli set. It captures the idea that valuation is sensitive to the highest
and lowest value encountered (or, equivalently, to the overall range of values) in
a given choice set. Formally, this can be described by the following equation:
Rangei =
xi −min(x1, x2, x3)
max(x1, x2, x3)−min(x1, x2, x3)
(2.7)
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Note that the items with the lowest and highest original values are always as-
signed 0 and 1 respectively, while the middle item’s value can vary between 0
and 1.
Rank Rule. The rank rule also follows from RFT, and reflects the “fre-
quency” of the stimulus, which can be translated as its ranked ordinal position in
the choice set. The rank rule reflects a simple mechanism of valuation, whereby
the subjective value of an item is solely determined by the number of items with
lower or higher values in the choice set, and the extent of the difference between
item values does not matter. Formally, given an ordered set of three stimuli




Note that according to the rank rule, the three subjective values assigned
to the items with the lowest, middle and highest value are always 0, 0.5 and 1,
respectively.
Local Maximum Rule. The local maximum rule generates subjective
value representations by dividing the value of each stimulus by the highest value
encountered on that trial, and in this way it corresponds to the normalised
version of the raw ratings used in Krajbich and Rangel (2011). This reflects a
bias towards the most rewarding, and hence potentially most salient option in
the current trial. Formally, the subjective values of a set of stimuli according to





Note that the stimuli with the highest value is always assigned a subjec-
tive value of 1, while the other two values can vary between 0 and 1 (exclusive).
Global Maximum Rule. The global maximum rule is identical to the
Local Maximum Rule, except that the objective values are normalised using the
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highest value encountered in the whole of the experiment (and not just on that
trial). This means that all values are normalised by the same constant, therefore,
the global maximum rule is equivalent to the original version of the aDDM (e.g.,
Krajbich & Rangel, 2011), and can serve as a natural reference point to test
whether the explanatory power of the model can be increased with a different
value transformation rule. Formally, in an experiment where the items that can
be encountered are x1, x2, ..., xn, the subjective value of a stimuli set according
to the global maximum rule is given by
Globalmaxi =
xi
max(x1, x2, ..., xn)
(2.10)
Note that when an item in the current trial has the highest value in
the whole of the experiment, this rule is equivalent to the local maximum rule,
otherwise the values can vary between 0 and 1 (exclusive).
2.5 Choice Set Manipulations
After identifying the four value transformation rules detailed above, the next
step was to find a set of choice set manipulations for which these transformation
rules (accommodated within an aDDM or DDM framework) produce different
predictions about choice behaviour. A choice set manipulation represents some
modification of the three options’ objective values based on a certain rule (e.g.
doubling each value, or adding a constant to each of them). The key idea is
that the four subjective value transformation rules (range, rank, local and global
maximum) differ in their predictions about how these choice set manipulations
affect choice proportions, which allowed us to assess their relative empirical per-
formance.
We chose to investigate the effect of the following four distinct choice set
manipulations: adding the same constant to each of the three values, multiplying
each value by a constant, and having a distant or a close second, and third value.
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Figure 2.3: Subjective values by choice set manipulation and value transformation rule. The
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Figure 2.3 shows the subjective values (these are required to fall between 0 and
1) derived from each transformation, assuming a raw value scale from 1 to 7.
The orange dots are the original values, while the purple dots show the new,
transformed values. For example, in the case of adding a constant (first column
of Figure 2.3), we added 3 to the original value set 1,2,4, which resulted in a
new value set 4,5,7, whereas multiplying 1,2,3 by 2 resulted in the new value
set 2,4,6 (second column). As illustrated by the four rows of Figure 2.3, the
subjective values of the original and new value sets often differ across the four
value transformation rules, resulting in different predictions about how these
choice set manipulations affect choice behaviour.
For example, when adding a constant to a set of values, the range and rank
transformed values are unaffected, while the global maximum transformed values
only shift by a constant, therefore these three rules predict no change in choice
behaviour. However, under the local maximum rule, the distance between the
best and the other two values narrows, which is predicted to increase the relative
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choice share of the middle and worst options at the expense of the best option.
When values are multiplied by a constant, only the global maximum rule predicts
any change, namely, that as the distance between the three options increases,
the best option becomes relatively more attractive compared to the other two.
When increasing the value of the middle option while holding everything else
constant (distant vs close second), the range and both maximum rules predict
that the relative share of the middle option increases at the expense of the best
option, while the rank rule predicts no change. Finally, the two maximum rules
predict that increasing the value of the worst option while holding everything
else constant (distant vs close third) will increase the share of the worst option
at the expense of the middle option, the range rule predicts that it will increase
the share of the best option and decrease the share of the middle option, while
the rank rule predicts no change. Table 2.1 summarizes these predictions.












































































*NC = No Change
Our original plan was to present participants with these seven distinct
trinary choice sets (124, 457, 123, 246, 137, 167, 567) to maximise the discrim-
inatory power of our experiments. However, due to an experimenter error, in
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Experiment 1, the displayed choice options were quasi-random, resulting in 84
unique choice sets instead of the originally planned seven. We nevertheless pro-
ceeded with fitting the aDDM to the data from Experiment 1, and had enough
data for the relevant seven choice sets to conduct a further comparison of choice
behaviour in Experiment 1 and 2.
2.6 Experiment 1
2.6.1 Method
Experiment 1 was a preferential choice experiment, where participants’ eye move-
ments were recorded during choice. Based on previous eye-tracking studies (e.g.,
Krajbich et al., 2010; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011), we decided in advance that a
sample of 50 participants should provide enough statistical power for our pur-
poses. To reach this sample size, we recruited sixty participants overall, out
of which ten participants could not be eye-tracked. Participants were recruited
through the University of Warwick’s Research Participation System, and were
paid £7.00 for taking part in the experiment. We did not record data on par-
ticipants’ gender, as we did not expect it to affect the results. Ethical approval
was obtained from the Department of Psychology, University of Warwick.
The experiment consisted of two parts. First, participants who signed up
for the study were required to complete an online questionnaire, where they had
to rate 110 movies on a scale from 1 to 7, based on how much they would like
to see the given movie (1 being not at all, and 7 being very much so). We also
asked them whether they have seen the movies before. The rating task began
with 10 test trials (these were the same movies for all participants), so that
participants could familiarise themselves with the task, and the type of movies
they will be required to rate. Then, they were informed that the actual rating
task is about to start. During this rating task, participants were presented with
the 100 movies in a randomised order, and we instructed them to try to use
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the whole range of the scale as much as possible. This was important, because
the second part of the experiment relied on these ratings, and could not be run
without at least one movie for each rating. Some participants failed to do this,
and so they were asked again to complete this task before coming to the lab for
the second part of the experiment. Figure 2.4 shows an example trial from this
task, which took about 15 minutes on average.
Figure 2.4: Example rating task from the first part of Experiment 1.
Those who successfully completed the first part were invited to the lab
for the second part of the study. In the second part, participants were presented
with 100 trinary sets of the pre-rated movies, and were asked to pick the one they
would like to see the most on each trial by pressing the corresponding keyboard
key (left, down, right arrow), while their eye movements were recorded at 500 Hz
using an EyeLink 1000 (SR Research). The order of the choice triplets and the
display order of the three movies in a given trial were both randomised. The eye
tracker was calibrated after every 25 choices (four times overall over the course
of the experiment), and each trial began only after participants fixated on a
centrally presented fixation cross for 500 ms. We did not add a text prompt to
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the screen to avoid additional visual distractions. Figure 2.5 shows an example
trial from the second part of this experiment.
Figure 2.5: Example choice task from the second part of Experiment 1.
2.6.2 Stimuli
We chose 110 movies that received the most votes in 10 distinct genres (adven-
ture, comedy, drama, family, fantasy, history, mystery, romance, sci-fi, thriller)
on IMDb (the most extensive movie information database) as of March, 2016. In
the first part of the experiment, the first ten trials were practice trials (one movie
from each genre), which aimed to give participants an idea about the range and
type of movies they will be asked to rate.
In the second part of the study, the displayed trinary sets were originally
generated based on the participant’s ratings to reflect the choice set manip-
ulations. However, as mentioned above, the choice sets displayed during the
experiment were unintentionally quasi-random, due to the incorrect numbering
of the 110 stimuli pictures. Each number still corresponded to a unique movie
(albeit this assignment was random), but the choice sets, which were based on
the movie numbers, were displayed as planned. This resulted in 84 unique trinary
choice sets, defined by the raw rating of each of the three options, as opposed to
the originally planned seven described in section 2.5.
In order to avoid the same set of movies appearing again, the script that
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generated the choice triplets aimed to ensure that all the stimuli with a given
rating got used before any repetition of stimuli occurs. While we tried to vary
the stimuli appearing as much as we could, repetition was inevitable in some
cases, since a few participants gave very uneven ratings (e.g., gave a rating of 1
to only a few movies).
Given that our main aim was to fit the aDDM to the data to compare each
value transformation variant, we decided it was still worth proceeding with the
analysis with the current dataset (even though the data now contained consider-
ably fewer trials that could help us delineate the differences in the explanatory
power of the four value transformation rules).
2.6.3 Exclusion criteria
As mentioned in section 2.6.1, we had usable eye-tracking data from 50 par-
ticipants. For a few participants, the calibration quality was not satisfactory
(defined as “poor” by the EyeLink system) in some parts of the experiment,
and therefore we excluded these trials, which accounted for about 2.5% of all
fixations. We also excluded the first three trials of each participant, and each
trial right after a calibration, to make sure we only included fixations that were
part of the choice process. We then excluded fixations that fell outside the three
areas of interest, and trials in the upper 1% of the reaction time distribution.
Finally, we only kept trials where all three of the choice items were fixated at
least once. After applying these exclusion criteria, the average number of trials
per participant was 80.
2.7 Fitting the aDDM
Using data from Experiment 1, we wished to compare the four value transforma-
tion rules’ explanatory power within the aDDM framework, on the basis of their
respective log-likelihoods of producing each participant’s data. To do this, we
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needed to establish a method for deriving choice probabilities, given a specific
set of parameters. We used two different methodological approaches to derive
these probabilities, a simulation-based approach, and a probability distribution
approach. Below we first describe the standard model fitting approach used in
the aDDM literature, and then we highlight how our simulation-based empirical
strategy builds on, and improves this standard approach.
When fitting the aDDM, the common strategy is to fit the model on the
group-level, and simulate out the choice process for all parameter value set (θ,
the penalty on the unattended item, σ, the noise parameter, and d, the speed of
integration) and preference rating combinations, with fixations sampled from the
empirical distribution of fixations, conditional on the preference rating difference
(e.g., Krajbich et al., 2010; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011; Fisher, 2017).
Then, given a discrete number of reaction time bins, the number of sim-
ulations falling into each choice and reaction time bin can be calculated for all
parameter and rating difference combinations, and the probability that a sim-
ulation trial finishes in a given choice and reaction time bin can be derived.
To obtain the log-likelihood of the data for each parameter combination, these
probabilities are multiplied by the number of empirical data points falling into
each choice and reaction time bin, and their logarithm is taken and summed
up. One or two iterative grid searches can be carried out using this estimation
method, resulting in the final estimate of the best fitting parameter values, and
the corresponding log-likelihood.
Our empirical approach differs from this method in several respects. First,
as opposed to a group-level approach, we derived the best fitting parameters for
each subject to account for individual heterogeneity. Therefore, our primary aim
was to find the best fitting parameter set and the corresponding log-likelihood
value for each participant and transformation rule (of which there were 200, given
50 participants and four subjective value transformation rules) to determine
which transformation rule yields the best fit for each participant. Second, to
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derive the most accurate estimate of the predicted probability of each trial falling
into a given choice and reaction time bin, we used the eye movement pattern
on that very trial (as opposed to probabilistically sampling it from an empirical
distribution, conditional on the rating difference). Third, in addition to the grid
search, we also used a Nelder-Mead optimization algorithm to find the best fitting
parameter values for each participant and value transformation rule. Finally, we
used 100,000 simulations to lessen the effect of noise (an inherent feature of the
aDDM) and obtain more reliable choice probability estimates (previous studies
used between 1000 and 4000 simulations, e.g., Krajbich & Rangel, 2011; Fisher,
2017).
In addition to these improvements, to evaluate the robustness of our es-
timates as well as to circumvent a methodological issue stemming from applying
a traditional simulations-based approach to a stochastic model, we also used a
novel probability distribution-based approach to derive the best fitting param-
eter combinations and corresponding log-likelihoods for each participant and
value transformation rule.
Before the parameter estimation, we discretized the eye movement data.
To do so, we divided each trial into 200 ms bins, where each bin was one step
in the evidence accumulation process assumed by aDDM. The fixated item in
a bin was sampled probabilistically, based on the proportion of time spent on
fixating on a given item in each bin. For example, if in one bin, 50 ms was
spent on fixating on item 1, and 150 ms was spent on fixating on item 2, then in
the simulations item 1 had a 25%, while item 2 had a 75% probability of being
chosen as the fixated item in that bin.
When fitting the aDDM for each value transformation rule, we used the
transformed ratings in place of r described in Equations 2.1–2.3 in section 2.2.
However, the unintentionally wide variety of value triplets displayed in Experi-
ment 1 posed a question about how to derive the range transformed values in case
there were two or three identical values in the choice set (it is straightforward
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in the case of the two maximum rules and the rank rule). We decided to code
the transformed range values as 1 if all values were identical. If there were two
equal values in a triplet, they were either coded as 1 or 0 (depending on whether
the third value was lower or higher than the two identical ones, respectively).
2.7.1 Simulation-based method
To summarise the main novel aspects of our simulation approach, we model
individual trials from individual participants (as opposed to deriving group-level
parameter estimates), and use the eye movements specific to the very trial we are
modelling (as opposed to randomly drawing it from the distribution of fixations
from all trials). In addition, we find the best fitting parameter estimates through
an optimization process, where the probability estimates are based on 100,000
simulations of each trial.
To obtain the relevant parameter sets for each participant and value trans-
formation rule, we first simulated out each trial, and calculated the probability
that the eventually chosen item was selected in the correct time bin. Note that
there are two sources of variation in these simulations: the inherent noise in
the accumulation process (captured by σ), and the non-deterministic fixation
pattern arising from the transformation of the fixation data into time bins.
To find the best fitting parameter sets, we started off with a grid search
with the following values: θ = {0.2, 0.45, 0.6, 0.85, 1}, σ = {0.1, 0.14, 0.2, 0.28, 0.4},
d = {0.1, 0.17, 0.31, 0.56, 1}, 125 parameter sets overall, for each participant and
value transformation rule. These parameter values were chosen after an iterative
process, ensuring that most participants’ best fitting values fell in the middle of
the range of the possible grid values. This was done to ensure that the algorithm
does not have to move considerable lengths in the parameter space to find the
best fitting parameter set in the subsequent optimization process.
Upon obtaining the best fitting parameter set from the grid, we started a
Nelder-Mead optimization algorithm with a maximum iteration number of 200,
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using the resulting parameter set from the grid search as starting points for
each participant and value transformation rule. The same process was repeated
once more using the results from the first Nelder-Mead optimization process as
a starting point, to increase the probability that we find the parameter set that
results in the highest log-likelihood of producing the data.
However, there is a methodological difficulty arising from the stochastic
nature of the aDDM. Due to the inherent noise in the process, two runs of
simulations of the same trial with the same parameter values naturally gives
slightly different results. This is problematic if the estimated probability of the
trial is generally low (near zero), as it can happen that in one simulation run, the
estimated probability is a positive number, while in the next one it is zero. When
taking the logarithm of all trial probabilities and summing them up, having just
one trial with a zero probability results in a log-likelihood value of minus infinity.
At the next simulation attempt, it is possible that the estimated probability
for the same trial will be positive this time, and depending on the estimated
probability of the rest of the trials, this can in turn result in a relatively high
overall log-likelihood value. Such dramatic changes in the log-likelihood values
can easily lead to the Nelder-Mead process getting stuck at a given point in the
parameter space.
This is because the Nelder-Mead optimization method was initially de-
veloped for deterministic models, and it has been demonstrated that substantial
noise in the underlying model can lead to false convergence (e.g., Chang, 2012;
Barton & Ivey, 1996). While running the second Nelder-Mead did not lead
to substantially different parameter estimates for most participants and value
transformation rules, we still wanted to alleviate concerns about the validity of
the simulations method, and decided to compare the results from the simulations
approach with those obtained from an alternative, deterministic implementation
of the aDDM.
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2.7.2 Probability distribution method
To circumvent the problem arising from the stochastic nature of the aDDM, we
utilised an alternative estimation method that is free of stochasticity. Rather
than deriving the probability of the data through noisy simulation, we calculate
it directly, by using a numerical evidence integration technique. This approach
removes the problem of variable log-likelihood values, thus making the parameter
search much easier.
In short, our approach was to derive the probability distribution of the
accumulation process over the relative evidence states (E1 − E2 and E1 − E3
from Equations 2.1–2.3 in section 2.2, with left, centre, right changed to 1, 2,
3, respectively), for each time bin and parameter combination. This method
allowed us to directly calculate the exact choice probability for each trial in
our data. Our approach is conceptually equivalent to that used by Diederich
and Busemeyer (2003), who approximated the diffusion process using Markov
Chain Theory, and derived the transition probabilities between different evidence
states. However, we apply this method to a more complex setting than described
in Diederich and Busemeyer (2003), in that implementing the aDDM entails
a trinary choice case, with variable drift rates within a trial (stemming from
changes in attention).
We chose to base our calculations on a “best versus average of other two”
termination rule:
V 1t = E1t −
E2t + E3t
2 (2.11)
V 2t = E2t −
E1t + E3t
2 (2.12)




as opposed to the original “best versus next best” formulation seen in
Equations 2.4–2.6 in section 2.2. However, we did not expect this modification to
have a dramatic effect on our results, since previous research had shown that the
two rules yield very similar predictions (Krajbich & Rangel, 2011). The reason
why we preferred the “best versus average of other two” rule over the “best versus
next best” rule is because it results in a bounded area of the finished evidence
states (corresponding to combinations of E1, E2 and E3, where the threshold
had been reached, and one of the options had been chosen), defined in terms of
the two relative evidence states (E1 − E2 and E1 − E3). This is illustrated by
Figure 2.6.
Figure 2.6: Finished evidence states with Average of other two and Next best termination
rules.
As mentioned, we wished to calculate the probability distribution of the
accumulation process over the relative evidence states E1 − E2 and E1 − E3
(each of which is represented by a dot on Figure 2.6), for a given parameter set
and time step. Assuming that each step in the process can be described by a
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two-dimensional vector with components
x = E1 − E2 = d(θtr1 − θtr2) + (ε1t − ε2t )
y = E1 − E3 = d(θtr1 − θtr3) + (ε1t − ε3t ),
(2.14)






This covariance matrix is not diagonal, because the axes are correlated
(due to the shared component ε1t in the equations defining the relative evidence
states), which, when modelling the process, results in an ellipse whose axes are
not parallel to the coordinate axes (see the left panel on Figure 2.7). To elimi-
nate the correlation between the axes, we can place them at a more convenient
position, by rotating both counterclockwise until the ellipse axes are parallel to
the coordinate axes (as demonstrated in the right panel of Figure 2.7).
Figure 2.7: Demonstration of the correlation problem. The left panel shows the original axes,
and the right panel shows the rotated axes with no correlation.
In this rotated coordinate system, the probability distribution over the
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relative evidence states can be characterised by a bivariate normal distribution of
two independent variables, allowing us to substantially simplify the subsequent
calculations by relying on the normality of the joint distribution of the two
relative evidence states. The rotated axes, x′ and y′ can be characterised (Anton
& Rorres, 2014) as
x′ = xcos(α)− ysin(α)
y′ = xsin(α) + ycos(α).
(2.16)
In Figure 2.7, the angle of rotation is α = 45◦. Expressed in terms of our
original relative evidence states, this 45◦ degree anti-clockwise rotation means
that the new axes can be defined as
x′ = E1 −
E2 + E3
2
y′ = E2 − E32 .
(2.17)
As the right panel in Figure 2.7 demonstrates, this results in an ellipse
whose axes are now parallel to the coordinate axes. In this transformed coordi-
nate system, we can characterise the decision process as a multivariate normal
distribution, whose movement along the relative evidence bins is governed by
the model parameters. To save computation time, the possible evidence states
were approximated by bins (the x evidence space spanned from -2.5 to 1.5 with
spacing 0.1 in 41 bins, whereas the y evidence space spanned from -1.5 to 1.5
with spacing 0.1 in 31 bins, resulting in 31 ·41 = 1271 bins overall). Our aim was
to calculate the probability distribution of the diffusion process over this grid for
each time period in the decision process, which allowed us to directly derive the
probability that an item is chosen at any given time point, by summing up the
probability mass over the evidence bins in which the item was chosen (see the
finished evidence states in Figure 2.6).
Figure 2.8 illustrates the diffusion process. On each trial, at time step 0,
the process starts from the central bin defined by x = 0 and y = 0, with proba-
bility density 1, corresponding to no evidence for any of the three alternatives.
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As shown in the upper panel of Figure 2.8, at each subsequent time step, we can
model the movement and diffusion of this probability mass over our evidence
grid. In this example, in the first two time steps, Alternative 1 is fixated, and
thus the overall probability mass starts moving towards the east (approaching
the relative evidence bins that correspond to Alternative 1 being chosen). The
movement of the probability mass throughout the choice process is governed by
the model parameters. At each time step, we can derive the choice probability
that either of alternatives are chosen by summing up the probability over the
relevant evidence states. The corresponding choice probabilities are depicted in
the lower panel of Figure 2.8. Below we explain in more technical detail how the
choice probabilities were derived.
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Figure 2.8: Illustration of the diffusion process over 7 time steps with attention pattern
1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3; σ = 0.3; θ = 0.67; d = 1, r = 0.5, 0.5, 0.5
Time step 4 Time step 5 Time step 6 Time step 7
Time step 0 Time step 1 Time step 2 Time step 3































From a computational perspective, we derive these probabilities with the
help of a transition matrix. In each time period, we calculate the probability
distribution over the grid by multiplying the previous time period’s probabil-
ity mass with our transition matrix. This matrix reflects the dynamics of the
diffusion process, and along with the drift rate, determine the resulting choice
probabilities at each time step.
The transition matrix characterizes the diffusion of the probability density
with σ as the only input to a bivariate normal distribution with mean µx = 0
and µy = 0. Specifically, this is done by taking each of the 1271 bins in the
grid as the centre of a bivariate normal distribution with standard deviation σ,
and calculating the exact probability mass moving from one bin into each of
the other 1271 bins in the grid. Calculating this probability vector for all our
bins in the grid gives us a 1271 · 1271 transition matrix, where each entry is
the transition probability from one bin to another. Starting with a probability
mass entirely concentrated in the bin defined as x = 0 and y = 0 at time step
0 (corresponding to no evidence for any of the alternatives), we can recursively
multiply the resulting probability mass in each time step with this transition
matrix. In absence of the second component, this process leads to a diffusion of
the probability density around our starting point x = 0 and y = 0, corresponding
to a diffusion process with no drift rate (also called a random walk process).
The drift rate is defined by parameters θ, r and d (described in Equations
2.1–2.3 in Section 2.2), and it governs the direction of the movement of the
probability mass. This drift rate can be incorporated in the transition matrix by
shifting the mean of the bivariate normal distributions. Because the drift rate
varies depending on the attention pattern (through θ), three transition matrices
can be constructed, depending on which item is fixated. Taken together, through
the model parameters, the transition matrix and the drift rate determine the
movement of the bivariate distribution in our grid.
As explained above, we can then derive the probability of choosing either
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of the options in at any given time period by summing up the probability mass
entering the bins corresponding to the option’s finished evidence states in that
time step. Before moving to the next time period, all the probability mass over
the finished evidence states are set to 0, allowing us to derive the probability
that an option is chosen exactly in the next time period. To ensure that this
estimation method is completely free of stochasticity, we used a deterministic
fixation pattern, based on which item was fixated first in each 200 ms bin.
Once we were able to calculate the choice probabilities using this method,
we again started off with a grid search to find the best fitting parameters for
each participant and subjective value transformation rule. We used the following
parameter grid: θ = {0.33, 0.67, 1}, σ = {0.1, 0.55, 1}, d={0.1, 0.55, 1} in running
the Nelder-Mead optimization algorithm. We used a smaller grid, because there
is no stochasticity in this method, but it is also computationally more intensive
to calculate (calculating the log-likelihood for one participant takes 13 times
longer compared to the simulation approach). For the same reason, we only
ran the Nelder-Mead process once more after the grid search, with a maximum
iteration number of 100.
2.7.3 Results
For both empirical methods (simulations and probability distribution approach),
the model fitting process resulted in 200 log-likelihoods, one for each value trans-
formation rule–participant pair. We wished to determine which value transfor-
mation rule produces the highest log-likelihood for each participant and esti-
mation method. For each participant, the four subjective value variants of the
aDDM have the same number of parameters, and are calculated on the same set
of data, therefore the log-likelihoods are directly comparable. Table 2.2 shows
the distribution of participants based on their respective best fitting value trans-
formation rules, demonstrating that the two estimation approaches have yielded
very similar results.
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Table 2.2: Best fitting value transformation rule for each participant by estimation method.
Approach Global Max Local Max Rank Range
Simulations 29 (58%) 11 (22%) 4 (8%) 6 (12%)
Probability Distribution 28 (56%) 9 (18%) 8 (16%) 5 (10%)
For the majority of participants (56–58%), the global maximum rule pro-
vided the best fit, regardless of the estimation approach. This is followed by the
local maximum rule, which provided the best fit for 18–22% of the participants.
The range rule proved to be the best fitting model for only about 10–12% of
participants. Interestingly, when using the probability distribution approach,
the rank rule provided the best fit for 16% of participants, whereas the same
number for the simulations approach is only 8%.
Table 2.3 shows the median estimated parameter values by value trans-
formation rule and estimation method. The parameter estimates do not vary
considerably across value transformation rules or estimation methods. For the
list of best fitting parameter values for each participant by value transformation
rule and estimation method, see Appendices A.1–A.2.




θ σ d θ σ d
Global Max 0.68 0.2 0.31 0.7 0.19 0.29
Local Max 0.67 0.2 0.25 0.68 0.19 0.24
Range 0.54 0.2 0.15 0.56 0.2 0.14
Rank 0.51 0.21 0.16 0.53 0.2 0.14
Overall, these results point to a cognitive mechanism where subjective
valuation largely depends on the absolute value of the options. The almost
identical results from the two estimation approaches underline the robustness
of the findings, and alleviates concerns about the reliability of the simulations
method. However, it can be argued that the preference ratings participants
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gave in the rating task are already context-dependent, since the movies are
inevitably evaluated with respect to each other. If this was the case, it would
bias our findings, which is why we decided to investigate the same question with
a perceptual version of Experiment 1.
2.8 Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we still relied on the choice set manipulations to test the ex-
planatory power of the four value transformation rules, but we used an alterna-
tive empirical approach and different stimuli domain. We assessed the explana-
tory power of the four value transformation rules by their ability to qualitatively
predict how the choice set manipulations affect the choice proportions, using
choice proportion data from Experiment 1 and a perceptual version of the same
task (Experiment 2).
Experiment 2 had several rationales. First and foremost, we wished to
alleviate concerns about the internal validity of the experimental design used
in Experiment 1. Second, comparing the results from a further comparison of
choice probabilities with the results from a model fitting approach allows us
to gain a deeper understanding of the relative explanatory power of each value
transformation rule. While we have some choice data on the seven relevant
choice sets from Experiment 1, due to the error in the experimental procedure,
it is not enough to conduct a test with appropriate statistical power. Finally,
since the movie stimuli are somewhat complex in the sense that there are a range
of factors we could not control for (e.g. visual saliency, mnemonic processes the
stimuli can induce), repeating the experiment with simpler and more neutral
stimuli will inform us about the validity and generalisability of our results.
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Figure 2.9: Example trial from Experiment 2.
2.8.1 Method
We recruited 130 participants through the University of Warwick’s Research
Participation System. On each trial, participants were presented with a trinary
set of rapidly changing sequences of numbers (taken from Tsetsos et al., 2012)
and were asked to choose the sequence with the highest average of numbers by
pressing the corresponding keyboard key (left, down, right arrow). The numbers
were updated every 210–250 ms. To familiarise participants with the task, the
experiment began with three practice trials, where feedback was given on which
sequence they chose. After the practice trials, there were 140 trials to be com-
pleted in two blocks (20 trials per choice set). Participants could take a break
for as long as they wished between the two blocks, and they were paid £5.00 for
taking part in the experiment. Figure 2.9 shows one trial from this experiment.
The experiment on average took about 15 minutes to complete. Ethical approval
was obtained from the Department of Psychology, University of Warwick.
2.8.2 Stimuli
Numbers for each presented sequence were derived from a truncated normal
distribution with σ = 18, and a mean that was calculated from a monotonic
transformation of the ratings from Experiment 1. Specifically, we multiplied
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each number by ten, and further added ten to them. For example, a trial with
values 1,2,4 in Experiment 1 corresponded to a trial with means 20, 30, 50 in
Experiment 2. The distribution was truncated to only include numbers between
0 and 99. We chose to work with the two-digit equivalents of the values from
Experiment 1 to increase the range of numbers that could be sampled, and the
constant was added to shift the lower end of the value distributions away from 0.
When a number below 10 was sampled, it was displayed as a two-digit number
with 0 as the first digit to prevent any differences in saliency between one- and
two-digit numbers.
2.8.3 Results
To conduct a further test of the explanatory power of the four value transfor-
mation rules, we compared the empirical choice proportions (from Experiment
1 and 2) with the choice set manipulation predictions of each value transforma-
tion rule. The choice proportion predictions for each value transformation rule
were derived from simulating out each trial 10,000 times in the DDM framework.
These simulations focused only on the eventually chosen item, and did not take
reaction times into account.
In the DDM, there are two parameters, σ, the noise, and d, the speed
of integration. While our main interest, the qualitative patterns of predicted
choice proportions are largely insensitive to the exact parameter values, we still
needed to determine the exact parameter values to use for generating predictions
for each value transformation rule. To derive these (group-level) parameter sets,
we again used a Nelder-Mead optimization algorithm minimising the squared
difference between the simulated and empirical choice proportions for each value
transformation rule. The empirical choice proportions were based on the results
from Experiment 2 as opposed to Experiment 1, due to the much larger sample
size for the relevant choice sets. We ran the optimization algorithm with a
maximum iteration number of 100 three times, first with starting parameters
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σ = 0.1, d = 0.1, and then using the resulting parameters from the first and
second run as starting parameters for the second and third optimization process,
respectively. Table 2.4 shows the best fitting parameter pairs for each value
transformation rule.
Table 2.4: Best fitting group-level parameter values from the grid search for each value
transformation rule.
σ d
Global Max 0.12 0.08
Local Max 0.17 0.07
Range 0.13 0.07
Rank 0.15 0.05
Figures 2.10–2.13 show the predictions for each rule and the associated
empirical choice proportions from both experiments. In these figures, the four
panels to the left correspond to the choice proportion predictions from the DDM
simulations, while the two panels on the right show the resulting choice pro-
portions from the two experiments and their associated 95% CIs. All model
predictions are based on 100,000 simulations. The difference in the precision of
the estimates from the two experiments reflects the difference in the amount of
choice data available for the relevant choice sets.
Adding a constant. Figure 2.10 shows the effect of adding a constant.
As described in section 2.5, the local maximum rule predicts that this value ma-
nipulation results in the best option becoming relatively less attractive compared
to the other two, whereas none of the other three value transformation rules pre-
dict any change in the choice proportions. Unfortunately, the wide confidence
intervals around the choice proportions from Experiment 1 do not allow us to
see any clear patterns, but the results from Experiment 2 are broadly in line
with the predictions from the local maximum rule (albeit the changes are less
pronounced than predicted). In summary, the results from adding a constant
lend partial support to the local maximum rule, as no other value transformation
rule predicts the correct qualitative pattern.
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Multiplying by a constant. Figure 2.11 shows the effect of multiply-
ing each value by a constant. The global maximum rule predicts that this value
manipulation results in the best option becoming relatively more attractive com-
pared to the other two, whereas none of the other three value transformation
rules predict any change in the choice proportions. The results from both ex-
periments are in line with the prediction that the best option will increase its
choice proportion share at the expense of the other two, strongly supporting the
global maximum rule.
Distant versus close second. Figure 2.12 shows the results from the
close versus distant second choice set manipulation. Only the rank rule does not
predict any change in the choice proportions, while the other three rules predict
that the middle option becomes relatively more attractive. Results from both
experiments support the latter prediction. Therefore, results from the distant
versus close second choice manipulation provides strong evidence against the
rank value transformation rule.































































Distant versus close third. Finally, Figure 2.13 shows the results from
the close versus distant third choice set manipulation. The predictions of the
value transformation rules differ significantly, the two maximum rules predicting
that the worst option will benefit at the expense of the other two (albeit the
extent of this change slightly differs between the two rules), and the range rule
predicting that both the worst and best options will steal from the middle item’s
share. The rank rule does not predict any change. While the results from
Experiment 2 unequivocally support the predictions of the two maximum rules,
the results form Experiment 1 are more mixed (although we can detect a clear
decrease in the choice proportion of the middle item). Therefore, results from the
close versus distant third choice manipulation offer support for the two maximum
rules.






























































To summarize, the results from these qualitative comparisons suggest
that the two maximum normalisation rules had the highest explanatory power.
More specifically, albeit to varying degrees, both maximum rules predicted the
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effect of three out of the four choice set manipulations, the range rule successfully
predicted one, and the rank rule did not predict the effect of any of the choice
set manipulations.
These results can be contrasted with the results from the model fitting
approach, which indicated that the global maximum rule has the highest ex-
planatory power by far. In line with this, multiplication by a constant, which
was only correctly predicted by the global maximum rule, resulted in the largest
difference between choice proportions in Experiment 1. However, it is also clear
from the results of the qualitative comparison that the global maximum rule
cannot alone explain choice behaviour.
In addition, interestingly, even though the two experiments involved fun-
damentally different stimuli (complex versus perceptual), the effects of the choice
set manipulations on the choice proportions turned out to be rather similar. Un-
fortunately, a strict comparison of the two datasets is hindered by the relatively
small sample size of Experiment 1. Nevertheless, the results lend some support




In this research project, our aim was to conduct a comprehensive evaluation
of the relative explanatory power of four different forms subjective valuation.
To compare four value transformation rules, each of which captures a different
subjective valuation mechanism, we used a popular cognitive model, the DDM
and its extension, the aDDM, to derive predictions about choice behaviour in
two choice experiments with trinary choice sets, one with complex stimuli (movie
posters), and another one with a perceptual task (rapidly updating sequences of
numbers).
We tested the relative explanatory power of these value transformation
rules in three separate tests. In the first two tests, we used a model fitting ap-
proach (based on simulations in the first test, and approximated choice probabil-
ities in the second test), using choice and eye-tracking data from Experiment 1.
The results showed that the global maximum rule was the best fitting subjective
transformation rule for the majority of participants, followed by the local maxi-
mum rule. In addition, the results from the two tests were remarkably similar,
alleviating concerns about employing a simulations-based estimation approach
in the context of a stochastic model.
In the third test, we compared the qualitative patterns of choice propor-
tions using data from Experiment 2 and 1. The results from the two comparison
methods were broadly in line, both supporting the view that while subjective
valuation mostly reflects the absolute magnitude of the options under consider-
ation, to a lesser extent, it is also affected by the relative value of the options
(within the local context).
These findings are consistent with insights from research investigating the
neural correlates of value-based decision making. Results from numerous neuroe-
conomic studies strongly support the view that the orbifrontal cortex (OFC) is
the brain region where subjective value encoding takes place in economic choices
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(for a review see Padoa-Schioppa & Conen, 2017). More importantly, it has been
suggested that there is a group of neurons in the OFC with two fundamental
properties that are likely to be directly responsible for simultaneous absolute
and relative value sensitivity in economic valuation.
For example, Padoa-Schioppa and Assad (2008) have shown that such
neurons exhibit menu invariance, meaning that the value assigned to each option
under consideration is independent from the value of the rest of the available
alternatives, reflecting the absolute value of the option (global maximum in our
experiments). Menu invariance gives rise to preference transitivity, ensuring that
preferences are stable across the wide range of contexts the decision maker might
encounter. In addition, there is ample evidence that neuronal firing rates adapt
to the range of available values (e.g., Padoa-Schioppa, 2009; Louie et al., 2013).
Such adaptation is widespread in sensory systems, and is a natural consequence
of biophysical constraints. Interestingly, although the most commonly proposed
form of adaptation in the neuroeconomic literature is range adaptation (e.g.,
Soltani et al., 2012), our data suggests that normalising by the maximum on
the current trials fares better than a range normalisation approach at predicting
choice.
There exist other ways to model context sensitivity within the sequential
sampling framework. Another approach to investigate context dependency could
have been to directly model changes in the drift rate. This could be done within
an experiment where the range of values encountered are manipulated block by
block (e.g., as done in Mullett & Tunney, 2013), and the model fitting approach
can evaluate the explanatory power of various forms of context dependency.
In addition, we could have investigated mixtures of models, for example,
a hybrid model, where the subjective value is partly affected by the absolute
value and partly affected by the local maximum transformation. Such investi-
gations would have required estimation an additional, mixing parameter, which
determines the degree to which each rule affects the subjective value.
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Alternatively, instead of changing the input values of the accumulation
equation, we could have focused on how these values are integrated and incor-
porated into the accumulation process (described in Equations 2.4–2.6). This
is what Teodorescu, Moran, and Usher (2016) did in a somewhat similar in-
vestigation to ours. Specifically, they contrasted relative and absolute evidence
processing in a sequential sampling framework by comparing an independent
race model (capturing absolute value processing, where the input is the abso-
lute value of the options), with a DDM model (where differences of input values
govern the accumulation process).
In their experiment, participants were instructed to choose the brighter
out of two, fluctuating grey patches, with a fixed mean brightness. They focused
on two manipulations: in an additive-boost condition, they added the same con-
stant to both means, preserving the difference between the two mean brightness,
whereas in the multiplicative-boost condition, they multiplied both means by
the same constant, preserving the ratio of the two means. These conditions are
direct equivalents to our add a constant, and multiply by a constant choice set
manipulations.
Interestingly, they found that no “pure” (either entirely absolute or rela-
tive) accumulation model could account for the data, and thus they propose two
distinct types of models that can account for this pattern: a DDM model where
the noise in the process is a function of the intensity of the inputs, and a leaky
competing accumulator model (LCA; Usher & McClelland, 2001), where simul-
taneous absolute and relative value sensitivity is a result of lateral inhibition.
While our approach is different from that of Teodorescu et al. (2016), our
results are similar, as they both suggest that subjective valuation is sensitive to
both the absolute and relative magnitudes of objective values. This dovetails
with findings from neuroeconomic research that suggests that OFC neurons ex-
hibit both menu invariance and range adaptation. Taken together, these results
point to a sequential sampling model with some form of hybrid value transfor-
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mation rule. As an ever increasing amount of research focuses on understanding
the neural basis of economic decision making, insights from this field will no
doubt inform and greatly advance the explanatory power of cognitive models of
choice in the future.
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Chapter 3




3.1.1 The attraction effect
Suppose you are looking to book a hotel for a weekend city break. You first
encounter two hotel options: Hotel A with an excellent central location for £140,
and Hotel B with a much less central location for £100. At this point, you are
not quite sure whether the better location of Hotel A is worth the extra money.
Then you notice that there is a third option, Hotel C, with a slightly less central
location than Hotel A, for £165. Which one would you choose?
A large body of decision-making research suggests that the presence of
Hotel C will make it more likely that you will go for Hotel A. Figure 3.1 illustrates
this choice situation, placing the three hotels in a price-by-location attribute
space. This phenomenon is called the attraction effect (also known as decoy
effect or asymmetric dominance effect), and it has been researched extensively
since the first time it was demonstrated by Huber, Payne, and Puto (1982).
Figure 3.1: The attraction effect: Hotels A, B and C differ on price and location. Assuming
that the decision maker is indifferent between Hotels A and B, the introduction of Hotel C

















This effect poses a challenge to all choice models that rely on the as-
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sumption that preferences can be represented on a cardinal scale in the form of
utilities (this is also called simple scalability, one of the consequences of Luce’s
Choice Axiom; Luce, 1959). Such models must satisfy two axioms. The first
is called order independence (its stricter version is known as independence from
irrelevant alternatives), which requires that the preference ranking of two op-
tions should not be affected by adding new options to the choice set. The second
axiom is called regularity, and it states that by extending the choice set, an
option’s choice probability cannot increase (Luce, 1977; Tversky, 1972).
The attraction effect clearly violates these axioms, as it shows that the
addition on an inferior decoy option increases the preference for the target over
the competitor. This means that the preference for one option cannot be rep-
resented by a single internal magnitude that is invariant to the other options’
value in the choice set. In fact, the presence of the effect supports a choice
model where the preference for a choice option is strongly affected by the range
of available options through the comparison process.
The attraction effect has been studied extensively over the past few
decades using various experimental populations and conditions, as well as stimuli
types. This research had shown that compared to young adults, older adults are
less susceptible to this decision bias (Kim & Hasher, 2005), and that children as
young as 5-year-olds already exhibit this effect (Zhen & Yu, 2016).
Several studies have investigated whether such choice biases are also
present in animal decision making. This line of research is very important as
it has the potential to deliver valuable insights into the evolutionary origins of
the attraction effect and related choice biases, informing attempts to model hu-
man decision making. Unfortunately, results from this area so far seem fairly
inconclusive. While decoy effects have been observed in various animals from
brainless amoebas (Latty & Beekman, 2011), to honeybees, grey jays (Shafir,
Waite, & Smith, 2002) and rhesus macaques (Parrish, Evans, & Beran, 2015), a
similar number of studies report conflicting results (in rhesus macaques, Parrish,
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Afrifa, & Beran, 2018; capuchin monkeys, Cohen & Santos, 2017; ant colonies,
Edwards & Pratt, 2009; and hummingbirds, Bateson, Healy, & Hurly, 2002).
It is possible that there is no single, coherent explanatory framework that
could accommodate these results, as the aforementioned studies have utilized a
wide range of experimental tasks and used very different subject populations,
thus they might only be superficially similar. In any case, these inconclusive
results highlight the attraction effect’s sensitivity to the experimental task and
population, and stresses the importance of exploring the boundary conditions of
the effect.
In humans, the strength of the effect has been probed under various ex-
perimental conditions. Research in this area showed that the attraction effect
is more pronounced under time pressure (Pettibone, 2012), and less pronounced
with undesirable choice options (Malkoc, Hedgcock, & Hoeffler, 2013), and feed-
back after choice (Ahn, Kim, & Ha, 2015). Mao and Oppewal (2012) found that
the strength of the effect is also influenced by individual differences: in their ex-
periment, participants who relied more on intuitive reasoning showed a stronger
attraction effect.
The role of individual heterogeneity has also been the focus of recent
research that attempted to accommodate the three most well-known decision
biases (the attraction, similarity, and compromise effect, also known as the Big
Three) in a single modelling framework. Previous investigations have found that
while the size of the attraction and compromise effect are positively correlated,
both are negatively correlated with the size of the similarity effect (Liew, Howe, &
Little, 2016; Berkowitsch, Scheibehenne, & Rieskamp, 2014). A recent study by
Cataldo and Cohen (2018) offers a simple, plausible explanation for this finding.
In this study, they manipulated the presentation format of the choice
options (such that the presentation format facilitated either an alternative-wise
or an attribute-wise comparison process), and found that the attraction and
compromise effects were stronger in the condition where participants were en-
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couraged to use an attribute-wise comparison process, whereas the similarity
effect was stronger in the alternative-wise condition. This finding suggests that
any modelling attempt that aims to offer an explanation for all three decision bi-
ases must take into account how individual heterogeneity affects the comparison
strategy.
Several explanations have been put forward to explain the attraction
effect. Simonson (1989) proposed that the decoy makes it easier to justify the
subsequent choice of the target. Huber et al. suggested that the presence of the
decoy changes the reference level against which the target and the competitor are
evaluated, making the target seem relatively more attractive. With the added
assumption of loss aversion, prospect theory also relies on reference dependence
to explain the attraction effect (Sivakumar, 2016). Another explanation that had
been proposed is trade-off aversion (e.g., Hedgcock & Rao, 2009). According to
this theory, the attraction effect stems from the decision maker’s inherent desire
to avoid negative emotion. This is because the presence of the decoy reduces the
cognitive cost and any potential negative affect generated during the evaluation
and subsequent comparison of two distinctly different choice options.
The latest modelling efforts aiming to explain the attraction effect almost
exclusively focused on sequential sampling models of choice. The attentional
drift diffusion model (aDDM) described in Chapter 2 is one such model. As
mentioned, these models view the choice as a series of noisy evidence accumula-
tion steps in favour of each choice option, where the option that first reaches a
given threshold will be chosen. Prominent examples of these kind of models are
multi-alternative decision field theory (MDFT; Roe, Busemeyer, & Townsend,
2001), multi-attribute decision by sampling (MDbS; Noguchi & Stewart, 2014),
the leaky competing accumulator model (LCA; Usher & McClelland, 2004), the
multi-attribute linear ballistic accumulator model (MLBA; Trueblood, Brown, &
Heathcote, 2014), and the associative accumulation model (AAM; Bhatia, 2013).
These sequential sampling models became very popular in decision mak-
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ing research as they can explain the attraction effect along with other well-
documented decision biases in a single modelling framework. While the models
listed above share the same underlying principle, they rely on different mecha-
nisms to produce the attraction effect. Specifically, the MDFT sees the attraction
effect as a result of the inhibitory links between alternatives, the LCA relies on
loss aversion and inhibition, the MDbS assumes that the presence of the decoy
changes the distribution of the evidence samples, the MLBA uses the assump-
tion of attention weights that are inversely proportional to the discriminability
of two options, while the AAM produces the attraction effect through the in-
creased accessibility of the attribute dimension on which the target option is the
strongest.
Considerable research has focused on the neural mechanism underlying
the attraction effect. These studies have typically used fMRI to measure neural
activity during choice, and showed that neural activation in certain brain regions
depends on the relative value of the option under consideration in the current
choice context (e.g., Mohr, Heekeren, & Rieskamp, 2017; Chung et al., 2017;
Gluth, Hotaling, & Rieskamp, 2017). These studies also lend support to mod-
els that utilize a sequential sampling principle, as neural activity during choice
in brain regions that are involved in decision making (specifically, in certain
prefrontal and parietal cortical areas) often resemble an accumulation process
(Busemeyer, Gluth, Rieskamp, & Turner, 2019). Most importantly, results from
studies using neural recordings support the view that value is constructed and
therefore is intrinsically dependent on the choice context.
3.1.2 The real-world relevance of the attraction effect
The real-world relevance of the attraction effect has recently become a con-
tentious issue in the decision-making literature. While the effect has previ-
ously been demonstrated over several choice domains (e.g., consumer products,
Doyle, O’Connor, Reynolds, & Bottomley, 1999; medical decisions, Schwartz &
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Chapman, 1999; mate choice, Sedikides, Ariely, & Olsen, 1999; hiring decisions,
Highhouse, 1996; political choice, Sue O’Curry & Pitts, 1995; work-family bene-
fits, Reb, Li, & Bagger, 2018; intertemporal choice, Gluth et al., 2017; perceptual
decisions, Trueblood, Brown, Heathcote, & Busemeyer, 2013), some claim that
the attraction effect is much less prevalent in natural contexts than previously
thought.
In their study, Frederick, Lee, and Baskin (2014) present a thorough
investigation of the boundary conditions of the attraction effect based on 38 ex-
periments with various stimuli types. These stimuli types include choice options
with numerically represented attributes as well as complex, real-world stimuli
(e.g., fruits, bottled water, apartments, etc.), and in some of these experiments
participants could even sample the choice options (e.g. squash, mints, popcorn).
The overall conclusion of this study is that while the presence of the decoy
seems to affect decisions when the option attributes are represented numerically,
it is absent in experiments with more complex, naturalistic stimuli. In light of
these results, Frederick et al. posited that the psychological processes under-
lying decisions that involve options with numeric attributes are fundamentally
different from those employed in decisions where the stimuli has a naturalistic
representation. This conclusion was also supported by Yang and Lynn (2014),
who reported difficulties replicating the attraction effect when the stimuli were
pictorial, as opposed to when attributes were presented numerically.
These two studies sparked considerable interest amongst decision making
researchers, and led to the re-examination of the boundary conditions of the at-
traction effect. Huber, Payne, and Puto (2014) discussed five critical conditions
that can inhibit the attraction effect, and argued that many of these are present
in the experiments reported by Frederick et al. and Yang and Lynn, which can
explain their failure to observe the effect. These are the following: (1) strong
prior preferences over the target and competitor, (2) inability to identify the in-
feriority of the decoy, (3) heterogeneity in prior preferences over the target and
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competitor, (4) an undesirable decoy, and (5) a too desirable decoy. Simonson
(2014) further stressed the importance of the detection of the dominance rela-
tionship in observing the attraction effect, and also pointed out several other
smaller, specific methodological shortcomings of the studies by Frederick et al.
and Yang and Lynn.
While these reactions have seemingly ended the debate, we believe that
the literature is still lacking a conclusive answer regarding the presence of the
attraction effect in choices with non-numeric option attribute presentations. A
rigorous investigation of this question would not only inform us about the real-
world relevance of the attraction effect, but would also shed light on the com-
monalities between the cognitive mechanisms underlying choices that involve
options with numeric and naturalistic attributes.
In light of the conflicting views about the importance of this effect, this
study is an attempt to replicate the attraction effect using naturalistic stimuli
with non-numeric attributes, whilst accounting for the major concerns raised
in connection with Frederick et al. and Yang and Lynn’s studies. Specifically,
our novel experimental design ensures that decision makers are indifferent be-
tween the target and competitor and that the inferiority of the decoy is clearly
identified. In addition, to increase the statistical power of our test, we used a
within-subjects design to identify the effect as well as both A, B, A’ and B, A,
B’ triplet pairs, where X’ is the dominated option (as suggested by Huber et al.,
2014).
3.1.3 Overview of Experiment 1 and 2
When selecting the type of naturalistic stimuli for testing the attraction effect,
our decision was guided by a few simple criteria we considered important for
creating target-decoy-competitor triplets. First, we needed stimuli that would
be at least of some interest to most people, or at least would be familiar to most
of our participants. Second, the stimuli needed to have multiple attributes, which
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can take a wide variety of values, as most real-world stimuli do. Third, we needed
to be able to establish the degree of similarity between pairs of items, which is
a non-trivial task in the case of naturalistic stimuli, due to the potentially high
number of dimensions and their incommensurability. In addition, we also needed
a large number of items to create enough triplets for a powerful within-subjects
design.
We decided to use movie posters as stimuli, as it satisfied most of our
criteria. Movies are an integral part of popular culture in Western societies,
thus we could reasonably expect that most participants will be familiar with
well-known movies. They also vary greatly by genre and topic, which offers us
a natural way to establish similarity between pairs of movies. In addition, even
if we only use reasonably well-known movies, we still have a vast pool of items
to create triplets from.
When choosing between naturalistic items such as movies, the decision
maker cannot rely on the numerical attributes of the choice options to establish
similarity and build a preference ordering (strictly speaking this is not true
in a non-experimental context, where people can always at least partly base
their decision on the numeric rating of the movie, but this information was not
available in our experiment). We expect mnemonic processes to have a very
important role in building preference representations of movie items, and while
this is inevitable if we are to use complex items that people are familiar with,
it can also be potentially problematic. Specifically, we do not exactly know how
the retrieval and preference construction process works and the extent to which
individual heterogeneity affects it.
However, regardless of how the preference representations are constructed,
we expect the comparison process to take place along a few salient attribute di-
mensions. These dimensions are likely to include the story themes, the genre
of the movie, and perhaps the actors and director. Therefore, it is possible to
establish a method to create movie pairs that are likely to be perceived different
66
or similar, using all available information on these movies.
In Experiment 1, we used two criteria to establish a measure of similarity
between our naturalistic stimuli items. First, we used latent semantic analysis on
the text associated with each movie (including various descriptions of the movie,
as well as the information on the actors and director). Section 3.1.4 provides
a brief overview of what latent semantic analysis entails. Second, we used the
overlap in genre categories that movies were assigned to on IMDb as a measure
of similarity.
We did not find any evidence for the attraction effect in Experiment 1, but
the results also indicated that the perceived similarity between the target and
decoy movies was often not strong enough to consider this as a valid test of the
attraction effect. Therefore, in Experiment 2, we relied on more detailed genre
information from allmovie.com, as well as similarity ratings from an independent
experiment to establish similarity. The target-decoy pairs were indeed perceived
as more similar in Experiment 2, but we still did not find any evidence for the
attraction effect. We speculate that this result arises from differences in the
cognitive processes underlying the evaluation of stimuli with numeric attributes
versus naturalistic objects.
3.1.4 Establishing complex object similarity: latent semantic
analysis
Latent semantic analysis (LSA; also known as latent semantic indexing) is a
statistical technique that was developed in the 1990s as a novel method for au-
tomatic indexing and retrieval of text documents (Deerwester, Dumais, Furnas,
Landauer, & Harshman, 1990). In LSA, each document in a set is considered as
a bag of words (a document here refers to a body of text). Thus the raw data
used by the LSA algorithm are huge document-by-word matrices, where entries
indicate the presence of a word in a document. Based on these matrices, the LSA
algorithm builds a specified number of “latent dimensions”, each of which can
67
be represented with a set of words that reflects a common underlying theme in
the documents. Then, similarity between any two documents can be established
based on the overlap in the latent dimensions that best characterise them. This
technique relies on singular value decomposition (SVD), a statistical tool that
uses dimensionality reduction to build a simpler, approximate representation of
a matrix (Leskovec, Rajaraman, & Ullman, 2014). This tool underlies many
real-world applications, from image compression to solving systems of linear
equations (e.g., Akritas & Malaschonok, 2004).
Enormous volumes of text data are being generated by users every day,
and there is an increasing need to understand the underlying patterns in these
texts. One of the most popular techniques used to achieve this is LSA. Ac-
cordingly, it has recently gained substantial popularity as a machine learning
technique that had been used in various “big data” contexts, from predicting
sales performance of movies from online reviews (Yu, Liu, Huang, & An, 2012)
to building recommendation systems (e.g. Wu, Wang, & Cheng, 2008), pre-
dicting political orientation from Twitter data (Conover, Gonçalves, Ratkiewicz,
Flammini, & Menczer, 2011), and detecting online bullying (Bigelow, Edwards,
& Edwards, 2016). Our research project largely builds on a study by Bhatia
and Stewart (2018), where they successfully used LSA to build multi-attribute
representations of choice options and predict subsequent choice behaviour.
To explain how the algorithm works in a nutshell, imagine that we have
a set of movies (these are the documents) with the corresponding user-generated
text that summarizes each movie. Then, we can create a term-document matrix,
where each row corresponds to a unique word found in these reviews, the columns
are the movies itself, and the cells represent the number of times each word has
appeared in a given movie description. We can call this matrix MTxD, where T
is the number of unique words that can be found in our corpus (the rows) and
D is the number of movies (the columns). Say we are interested in retrieving k
< min{T,D} underlying dimensions from these movie description texts, where k
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is a measure of the crudity of our simplified representation of these movies: the
higher it is, the more detailed our alternative representation of matrix M, but
the less efficient it is.
Then, by performing a SVD, we can decompose matrix M the following
way:
MT xD = UT xkΣkxkVkxD (3.1)
where UT xk is a matrix with the loading of each unique word on the un-
derlying k latent dimensions. To put it differently, it contains information about
the words that best describe the retrieved latent dimensions, giving interpretable
meaning to them. Similarly, VkxD contains the loading of each document on these
k latent dimensions. One can consider the VkxD matrix as giving the coordinates
of all of the movies in k-dimensional movie space, where UT xk defines each of
the dimensions. The k latent dimensions are always retrieved in their order of
importance, defined by the share of variance they can explain (thus increasing
the number of latent dimensions has a decreasing marginal return in terms of
variance explained). Having obtained these matrices, we are ready to 1) describe
each movie based on the latent dimensions it has the highest loading on and 2)
establish similarity between the movies based on their common topics. Section




As mentioned above, our aim was to select a rich set of movies as stimuli. To
this end, we collected data from www.imdb.com on the most popular (given by
the number of votes) 800 movies from each of the following genre categories:
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comedy, sci-fi, horror, romance, action, thriller, drama, mystery, crime, anima-
tion, adventure, fantasy; amounting to 9,600 movies overall. Since most movies
appear in multiple categories, if a movie in one category has already been re-
trieved as part of another category the code continued to the next movie (the
retrieval by category happened in the same order as they are listed above). The
information we retrieved for each movie were the following: poster image, title,
director, actors, number of votes, genre categories, plot keywords and summaries
of the movie. Keywords and summaries describe the plot of the movie and are
both generated by the users. We used both texts to establish semantic similarity
between the movies.
Before performing the LSA, the texts needed to be cleaned. This included
removing any text that was not written in English, removing numbers, stop
words, punctuation and duplicate words. In addition, we eliminated whitespace
from keyword expressions that consisted of multiple words, and thus were treated
as one word, to retain their meaning (e.g., expressions like “organized crime”).
If, after these transformations, there were no text left for a given movie, it was
excluded from the analysis. We had text data with 61,525 unique words for 9,272
movies.
The next step was to create a term-document matrix with each row as
a word and each movie as a column. We then used term frequency-inverse
document frequency weighting (also known as tf-idf) to measure the importance
of each word in each movie text. Assuming that there are i = 1...T rows (words)
and j = 1...D columns (movies), and ni,j is the number of times a word occurs







j=1 min{ni,j , 1}
)
(3.2)
In other words, for a given word and document, the weight is the product
of the 1) share of the word from all the words in that document multiplied with
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2) the logarithm of the overall number of documents divided by the number of
documents that contain the word.
The underlying principle of this weighting scheme is that the importance
of a term is inversely proportional to the number of documents it appears in.
For example, “murder” and “kamikaze” are both keywords used to describe the
plot of Pearl Harbor, but since “murder” appears in 3,336 movie descriptions,
whereas “kamikaze” only appears in 10, the latter is assumed to contain more
information about the movie, and therefore will be assigned a higher weight. We
performed the latent semantic analysis on this cleaned, weighted corpus.
3.2.1.2 Choice set selection
We decided to use a latent semantic solution with 20 latent dimensions, as we
found that this number gives us a sufficiently rich latent dimension space to
establish similarity between movies, while keeping computational complexity
at a reasonable level. Figure 3.2 shows the 10 first words with the highest
absolute loading on these 20 dimensions (this is part of the UT xk matrix from
Equation 3.1). Words that have an orange colour load positively on the given
dimension, while words in blue load negatively on them. This means that some
of the dimensions have a somewhat counterintuitive “reversed definition”, and
are described by words that are the least characteristic of them.
For example, the words that best describe latent dimension number 4 are
“slasher”, “maniac”, “homicidal maniac”, which all relate to a serial killer story,
so we would expect serial killer movies to load highly on this dimension, whereas
movies with no such theme (e.g., romantic comedies) to load negatively on this
dimension. Similarly, latent dimension number 5 has high negative loadings for
words that relate to interpersonal relationships, such as “marriage”, “romance”,
“married”, so we would expect romantic movies to load negatively on this dimen-
sion (as the dimension can be best described as “non-romantic”), whereas any
movie without such themes (e.g. animated superhero movies, zombie movies)
71
should load positively on this dimension.
Table 3.1 shows the ranking of the 20 latent dimensions for four selected
movies. The ranking is based on the absolute value of the movie’s loading on a
given dimension (this was derived from matrix VkxD from Equation 3.1), such
that the latent dimensions are listed in descending order of relevance for each
movie. Similarly to Figure 3.2, the colour code shows the direction of the asso-
ciation: the dimension number is coloured orange if the movie loads positively
on that given dimension, and blue if it loads negatively.
Based on the information presented in Figure 3.2 and Table 3.1, we can
now attempt to describe each of the four movies based on what the algorithm
tells us about them. Naturally, dimensions with positive loadings are more
helpful if one wishes to use the latent semantic solution to build a lower-level
representation of each movie. For example, assuming no prior knowledge about
these four movies, the latent semantic analysis solution tells us that Deadpool
is a superhero movie with adult themes (such as nudity and violence), Love
Actually is a movie set in the real world and is about romantic relationships,
Psycho features homicide and is set in the US countryside, while Wolf of Wall
Street is a movie that is set in the US with lots of adult scenes (mostly sexual,
but there is violence too) that features an investigation.
While even a human might find it hard to accurately describe a large,
diverse set of movies with only 20 “themes”, the algorithm seems to perform
surprisingly well in capturing the most important aspects of these movies, high-


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.1: Ranking of the 20 latent dimensions for each of the four selected movies (based on
the movies’ absolute loading on each dimension), in descending order of relevance. The









1 6 15 4 14
2 16 5 5 8
3 1 8 17 20
4 12 13 2 16
5 7 12 16 19
6 8 14 11 7
7 14 2 12 15
8 10 1 13 1
9 19 19 19 18
10 15 11 7 17
11 20 20 14 2
12 5 18 10 5
13 3 9 3 11
14 13 17 15 3
15 4 6 8 9
16 9 3 20 13
17 2 10 1 6
18 11 7 6 12
19 17 4 18 10
20 18 16 9 4
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We used all 9,272 movies to build a latent semantic representation of the
types of movies people encounter, but we only used 200 movies as stimuli in
the experiment. These movies were chosen in the following way. We selected
ten genres (romance, drama, sci-fi, thriller, comedy, horror, animation, fantasy,
crime, action), and retrieved the first 20 most popular movies in each genre.
This happened in a sequential manner, starting the retrieval with the genres with
the lowest number of movies (the final order was horror, romance, animation,
fantasy, comedy, thriller, crime, sci-fi, action, drama). The rationale behind
this approach was to avoid having relatively unknown movies appearing in a
category (in case the well-known ones have already been retrieved as part of
another category). We excluded any movies that were part of a sequel if a
member of that sequel has already been selected.
Once we knew each movie’s loading on the 20 latent dimensions, we could
calculate the Euclidean distance between any two of the 200 movies. Based on
this calculation, Table 3.2 shows the closest (most similar) and furthest (least
similar) five movies for another four selected movies (Interstellar, Inglourious
Basterds, The Hobbit: An Unexpected Journey, Star Wars: Episode IV - A New
Hope).
This demonstrates that while the algorithm seems to perform well in
finding common themes in movies (e.g., the space theme for Interstellar and Star
Wars, the war theme for Inglourious Basterds, and the adventure in a magical
world theme in The Hobbit), there are a few odd matches. In particular, two
movies can have very similar themes, but they might fall into two completely
different genres, and thus would never be perceived as similar. A good example
is the proximity of WALL-E and Interstellar: while both score high on the outer
space theme, WALL-E is an animated family movie, while Interstellar is a sci-
fi adventure movie, and therefore they are unlikely to be perceived as similar.
Other odd matches include Interstellar – Alien and The Hobbit – Shrek, which
further show that latent semantic proximity alone is not enough to create similar
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movie pairs.
Table 3.2: Closest and furthest five movies for four selected movies based on the Euclidean









Closest 2 Oblivion Casablanca
The Lord of the
Rings
Avatar









Full Metal Jacket Frozen
The Fifth
Element




Furthest 5 Titanic Man of Steel Man of Steel Life of Pi
Furthest 4 Deadpool Star Trek Star Trek Watchmen
Furthest 3
The Wolf of Wall
Street
The Dark Knight
The Wolf of Wall
Street
Deadpool
Furthest 2 The Dark Knight
The Wolf of Wall
Street
The Dark Knight
The Wolf of Wall
Street
Furthest 1 Star Wars Star Wars Star Wars The Dark Knight
To mitigate this problem, we decided to also use genre similarity criteria
derived from the genre classification information we retrieved from IMDb. This
classification contains at least one and at most three main genre types that best
describe each movie’s type. The simplest approach would be to calculate the
number of overlapping genres and rank each movie pair based on this measure.
However, there are two problems with this approach. First, the genres used in
the IMDb classification are rather crude, since there are only about 18 main
76
genre types. Second, many movies only have one genre assigned to it, decreasing
the quality of the genre matching criteria.
For this reason, we decided to use a different method to calculate the
genre similarity between any two movies. Our method consists of three parts,
each with a separate score, and the sum of these is the final score, reflecting the
genre similarity between each movie pair.
The first part of the score is simply the number of overlapping genres
between the two movies. However, as we mentioned above, the genre information
is rather scarce for many movies (although every movie has at least one genre),
therefore we decided to use the concept of genre similarity as the second criterion.
For example, considering a romance, thriller and horror movie, and assuming we
do not have any additional genre information on these movies, we would naturally
like the thriller and horror movies to be closer to each other than to the romance
movie.
To gauge the “proximity” of any two genres, we used genre information
from all 9,272 movies in our database to build a genre correlation matrix, which
reveals common “genre-mixtures” (see Figure 3.3), that often appear together in
genre lists. Then, considering movie pair A and B, we can calculate the number
of genres that are positively correlated with the main genre of movie A (the first
genre in its genre list) and also appear in the genre list of movie B. For example,
using this criteria, the thriller and horror movies would be closer to each other
than to the romance movie, since thriller and horror are positively correlated
with each other, and both are negatively correlated with romance.
As a real example, consider the movie Fight Club. It only has drama
assigned as a category on IMDb. Therefore, based on only the first criterion it is
equally close to Lion King, The Lord of the Rings and Se7en (as these all have
drama as one of the categories). However, when we add the second criterion,
Fight Club has a similarity score of 3 with Se7en (shared genres: drama, crime,
mystery), and 1 with Lion King and The Lord of the Rings (the only shared
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Figure 3.3: Genre correlation matrix.
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category is drama), respectively. Finally, to introduce higher variation in the
movie similarity scores, each movie pair was given an additional point if they
were retrieved as part of the same genre category from the IMDb website.
At this point we knew the semantic distance and the genre similarity score
between each movie pair, and the next step was to construct the target-decoy
and target-competitor pairs. We used our LSA- and genre-similarity scores to
select pairs of movies that are likely to be perceived as different and similar
as target-competitor and target-decoy pairs, respectively. We considered movie
pair A and B as different enough to qualify as a target-competitor candidate
if 1) the two movies fell in the upper 40% in each other’s semantic distance
distribution (where a higher distance means the movies are less similar) and 2)
their respective genre similarity scores were in the lower 30% of each other’s
genre similarity score distribution (where a lower genre similarity score means
they are less similar).
Considering the variety of the movies people encounter, we would nat-
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urally expect to find fewer similar movies than dissimilar ones. Based on this
assumption, we used a more stringent set of criteria to find movie pairs similar
enough to qualify as target-decoy pairs: the two movies had to fall 1) in the
lower 20% of each other’s semantic distance distribution and 2) in the upper
15% of each other’s genre similarity score distribution. These cut-off values were
chosen to provide us with a sufficient number of reasonable matches (601 unique
target-decoy and 1,393 target-competitor pairs).
To increase the power of our test, our aim was to create “quadruplets” of
movies: two targets A and B, and their decoys A’ and B’ (as shown on Figure
3.4). A quadruplet can be used to make two triplets: A, B, A’ and A, B, B’.
That is, each quadruplet consists one target-competitor and two target-decoy
pairs. Using our target-decoy and target-competitor pairs, we created 21,886
unique quadruplets. We classified these quadruplets based on the “quality” of
their two target-decoy pairs. We called a target-decoy pair a strict match if they
fell within 1) the lower 7.5% of each other’s semantic distance distribution and
2) within the upper 15% of each other’s genre similarity score distribution (these
are half the cut-off values we used for creating the target-decoy pairs).
We conjectured that the perceived similarity of the target-decoy pairs will
be the most problematic part of recreating an attraction effect (as opposed to
finding target-competitor pairs that are perceived as different). This is because
we have a highly varied stimuli set with a vast number of storyline-genre combi-
nations, which makes it much harder to find two movies that can be considered
similar (especially after eliminating sequels). For this reason, a quadruplet was
classified as a high-quality quadruplet if both of the target-decoy pairs in it were
classified as strict matches.
3.2.1.3 Experimental procedure
The experiment consisted of three stages: preference rating stage, choice stage,






























ticipants’ subjective evaluations over the 200 movies (“How do you personally
rate this movie?”) on a scale from 1 (worst) to 7 (best). We also asked whether
the participant had seen the movie before. The 200 movies were presented in a
random order for each participant. The rating stage took about 15–20 minutes
on average. The left panel on Figure 3.5 shows an example of the rating task.
Before the choice stage, we created choice triplets for each participant
using the ratings they gave in the preference rating stage in the following way.
First, based on the individual ratings from each participant, we identified the
subset of quadruplets where: (a) the target and competitor were both rated
4,5,6 or 7, and (b) the two decoy movies were rated at least 3 points lower than
the two decoy candidates. Note that we did not require the two decoys in the
quadruplet to have the same rating as it would have severely limited the number
of quadruplets we could use (e.g., we allowed for quadruplets with ratings 7,7 for
the two targets and 4,1 for the two decoys), but we controlled for this difference
in our analysis.
We then selected the subset of quadruplets where all of the movies or
none of the movies had been seen, to make sure that choice behaviour will not
be governed by differences in familiarity with the movies. The result was a
bespoke subset of quadruplets for each participant, where the target/competitor
movies had the same rating and the decoy movies were rated worse.
However, we did not want the same movie to appear twice as a tar-
get/competitor for one participant, and for this reason we used a sequential
elimination technique: we first chose the quadruplet with the highest combined
target-decoy similarity rating, then eliminated all quadruplets with the same tar-
get/competitor movies. We repeated these steps until we had a set of quadruplets
with unique target/competitor movies.
We then only invited those participants back for whom we could create
at least three high-quality quadruplets this way (corresponding to at least six



































In the choice stage, participants were presented with the selected movie triplets
in a random order and were asked to choose the one they preferred the most out
of the three (see the middle panel on Figure 3.5).
Because we had to invite participants back for the choice stage, we col-
lected data in batches of 50 until we had choice data for at least a 100 participants
(after all the exclusion criteria had been applied, see section 3.2.1.4).
After the choice stage, those participants whose unique quadruplets in-
cluded non high-quality quadruplets took part in a third, similarity rating stage.
In this stage, they were asked to rate the similarity of the non-strict match movie
pairs on a scale from 1 (least similar) to 7 (most similar), where a “don’t know”
option was also included. The right panel on Figure 3.5 shows an example of the
similarity rating task. Information collected in this similarity rating stage was
important to ensure the validity of the test.
Overall 322 participants were recruited from the Prolific Academic sub-
ject pool whose first language was English and were paid at an hourly rate of
£8. We obtained ethics approval from The University of Warwick’s Humanities
and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee (reference number: 50/17-18).
The description of the experiment asked for participants who were familiar with
American movies. We did not collect data on gender, age and ethnicity, as we
did not plan to use this information. The typical Prolific Academic user is from
the UK, US or Canada (∼ 80%), below the age of 40 (∼ 75%), Caucasian (∼
79%), female (∼ 60%) and is in full- or part-time employment (∼ 67%). Partic-
ipants who were invited back after the rating stage were sent an invitation for
the choice and similarity rating stage typically three days after they completed
the rating stage, and were paid after they completed all three stages.
Out of the 322 participants who completed the rating stage, we could
create at least one quadruplet that included movies that had either all been seen
or not seen for 262 participants, and for 122 of these participants we could create
at least 3 high-quality quadruplets. Out of the 122 participants who were invited
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back, 114 took part in the choice stage of the experiment.
3.2.1.4 Exclusion criteria
To conduct a rigorous test of the attraction effect, it is crucial that participants
take the task seriously and reveal their true preferences. Given that individually
rating 200 movies can seem somewhat mundane, we specified a set of exclu-
sion criteria to filter those participants out who did not take the rating task
sufficiently seriously. These were the following.
We excluded participants who fell into the fastest 5% of the reaction
time distribution, the lowest 5% of the entropy distribution, and the upper and
lower 5% of the autocorrelation distribution. Entropy refers to the diversity of
the ratings, while autocorrelation takes into account their temporal pattern and
measures the extent to which a response depends on previous responses. Thus,
this measure aimed to filter out response patterns where participants 1) spent
an unusually short time completing the task or 2) did not use the whole of the
ratings scale or 3) often gave the same ratings for consecutive movies or 4) were
giving ratings randomly.
This set of exclusion criteria was validated by a pilot study, where we
collected repeated participant ratings for a set of books and found that the
subset of participants with a low correlation between repeated ratings (r < 0.8)
were almost exclusively the ones who were also filtered out by these three criteria.
After we applied these exclusion criteria to our sample of 114 participants, we
had choice data from 101 participants.
The study design, exclusion criteria and all the analyses were planned




Figure 3.6 shows the distribution of the proportion of participants over the num-
ber of choice trials, which, by construction, was always even (since one quadru-
plet included two choice triplets). The minimum number of choice trials was 6,
and the maximum was 36. As it can be seen, 87% of participants were presented
with at least 8 choice trials. The average number of choice trials was 14.
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As we specified in our pre-registered analysis plan, we excluded any trial
in which the participant chose the decoy from the analyses presented below.
Figure 3.7 shows that the decoy was rarely chosen, in fact, 61% of the participants
never chose it, and less than 4% participants chose it in more than 25% of the
trials. This indicates that most participants gave reliable ratings in the first
stage, and thus were able to identify the dominated decoy in the choice stage.
To test for the presence of the attraction effect, we conducted a one-
sample t-test to test the hypothesis that the mean of the proportion of trials
where the target was chosen is above 0.5. Therefore, evidence for the alternative
hypothesis would indicate an increased likelihood of choosing the target item.
For this analysis, we used the triplets created from high-quality quadru-
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Figure 3.7: Distribution of the proportion of participants by proportion of trials where the
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plets (involving target-decoy pairs that were strict matches). Using a one-sided
t-test to test whether participants were more likely to choose the target than the
competitor, we found no evidence for the attraction effect (M = 0.50, SD = 0.09),
t(100) = 0.39, p = .348. Figure 3.8 shows the distribution of the proportion of
trials where the target was chosen, indicating that the vast majority of partic-
ipants were indifferent between the target and competitor, implying that the
presence of the decoy did not affect preferences, M = 0.50, 95% CI [0.49–0.52].
Figure 3.8: Distribution of the proportion of trials where the target was chosen in Experiment
1 (triplets with strict target-decoy pairs only). The red dot and error bars show the





































































































As specified in our pre-registered plan, we repeated the analysis for triplets
with strict target-decoy movie pairs plus triplets created from half the remaining
quadruplets with the lowest combined target-decoy semantic distance (we refer
to these as the “better half” of the remaining quadruplets), and again found no
evidence for the attraction effect (M = 0.51, SD = 0.08), t(100) = 0.28, p = .22
(see Appendix B for the distribution of the proportion of trials where the target
was chosen in this subset of data).
Our last planned analysis was a mixed effects logistic regression model
with subject-specific random intercepts, where for each trial, we predict the likeli-
hood of choosing the target item with the following explanatory variables: having
seen all three of the movies (as opposed to not having seen any of them), target-
decoy and target-competitor semantic/genre distance, and the target-decoy rat-
ing difference (by the design of the triplet construction method, this was at least
3, and at most 6). Table 3.3 shows the results from this regression.
Table 3.3: Odds-ratios and 95% CIs from a mixed-effects logistic model with subject-specific
intercepts, Experiment 1. (T – Target, C – Competitor, D – Decoy)
Dependent variable:
Target chosen
Seen all 1.156 (0.844, 1.589)
TC semantic distance 0.980 (0.878, 1.093)
TD semantic distance 1.015 (0.910, 1.131)
TC genre distance 0.993 (0.890, 1.107)
TD genre distance 0.972 (0.872, 1.084)
TD rating difference 0.908 (0.789, 1.046)
Intercept 0.992 (0.628, 1.566)
Observations 1,418
Log Likelihood −978.245
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,972.490
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 2,014.546
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
As it can be seen, familiarity with the movies, preference difference be-
tween the target and decoy movies, and the semantic/genre distance between
87
the target-decoy and target-competitor pairs do not affect the likelihood that
the target will be chosen. Based on this model, we can predict the probability
of choosing the target in an “ideal” attraction effect situation, where the target-
decoy rating difference is at its maximum (6), all the movies had been seen in the
triplet, and the genre/semantic difference between the target-decoy and target-
competitor pairs are at their respective minimum and maximum. This predicted
proportion1 is only 43%, 95% CI [30%–57%], which further shows the lack of
an increased tendency to choose the target even in choice situations where the
attraction effect is most likely to be observed.
We can only speculate about the underlying reason(s) why we did not see
an increased preference for the target in our experiment. One possible explana-
tion for our results is that the attraction effect is simply absent in settings where
choice options are complex objects, as argued by Frederick et al. (2014) and
Yang and Lynn (2014). While this is one possible explanation for our results, we
cannot be certain unless we can safely claim that our experimental methodology
managed to satisfy all the criteria required for a stringent test of the attraction
effect. Testing the attraction effect with naturalistic stimuli is a complex task, as
it poses several challenges to the standard experimental methodology commonly
used in research focusing on this decision bias.
First, naturalistic objects differ from numerical stimuli as we cannot infer
the relative value of each option “on the spot”. To circumvent this issue, we
added a rating stage before the actual choice task, and there was at least a
day’s difference between the completion of the two tasks. One natural concern
could be that this might have reduced the reliability of ratings. However, the
results have shown that participants were (1) indifferent between the options they
have previously rated the same and (2) rarely ended up choosing the dominated
option. These results indicate that participants gave honest answers in the rating
stage and their preferences did not change over time.
1Based on a logistic regression without mixed effects.
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Second, one must make sure that participants are sufficiently interested
in the stimuli. With numerical stimuli, interest can be sustained by using an
incentive-compatible experimental design. To ensure these criteria are met in our
experiment, we used the most popular movies on IMDb, employed a very strict
exclusion criteria to exclude participants who did not take the task seriously, and
also controlled for familiarity with the choice options, but this did not modulate
the strength of the effect.
Third, the similarity comparison process might differ between options
with numerical and naturalistic attributes. The perceived similarity of the target
and decoy is a crucial assumption, as many choice models rely on it to be able to
produce the attraction effect (see subsection 3.1.1). To ensure maximal similarity
between the target and decoy, we used all available information on our movies,
including storyline, actors, and genres, to create the target-decoy and target-
competitor pairs, and conducted separate analyses based on the quality of the
match. However, this still does not ensure that participants perceived the target-
decoy pairs as similar and the target-competitor pair as different.
Fortunately, we collected information on perceived similarity for a small
subset of movie pairs that did not qualify as strict matches based on our se-
lection criteria, which allows us to estimate the extent of the problem. Specif-
ically, we have at least one similarity rating for 184 unique target-decoy and
203 unique target-competitor pairs, which constitute 16% and 18% of all unique
choice triplets, respectively. Figure 3.9 shows the distribution of the similarity
ratings for these target-decoy and target-competitor pairs.
It seems that while most target-competitor movie pairs were given low
similarity ratings, showing that they were perceived as markedly different (as
we hoped), participants generally did not perceive our target-decoy pairs to be
very similar. Although it is worth keeping in mind that we asked for similarity
ratings for this subset of movie pairs exactly because we were worried that they
might not be perceived as different/similar enough (therefore, it is likely that
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target-decoy pairs that were strict matches were perceived as more similar than
the non-strict matches), but the very low target-decoy similarity ratings still cast
doubt on the general efficacy of our triplet selection criteria.
While we predicted in advance that creating pairs of similar movies will
be the most challenging part of the experimental design, the lack of perceived
similarity is highly problematic when designing a test of the attraction effect.
Specifically, if the proximity of the target and decoy are not recognised, then the
choice task simplifies to a situation with two, equally good, distinct options, and
a third, significantly inferior option. In this case, we would expect that the decoy
will not have any effect of the subjective valuation of the two, equally desirable
options and that they will be chosen equally frequently, which is exactly the
pattern we have seen in our results.
3.2.3 Discussion
Our aim in Experiment 1 was to test the attraction effect using naturalistic, real-
world stimuli. Our results suggested that adding a dominated decoy to a binary
choice set did not increase preference for the dominating target. We are 95%
confident that the true proportion of trials where the target was chosen is between
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49% and 52%. In addition, the tendency to choose the target was not affected by
participants’ familiarity with the movies, the target-decoy rating difference, or
the semantic/genre proximity of the target-decoy and target-competitor pairs.
Furthermore, the distribution of the target-decoy similarity ratings from
a subset of triplets show that participants rarely perceived the target-decoy pairs
as similar. This indicates that (at least) some of the triplets we created did not
manage to invoke an attraction effect choice situation.
Why did our stimuli selection method fail to produce movie pairs that are
similar? As we mentioned in section 3.2.1.2, while the latent semantic solution
was successful in retrieving common themes and aspects of each movie’s storyline,
genre differences are not captured well in this framework (as a certain theme can
appear in very different contexts), and it is possible that they are central to the
similarity judgement process.
While our genre matching criteria were supposed to account for this prob-
lem, it is possible that matching movies along 18 genre types simply does not
capture subtle genre differences that are crucial in judging the similarity between
two movies. This problem is further exacerbated by the fact that many movies
have only one category assigned on IMDb, making it much harder to establish
movie similarity along the genre dimension.
For example, The Life of Brian has comedy as the only category assigned,
whereas Monty Python and The Holy Grail has adventure, comedy and fantasy
as genre categories, which means that our algorithm does not identify these
two movies as similar enough along the genre dimension, despite the fact that
they are both Monty Python movies (and would probably be considered as very
similar by most people).
To summarise, in Experiment 1, we find no evidence for the attraction
effect. However, the generally low target-decoy similarity ratings suggest that
in a significant proportion of the trials, we simply failed to create an attraction
effect type situation. To conduct a rigorous test of the attraction effect using
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the same stimuli, this problem needs to be accounted for.
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3.3 Experiment 2
Experiment 2 also aimed to test the attraction effect with the same natural-
istic choice options, while addressing the problems encountered in Experiment
1. Specifically, to ensure that target-decoy pairs were perceived as similar and
that target-competitor pairs were perceived as different, we used similarity rat-
ings from a separate, independent group of participants to help construct choice
triplets. We also collected similarity ratings on every target-decoy and target-
competitor pair encountered in the choice stage immediately after the choices,
which enables us to directly test how the strength of any attraction effect depends
on the perceived similarity of the target-decoy and target-competitor pairs.
3.3.1 Method
We followed a slightly simplified version of the method described in section 3.2.1.
Similarly to Experiment 1, the study design, exclusion criteria, and all the anal-
yses were planned and registered before we collected any choice data (for the
pre-registration, see Appendix B).
3.3.1.1 Stimuli
Using the same movie selection procedure (retrieving the most popular movies
from the 10 selected genres) we doubled the size of the stimuli set, amounting
to 400 movies. We extended the stimuli set in the hope that this will increase
the likelihood of finding pairs of similar movies (while still using movies our
participants are likely to be familiar with).
3.3.1.2 Choice set selection
We mostly used a genre matching criteria to identify potential target-decoy and
target-competitor pairs. To do this, we used additional genre information from
the allmovie.com website. The genre information on allmovie.com is much richer
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than on IMDb: compared to the 18 genre categories on IMDb, there are 156 genre
and sub-genre categories, capturing many important aspects of the movies. For
example, using this criteria, The Life of Brian (main genre: comedy, sub-genres:
parody/spoof, absurd comedy, religious comedy) and Monty Python and The
Holy Grail (main genre: comedy, sub-genres: absurd comedy, parody/spoof,
slapstick) are very close to each other, just as we would expect. Using this rich
genre information, we created a movie by movie (400 x 400) matrix, where each
cell was the number of overlapping genre categories between the two movies.
We then paired up movies that were both scoring highest in each other’s
genre score distribution, creating 2,271 target-decoy candidates. We also added
806 pairs obtained from the mutually closest 10% of movies based on the latent
semantic solution with 20 and 74 latent dimensions (the 806 pairs were the
ones that appeared in both solutions). The rationale behind this approach was
to capture movie pairs that are very close to each other in terms of the story
themes, but are not the closest on the genre dimension. Overall, we had 3,011
unique movie pairs at this point.
Our next task was to reduce the size of this list by selecting the most
similar movie pairs. This was done manually by two researchers, who gave a
similarity rating between 1–7 for each movie pair (1 – least similar, 7 – most
similar). We only kept the movie pairs that had a similarity rating above 1,
resulting in 1,242 target-decoy candidates. We then divided the 1,242 pairs into
six groups of 207 pairs, and ran an independent pilot study where we asked 60
participants to rate the similarity of a randomly chosen group of movie pairs,
obtaining 10 independent similarity ratings for each of the 1,242 target-decoy
candidates. Participants rated the similarity of each movie pair on a 1–7 scale,
where 1 is the least and 7 is the most similar, and a “Don’t know” option
was also available. Figure 3.10 shows the distribution of the average similarity
ratings for each movie pair. We retained information about the mean similarity
of each target-decoy pair, which we later used in the choice set selection stage,
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to discriminate between quadruplets that contain the same target or competitor
movies.
We then decided to only use movie pairs with ratings that are equal to
or higher than 4.5, which corresponds to the upper 20% of the similarity rating
distribution (253 movie pairs). We hoped this procedure would ensure that our
target-decoy candidate pairs are perceived as similar by most participants.
Once we had a sufficient number of movie pairs that we believed were
reasonably similar, the next step in creating the quadruplets was to create target-
competitor pairs. To do this, we first created a target-decoy pair by target-decoy
pair matrix (253x253), where each cell was the number of overlapping genre
categories between the two movie pairs. For example, considering the comparison
between target-decoy candidate 1 (consisting of movie A and movie B) and
target-decoy candidate 2 (consisting of movie C and movie D), we summed the
number of genre overlaps between movies A–C, A–D, B–C and B–D.
Then we created the quadruplets by combining each target-decoy pair
with all the target-decoy pairs that it had no common genre categories with,
and taking the unique combinations of the four movies. This resulted in 20,022
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quadruplets, created from 231 unique movies.
3.3.1.3 Experimental procedure
The experimental procedure was almost identical to the one described in Exper-
iment 1 (see section 3.2.1.3). We first asked participants to provide preference
ratings for 231 movies and to specify whether they had seen the movies. After
we collected ratings data for the next 50 participants, we identified the quadru-
plets in which 1) all the movies had either been seen or not seen, 2) the two
targets had the same rating and 3) the rating difference between the two targets
and their respective decoys was at least 3. Using the same sequential selection
procedure (using the sum of the two similarity ratings as an indicator for the
quality of the choice set), we then obtained a subset of these quadruplets with
unique target and competitor movies. We invited back those participants for
whom we could create at least three quadruplets.
After the choice stage, we asked each participant to rate the similarity of
each target-decoy and target-competitor pair they encountered in the previous
stage. While asking participants to rate the similarity of all target-decoy and
target-competitor pairs is costly and time-consuming, this information enabled
us to account for individual heterogeneity in similarity perception and make sure
that our choice triplets represented an attraction effect choice situation for each
participant.
We recruited 297 participants using Prolific Academic. Out of the 297
participants that completed part 1, we could create at least one quadruplet that
included movies that had either been all seen or not seen for 249 participants,
and for 179 of these participants we could create at least 3 quadruplets. Out of




We used the same exclusion criteria described in section 3.2.1.4. After we applied
these exclusion criteria to our sample of 152 participants, we had choice data
from 135 participants.
3.3.2 Results
Figure 3.11 shows the distribution of the proportion of participants by the num-
ber of choice trials. Similarly to Experiment 1, all participants completed an
even number of choice trials, the lowest number of choice trials was 6, and the
highest was 54. The average number of trials was 16, and 84% of participants
were presented with at least 8 choice trials.
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Figure 3.12 shows that similarly to Experiment 1, the decoy was again
rarely chosen. In fact, 72% of the participants have never chosen it, and only
2% of participants have chosen it in more than 25% of the trials. This indicates
that participants were again able to identify the dominated decoy in the choice
stage.
Before analysing choice behaviour, it is instructive to plot the target-
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Figure 3.12: Distribution of the proportion of participants by proportion of trials where the
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decoy and target-competitor similarity rating distributions, to see if we managed
to create more similar target-decoy pairs in Experiment 2. Figure 3.13 shows
these distributions, and we can see that the overwhelming majority of target-
competitor pairs were perceived as not similar, while the majority of target-decoy
pairs were perceived as similar, which shows that we indeed managed to improve
the perceived similarity of the target-decoy pairs.



















To test for the presence of the attraction effect, we again conducted a
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Figure 3.14: Proportion of trials where the decoy was chosen in Experiment 2. Each dot is a























































































































one-sample t-test to test the hypothesis that the mean of the proportion of trials
where the target was chosen is above 0.5 (indicating an increased likelihood of
choosing the target item). The results are very similar to those from Experiment
1: we again found no evidence for the attraction effect (M = 0.49, SD = 0.07),
t(134) = -0.44, p = .669. Figure 3.14 shows the distribution of the proportions of
trials where the target was chosen, which again indicates that participants were
indifferent between the target and the competitor, M = 0.50, 95% CI [0.49–0.51].
As specified in our pre-registered analysis plan, we also ran a mixed effects
logistic regression with subject-specific intercept to investigate how the target-
decoy and target-competitor similarity ratings and familiarity of with the movies
affect the likelihood of choosing the target. Table 3.4 shows the results from this
regression, where contrary to our expectations, none of the explanatory variables
seem to modulate the strength of the attraction effect.
We can again estimate the probability of choosing the target in an “ideal”
attraction effect scenario, where the target-decoy pair is perceived as the most
similar, whereas the target-competitor pair is perceived as the least similar.
This predicted proportion2 is again only 41%, 95% CI [31%, 52%], showing that
2Based on a logistic regression without mixed effects.
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Table 3.4: Odds-ratios and 95% CIs from a mixed-effects logistic model with subject-specific
intercepts, Experiment 2. (T – Target, C – Competitor, D – Decoy)
Dependent variable:
Target chosen
Seen all 1.122 (0.731, 1.729)
TC similarity rating 0.967 (0.872, 1.073)
TD similarity rating 0.926 (0.835, 1.027)
TD rating difference 0.935 (0.837, 1.044)
Intercept 1.062 (0.598, 1.882)
Observations 1,541
Log Likelihood −1,064.822
Akaike Inf. Crit. 2,141.644
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 2,173.686
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
even when the target-decoy and target-competitor pairs are perceived as very
similar/different, we do not see an increased tendency to choose the target (if
anything, we see a slight tendency to choose the competitor).
3.3.3 Discussion
Experiment 2 aimed to test the attraction effect with complex, naturalistic
stimuli, while accounting for the methodological shortcomings of Experiment 1.
Based on the results from Experiment 1, we hypothesized that we did not find
evidence for the attraction effect in Experiment 1 because participants generally
did not perceive the target-decoy pairs as similar.
For this reason, in Experiment 2, we used a rich set of genre information
to create similar movie pairs. In addition, we collected similarity ratings for each
target-decoy and target-competitor pair participants encountered in the choice
stage. This allowed us to see how the strength of the attraction effect depends
on the perceived similarity of the movie pairs.
The results are broadly similar to those obtained from Experiment 1.
That is, we have found that the presence of a dominated decoy does not alter
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preferences between the target and the competitor (we are 95% confident that
the true proportion of trials where the target was chosen is between 49% and
51%). In addition, to our surprise, the tendency to choose the target was not




In Experiment 1 and 2, we explored the strength of the attraction effect in a
naturalistic choice context. While previous research had shown that the effect is
rather robust in choice tasks where the attributes have a numerical representa-
tion, its relevance has been questioned in choice contexts involving naturalistic
options.
To conduct a test of the attraction effect using complex stimuli, we used
movie posters as real-world choice options to create target-competitor-decoy
choice triplets. In Experiment 1, we did not find any evidence for the attrac-
tion effect, but we also found that participants did not perceive our target-decoy
pairs as similar, which cast doubt on the validity of our test. To address this
problem, we conducted the same test with an improved methodology in Exper-
iment 2. We believe that Experiment 2 is the first rigorous investigation of this
research question: we designed it carefully to address all the criticisms raised in
connection with the study by Frederick et al., where they used similar stimuli.
First, our experimental design ensured participants’ indifference between
the target and the decoy, maximising the probability that choices will be con-
structed on the spot (rather than through relying on strong prior preferences),
and an attraction effect will occur. While one could argue that mnemonic pro-
cesses arising from familiarity with the stimuli can alter preferences in the choice
stage, we still did not detect an increased tendency to choose the target when
participants were not familiar with the movies.
Second, we have strong evidence that the dominance relationship was
perceived in our experiment. The target-decoy similarity ratings confirmed that
our careful target-decoy selection process indeed managed to produce movie
pairs that were perceived as similar. In addition, we ensured that the decoy
was always rated at least 3 units lower than the target (and the competitor).
Accordingly, the decoy was only chosen in 4.3% of the trials, which clearly shows
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that participants were able to spot and avoid the dominated alternative.
Third, by creating bespoke choice triplets based on preference ratings, we
avoided individual heterogeneity in preferences to act as a potential confound.
In addition, we ensured that the decoy was not too desirable in comparison to
the target. We also used a set of strict exclusion criteria to filter out participants
who did not take the task sufficiently seriously, and with an average of 16 choice
trials per participant, we avoided participant fatigue.
Finally, in our analysis we controlled for familiarity with the choice op-
tions, perceived similarity of the target-decoy and target-competitor pair, and
relative preference between the target and the decoy, but we found that none of
these modulated the strength of the attraction effect.
The results from this rigorous test duplicated the findings from Exper-
iment 1: the presence of the decoy in the choice set did not alter preferences
between the target and the competitor. Therefore, we can conclude that even
when we accounted for the criticisms in connection with Frederick et al. and
Yang and Lynn’s studies, we still did not find the attraction effect when options
had complex, naturalistic attributes. This illuminates the possibility that the
discrepancy stems directly from the stimuli presentation, which might give rise
to fundamentally different comparison processes.
Unfortunately, Frederick et al. did not elaborate on the potential reasons
for their results. They briefly conclude that it is the numerical nature of the
attribute dimensions that gives rise to the attraction effect, but we think this
is a simplification. In fact, it has been shown on numerous occasions that the
attraction effect is also present in settings where options do not have numerical
attributes.
For example, Choplin and Hummel (2005) have demonstrated the effect
in a similarity judgment task with unidimensional stimuli (by varying the aspect
ratio of circles and the length of lines). Maylor and Roberts (2007) have found
the attraction effect in a memory judgment task. Farmer, El-Deredy, Howes,
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and Warren (2015) have demonstrated the effect in motor planning decisions. In
addition, the attraction effect has also been found in experiments using percep-
tual stimuli. In Trueblood et al., participants were presented with rectangles of
differing height and width, and had to select the rectangle with the largest area.
Other studies have used the same rectangle stimuli and found the attraction
effect in children (Zhen & Yu, 2016) and monkeys (Parrish et al., 2015).
Interestingly, Frederick et al. presented the only experiment we know
about that did not find the attraction effect using Trueblood et al., 2013’s per-
ceptual stimuli. However, important differences exist between the two experi-
mental methodologies, demonstrated by the fact that in Frederick et al.’s study,
the decoy’s choice share was double of that reported in Trueblood et al.’s experi-
ment. Nevertheless, we think replications are key in understanding the boundary
conditions of the attraction effect. We are aware of the fact that there is an un-
fortunate tendency in psychology not to report failed replication attempts (Ingre
& Nilsonne, 2018), which hinders our understanding of how the strength of the
attraction effect depends on the stimuli characteristics.
We find these contradictory results interesting, as they raise the possibil-
ity that it is not the numerical nature of the attribute dimensions, but some other
attribute characteristic that underlies the attraction effect. We will investigate




underlying the attraction effect
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4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3, we conducted two experiments to probe the robustness of the at-
traction effect with complex, naturalistic stimuli. This research question arose
from the debate on the real-world relevance of the attraction effect, which started
with the study of Frederick et al. (2014) that described numerous failed attempts
to replicate the attraction effect in choice contexts where the options were nat-
uralistic objects. They drew the conclusion that the attraction effect is only
present in choice settings where the options have numerical attributes. The
findings from our experiments confirmed Frederick et al.’s results in that we
have not found any evidence for the attraction effect using movie posters as
naturalistic stimuli.
However, as discussed in Chapter 3, there is substantial evidence that the
attraction effect is not restricted to choice settings where the options have nu-
merical attributes. In value-based decision making, Farmer, Warren, El-Deredy,
and Howes (2017) have demonstrated the attraction effect using perceptual rep-
resentation of gambles. In one version, they adopted the rectangle stimuli of
Trueblood et al. (2013) to represent the probability and the nominal amount to
be won (therefore, the area of each rectangle corresponded to the expected value
of the gamble). In another experiment, the probability of the gamble was rep-
resented by the proportion of randomly distributed coloured squares in a 10x10
grid, whereas the nominal amount was represented as the proportion of coloured
squares in another 10x10 grid.
While these perceptual tasks are clear departures from the commonly
used numerical attributes format, they are still very similar to it in one respect.
Specifically, in both versions, the two attribute dimensions are spatially sep-
arated, and thus can be attended independently. We argue that independent
processing of attribute dimensions can be key in explaining why the attraction
effect is so elusive in some choice contexts. To design an experiment that tests
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this hypothesis, we draw on insights from decades of research on the perception
and processing of multiattribute stimuli.
4.1.1 Integral and separate dimensions
The idea that multiattribute stimuli can be classified based on the perceived
separability of the attribute dimensions first emerged from research focusing
on similarity judgments using the method of multidimensional scaling (MDS;
Kruskal, 1964; Shepard, 1980). In essence, MDS can be used to build a low-
dimensional geometrical representation of the perceived similarity between pairs
of objects (Hout, Papesh, & Goldinger, 2013). In this representation, the objects
are points in a Cartesian coordinate system, and the distance between them cor-
responds to their perceived similarity (so that more similar objects are closer to
each other). This distance can be calculated in various ways, of which the Eu-
clidean distance metric, δ =
√
δ2x + δ2y is the most intuitive and well-known, and
was consequently used in the first applications of MDS to similarity judgments.
However, Attneave (1950) challenged the appropriacy of the Euclidean
distance metric. He proposed that an alternative distance measure, the city-
block metric, δ = δx + δy provides a much better fit for the similarity judgment
data he collected in his experiments, where he asked participants to make sim-
ilarity judgments between parallelograms, squares and triangles with varying
dimensions, including size, tilt, and colour. According to the city-block met-
ric, the perceived overall distance is simply the sum of the distances along the
attribute dimensions.
In contrast with Attneave’s results, Torgerson (1958) found strong sup-
port for the Euclidean metric in an experiment where participants were asked to
provide similarity judgments for Munsell colour chips that differed in brightness
and saturation. These contradictory results led researchers to examine how the
perceived similarity of two objects depend on their attribute characteristics.
In fact, the Euclidean and city-block distance metrics reflect two funda-
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mentally different ways of perceiving object similarity. Specifically, the Euclidean
distance metric is invariant to axis rotation, while the city-block metric is not.
This means that objects whose pairwise similarity can be best described by the
city-block metric have “privileged” psychological dimensions, whereas the Eu-
clidean metric is more appropriate for objects that are processed “holistically”,
where the underlying attribute dimensions may not even be perceived separately
(Shepp & Ballesteros, 1989).
Shepard (1964) argued that these differences can be explored by analysing
how participants justify their similarity judgments for these two classes of stimuli.
For example, when the attributes can be perceived independently (stimuli that
he called analyzable), participants have almost always referred to the distinct
attribute dimensions when describing differences. However, when the stimuli are
processed holistically (for dimensions he called unitary), participants tended to
describe the difference along one, “combined” dimension, indicating that the two
attribute dimensions cannot be perceived separately (and that the participant
might not even be aware that there are multiple underlying dimensions).
Lockhead (1966) investigated how the effect of dimensional redundancy
differs for stimuli with separable and integral dimensions (these are the respective
equivalents of analyzable and unitary in Shepard’s terminology). A redundancy
gain is said to occur when performance in a selective attention task (most typ-
ically discrimination, detection, or categorization) is improved (faster and/or
more accurate responses) when the two attribute dimensions vary in a corre-
lated manner. Previous research found redundancy gains for integral dimensions
(Munsell colour chips; Eriksen & Hake, 1955), but not for separable dimensions
(visual positions of X’s and O’s; Garner & Lee, 1962). Lockhead argued that
the redundancy gain occurs because integral attributes cannot be attended sep-
arately, and that the concept of redundancy gain should be key in the definition
of integral attribute dimensions.
Drawing on Lockhead’s findings, Garner and Felfoldy (1970) demon-
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strated that integral dimensions give rise to redundancy gains and interference
effects within the same experimental task. Interference effects (slower and less
accurate responses) can be observed if the two integral dimensions are orthogo-
nal (vary in an uncorrelated manner). They proposed a new definition for inte-
gral attribute dimensions. According to this, dimensional integrality (1) can be
best described by the Euclidean distance metric, (2) produces redundancy gains
if the dimensions vary in a correlated fashion, and (3) results in interference
effects when the two dimensions are orthogonal. The experimental paradigm
where these assumptions can be tested with a control, correlated, and filtering
condition has later became known as the Garner interference task (Burns, 2014).
More recent research focused on how the processing of stimuli with inte-
gral and separable dimensions differ in perceptual categorization tasks. These
studies have typically analysed reaction times and choice probabilities in se-
quential sampling modelling frameworks. Little, Nosofsky, and Denton (2011)
investigated whether the processing of multiattribute stimuli depends on the
spatial separability of the attribute dimensions. They found that when the at-
tribute dimensions are spatially separated (e.g., the base width of a lamp and
the curvature of its top piece), they are processed in a sequential, serial manner.
However, when the attribute dimensions are spatially overlapping, such that
both attributes can be attended simultaneously (e.g., the colour of a rectangle
and the position of an inset bar), a mixture of serial and parallel processing of
dimensions occur. In a follow-up study, they found strong evidence that stimuli
with integral attributes (e.g., brightness and saturation) are processed in a coac-
tive fashion, where the attribute information is combined into a single processing
channel (Little, Nosofsky, Donkin, & Denton, 2013), as opposed to the parallel
and serial model, where there are two independent accumulation processes for
the two attribute dimensions.
While caution is warranted when applying insights from perceptual cate-
gorization to value-based decision making due to the inherent differences between
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the two choice tasks, if object processing shares commonalities in the two con-
texts, it bears significance for any research that aims to investigate the cognitive
mechanism underlying the attraction effect in preferential choice. Crucially, most
sequential sampling models that are able to accommodate the attraction effect
rely on the assumption of attribute-wise processing of choice options. In addi-
tion, eye-tracking evidence suggests that single-attribute pairwise comparisons
play a key role in the attraction effect (Noguchi & Stewart, 2014).
To elucidate whether it is the separable nature of the choice attributes
that gives rise to the attraction effect in value-based decision making, we con-
ducted an experiment to test whether the strength of the effect depends on
stimulus presentation. Participants first had to learn a valuation rule in a learn-
ing stage, and they were instructed to use this rule in the choice stage where
they were presented with attraction effect choice triplets created form two kinds
of artificial stimuli (separable and integral version).
4.2 Experiment 1
4.2.1 Method
In this experiment, our aim was to investigate the hypothesis that the strength
of the attraction effect depends on the separability of the attribute dimensions.
To this end, we created two versions of the same stimuli: a “traditional” version,
where the two attribute dimensions have numerical values (numerical condition),
and a perceptual version, where the attribute dimensions are integral, and thus
cannot be attended independently (pictorial condition). We expected to see the
attraction effect in the numerical condition, where the options can be compared
along an attribute dimension, but not in the pictorial condition, where the op-
tions can only be processed holistically.
Designing a value-based choice experiment where the attribute dimen-
sions are integral and preferences are monotone and continuous is challenging.
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To be consistent with previous research, we chose the most well-known integral
stimuli in the literature, Munsell colours with a fixed hue, but varying brightness
and intensity. Numerous studies have established that these attribute dimensions
are integral, and therefore are processed holistically (e.g., Eriksen & Hake, 1955;
Garner & Felfoldy, 1970).
We are only aware of a few studies that used perceptual stimuli in a pref-
erential choice context. In these, the value of the options naturally depended
on the perceptual representation of the attribute dimensions (e.g., height and
width of rectangle, where the value is given by the area; Trueblood et al., 2013).
However, when the attributes are integral, it is much harder to “induce” prefer-
ences based on a valuation rule, due to the very nature of the stimuli (i.e., the
inaccessibility of the independent dimensions). To overcome this difficulty, we
first established a valuation rule that assigns a nominal value to each option,
based on the two attribute dimensions. Participants had to learn this valua-
tion rule in a learning stage that preceded the choice stage. They were then
instructed to use the valuation rule when making decisions in the choice stage.
While inducing preferences through the learning stage is somewhat artificial, this
method ensured that participants had continuous, monotone and homogeneous
preferences over our stimuli set.
4.2.2 Stimuli
In colour theory, there are various ways to describe colours, of which the red-
green-blue (RGB) colour model is perhaps the most well-known (Shipman, 2012).
We created our stimuli using the hue-saturation-value (HSV) colour model. We
will refer to saturation as intensity, and to value as brightness. In the HSV model,
hue corresponds to the pure colour component of a colour, and is measured as
the angle around the colour wheel, ranging from 0◦ to 360◦, with cyan at 180◦,
and red at both ends of the wheel. For this entire experiment, we fixed the value
of hue at 300◦, resulting in a purple colour at the mean values of intensity and
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brightness. Intensity and brightness both vary between 0 and 1. As shown by
Figure 4.1, if brightness is set to 0.5, and hue is fixed at 300◦, an intensity level
of 0.1 corresponds to a completely grey colour, whereas a value of 0.9 results in
an intense purple colour. Equally, if intensity is set at 0.5, and hue is fixed at
300◦, a brightness level of 0.1 corresponds to a completely black colour, whereas
a value of 0.9 results in a light purple colour.
Our stimuli were teapots with varying brightness and intensity levels.
Participants were told that the levels of these two attributes determined each
teapot’s value. In the numerical condition, the brightness and intensity values
were displayed numerically, whereas in the pictorial condition, it was the colour
of the teapot that determined the value. Importantly, the value of the choice
options were calculated using the same rule in both conditions.
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4.2.2.1 Choice triplet selection process
Previous research has shown that one unit change in brightness is perceptually
equivalent to a two unit change in intensity (Newhall, 1940), and we took this
into account when constructing the rule that determines the value of each option
based on the corresponding brightness and intensity values. This relationship is
captured by the red line on Figure 4.2, which is defined by the equation
Brightness = 0.5 · Intensity + 0.25. (4.1)
All stimuli were required to fall within the boundaries of the black poly-
gon displayed on Figure 4.2. The shape of the polygon ensured that intensity
and brightness were restricted to fall between 0.05–0.95 and 0.15–0.85, respec-
tively. This was necessary to avoid extreme attribute values that could hinder
the perception of the other attribute dimension (e.g., a very low brightness would
translate into a black colour, regardless of the intensity value).
To create an attraction effect choice triplet, we first determined the po-
sition of the target and competitor options within the polygon, followed by the
decoy. Then, we calculated the nominal value of each of the three options using
Equation 4.1, such that options that scored higher on the intensity and bright-
ness attribute dimensions were assigned a higher nominal value. We explain the
choice triplet generation process in more detail below.
First, we determined the location of the target and competitor options.
To do this, we first chose a random constant that was substituted into the fol-
lowing equation:
Brightness = −0.5 · Intensity + constant. (4.2)
In Figure 4.2, the dark blue line is defined by this equation, with constant =
0.75. The constant in Equation 4.2 was always chosen to ensure that the point
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where the red and blue lines cross fell within the polygon (0.35 < constant <
1.15). On Figure 4.2, this is the center of the polygon where Intensity = 0.5
and Brightness = 0.5, and the dark blue line is thus the reflection of the red
line over a vertical line defined by Intensity = 0.5 (the middle dashed line on
Figure 4.2).
We then created the two target candidates by selecting two points along
the reflected line (the dark blue line), one in the upper half of the polygon (target
candidate A), and another in the lower half (target candidate B), such that the
distance between the two points had to be at least half the overall length of the
dark blue line within the polygon. This was important in order to ensure that
one of the target candidates had a high intensity and a low brightness value and
vice versa, so that they would be perceived as markedly different by the decision
maker (as is required from the target and the competitor in an attraction effect
choice scenario). Having created the two target candidates, the next step in
creating the choice triplets was to determine the position of the decoy option.
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To create the decoy, we first randomly decided which target candidate will
be assigned a decoy option (Target A or Target B on Figure 4.2). We then again
reflected the dark blue line through a vertical line that crossed the chosen target
option (the dashed lines defined by Intensity = 0.25 and Intensity = 0.75
for Target A and Target B, respectively), which, depending on which target
candidate was chosen to be the target, gave us one of the grey lines, which is
parallel to the original red line. Naturally, any option along this line that lies
to the left of the target will have a lower intensity and brightness value, and
therefore will be inferior to it.
However, all decoys need to satisfy two criteria. First, a decoy needs to
be sufficiently far away from the target option, so that the dominance relation-
ship can be easily identified. Perceiving the dominance relationship is especially
problematic with naturalistic stimuli (as opposed to a choice scenario with nu-
merical attributes where it can be identified with absolute certainty – provided
that the decision maker pays attention to the task). Therefore, we considered
this criterion as the most important when creating the decoys. Second, a decoy
cannot be too far away from the target, as they need to be somewhat similar to
invoke an attraction effect choice situation.
Taking these considerations into account, we decided that the decoy’s
position should depend on the distance between the target and the competitor
(as this can vary to an extent). This avoids situations where the decoy is also
dominated by the competitor (this can happen if the target and the competitor
are relatively close, while the target and the decoy are relatively far away from
each other). Specifically, we decided that the distance between the target and
the decoy along the brightness dimension (y axis) should be the 27.5% of the
overall difference between the target and the competitor along the same axis.
This criterion uniquely defines a point along the grey line (either Decoy A or
Decoy B in Figure 4.2).
Once we have decided on the exact brightness and intensity values for the
115
attraction effect choice triplet, the next step was to determine the nominal value
of the options. We assigned a nominal value to every point along the red line,
starting with £0 and going up to £1000 (in the bottom left and top right corner
in Figure 4.2, respectively, where the line crosses the polygon boundaries), so that
any line parallel to the dark blue line is essentially a contour line, corresponding
to a certain nominal value. Using these contour lines, we can assign a nominal
value to any point within the polygon.
For example, as the dark blue line crosses the red line at exactly halfway
through its length within the polygon, the target and competitor were assigned
a value of £500. Then, once we calculated the position of the decoy, we were
able to define the relevant contour line (light blue line in Figure 4.2), which
corresponds to a nominal value of £328.




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































● Target Competitor Decoy
Using the method described above, we generated 500 choice triplets with
target, competitor and decoy, as shown on Figure 4.3, where each option is
defined by its brightness, intensity and nominal value. In the pictorial condition,
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participants were presented coloured teapots, where the colour of each teapot was
defined by the corresponding intensity and brightness values, and we instructed
them to select the teapot with the highest nominal value. We hypothesised
that using integer numbers will make comparisons cognitively less demanding
in the numerical condition, therefore we transformed the raw brightness and
intensity values by subtracting the minimum and multiplying them by 200. The
raw intensity and brightness values fell between 0.05–0.95 and 0.15–0.85, and
the new range of intensity and brightness values fell between 0–180 and 0–140,
respectively.
4.2.2.2 Experimental procedure
The experiment consisted of a numerical and pictorial condition, each with two
stages: a learning and a choice stage, the latter of which was the main task. All
participants were required to complete both conditions, and the order of the two
conditions was determined randomly.
The learning stage served to “teach” participants how to infer the nomi-
nal value of the options, based on the numeric attributes/colour of the teapots.
While a one-dimensional valuation rule can be fairly intuitive (e.g., the brighter
or more intense the colour, the better) and thus easy to learn, when it comes
to a two-dimensional learning rule, the interactions between the two integral di-
mensions can complicate the valuation process. For this reason, the choice stage
in each condition was only accessible upon passing the corresponding learning
stage. Before the learning stage, participants were provided with a “valuation
map”, which served to explain how the nominal value depended on the attribute
values (see Figure 4.4). The example stimuli on the valuation maps were derived
from four equally spaced contour lines, like the blue lines on Figure 4.2.
In the numerical condition, we invited participants to try to infer the
trade-off between the two attribute dimensions before starting the learning stage.
The true underlying trade-off is reflected by the red line on Figure 4.2: a two
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Figure 4.4: Value maps for both choice tasks in the experiment.
unit change in intensity is equal to a one unit change in brightness.
Each learning stage consisted of 20 questions, where participants had to
guess the relative nominal values of the two displayed options, and use the key-
board to indicate which option was worth more than the other (left/right arrow),
or whether they were equally valuable (up arrow), as shown on Figure 4.5. Given
that indifference between the target and competitor is crucial in invoking an at-
traction effect choice situation, we wanted to make sure that participants were
able to recognise that two markedly different options can have a similar nominal
value. After the keypress, participants were given feedback about whether the
answer was correct, and were shown the actual nominal value of the displayed
options, to facilitate learning. In order to pass the learning stage and proceed to
the subsequent choice stage, participants had to get at least 75% of the questions
right (at least 15 questions out of 20). However, participants could attempt to
complete the learning stage as many times as they wished, and after every failed
session, they were encouraged to consult the relevant value map once more before
trying again.
To generate the stimuli for the learning stage, we used the 500 choice
triplets to create four types of practice questions, based on the value difference
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Figure 4.5: Example practice trial in the numerical and pictorial condition.
between the two options: equal (where the two options were of equal value),
difficult (£100–£150 value difference), moderate (£150–£250 value difference),
and easy (value difference higher than £250). Using the 1500 choice options
generated for the 500 choice triplets, we created 400 questions for the learning
stage, 100 questions for each difficulty level. Each learning stage comprised of
20 questions, with 5 randomly chosen questions from the set of pre-generated
questions for each difficulty level.
Once the participant had passed the learning stage, the choice stage be-
gan. Participants were presented with 80 choice triplets, and their task was to
select the option with the highest nominal value. Out of the 80 questions, 12
were catch trials that served to gauge the attention of participants. On these
trials, there was a clearly dominating option out of the three displayed options.
To create stimuli for the catch trials, we again used the pre-generated 1500
options that comprised the 500 choice triplets, by first choosing an option with a
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nominal value of at least £300, and then two inferior options that were at least
worth £100 less than the first, high-value option. Using this method, we created
75 catch choice triplets overall. For each choice stage, the 12 catch trials were
randomly chosen from the overall 75 triplets. The rest of the trials in the choice
stage were attraction effect choice triplets, and were randomly selected from the
500 choice triplets (see Figure 4.6). During each trial in the learning and choice
stage, the presentation order of the options was always randomised. Between
the two conditions (pictorial/numerical), participants could take a break for as
long as they liked.
Figure 4.6: Example choice triplets (from left to right: DTC and DCT).
To obtain a power level of 80%, we calculated that a sample size of 100
would be suitable, assuming an effect size of 0.25 (Cohen’s d). All partici-
pants were recruited through the Warwick SONA System. We obtained ethics
approval from The University of Warwick’s Humanities and Social Sciences Re-
search Ethics Committee (reference number: 50/17-18). The study was adver-
tised as a decision-making study, and participants were given a £4 show-up fee,
and were told that they could earn £0.5 for every block of 20 correct questions,
therefore, the highest possible earning in this experiment was £8 (as there were
160 questions overall). Given that completing the study involved 160 choice trials
(and the two practice sessions), incentive-compatibility was important to ensure
that participants stayed motivated during the choice stages. The experiment




To ensure that we only include participants who took the task sufficiently se-
riously, we excluded choice blocks where the accuracy on the catch trials was
2.5 standard deviations below the average accuracy for that type of choice task
(pictorial/numerical). In addition, we excluded choice blocks that fell into the
lowest 2.5% of the entropy distribution, and the upper and lower 2.5% of the
autocorrelation distribution across all participants, based on the pattern of their
responses. Finally, we excluded trials that fell into the fastest 2.5% of the reaction
time distribution, and trials where the subject selected the decoy option. The
study design, exclusion criteria and all the analyses were planned and registered
before we collected any choice data (see Appendix C for the pre-registration).
4.2.3 Results
Ideally, if all of the 100 participants had completed both conditions, we would
have data from 200 choice blocks (100 pictorial and 100 numerical each). How-
ever, the learning stages turned out to be more challenging for participants than
we originally intended, and 14 people did not manage to pass the first learning
stage in 50 minutes (or gave up earlier), and consequently we did not manage
to collect any choice data from these participants. After applying all exclusion
criteria, we were left with choice data from 86 people, who completed 68 pictorial
and 76 numerical choice blocks. Out of the 86 people, 61 completed both the
pictorial and numeric conditions within the 50 minutes provided.
The left panel on Figure 4.7 shows the number of attempts it took for
participants to pass the numerical and pictorial learning stage (each attempt
consisted of 20 questions, as explained above), by the order of the conditions
(numerical/pictorial first, therefore, there are 86 dots, each of which is a par-
ticipant). For the majority of participants, it took fewer than 10 attempts to
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pass the learning stages, and there is considerable individual heterogeneity in the
number of attempts it took to complete the learning stage in the two conditions.
The right panel in Figure 4.7 shows the number of completed choice
trials by condition and condition order (here each dot refers to a participant’s
condition, there are 144 of these overall), demonstrating that the vast majority
of participants have managed to finish at least one of the choice stages before the
experiment was terminated. We can also see that the choice stages were more
likely to be interrupted in the numerical condition than in the pictorial condition,
because choice trials involving numerical choice options typically took longer.
Figure 4.8 shows the distribution of the proportion of trials on which
the decoy was chosen, by condition. It can be seen that participants generally
performed well in identifying dominated options (in 94% of the 144 conditions,
the proportion of the trials where the decoy was chosen was below 10%). In
addition, the decoy was never chosen in 45% of the numerical and 10% of the
pictorial conditions, indicating that participants found it much easier to identify
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the decoy in the numerical condition. This is not surprising, given that in the
numerical version, the choice process requires the sequential comparison of the
attribute values, during which the decoy option is more likely to be identified
with certainty and thus avoided, whereas in the pictorial version people are more
likely to make a quicker, intuitive decision, which might result in an error.
To demonstrate this, Figure 4.9 shows the median of the reaction times
(measured in seconds, scaled by subject) by condition, chosen item, and subject.
As expected, participants took substantially longer to make a decision in the nu-
merical condition. Interestingly, we do not see substantial differences in reaction
times by the chosen item.
In addition, there were no differences in the performance on the catch
trials between the numerical and pictorial conditions (paired Wilcoxon Signed-
Rank Test using data from the 58 participants who completed both conditions,
p = .482), showing that participants were equally good at spotting and choosing
a clearly dominating option in the two types of choice tasks.
As specified in the pre-registration, to investigate how the attraction effect
depends on the presentation format of the stimuli, we first tested whether the
order of the conditions modulated the strength of the attraction effect. We did
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Figure 4.9: Distribution of the median scaled reaction times of
each participant by condition and chosen item (target,
competitor, decoy). Reaction times were first scaled by subject,
then the median was calculated for each subject, condition, and
chosen item. Black points and corresponding error bars represent
bootstrapped 95% CIs of the means of these medians, weighted












































































































































































































































































































































































































Condition ● ●Numeric Pictorial
not expect the effect to depend on the order. For each participant and condition,
we calculated the attraction effect as the proportion of all trials on which the
target was chosen, after excluding trials where the decoy was chosen. The left
panel on Figure 4.10 shows the distribution of the proportion of trials on which
the target was chosen. We can see that while the order of the conditions does
not affect the strength of the attraction effect in the pictorial choice task, there
is a pronounced increase in the tendency to choose the target in the numerical
condition if it follows the pictorial choice task. The right panel of Figure 4.10
echoes the same pattern, showing the strength of the effect in the two choice
tasks for the subset of participants who completed both types of choice tasks (of
which there were 58).
Table 4.1 shows the results from a mixed-effects logistic regression, where
we explore how the strength of the effect varies by condition and condition
order. The results again indicate that the strength of the attraction effect in
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Condition:Numerical 1.001 (0.876, 1.145)
Order:Pictorial first 0.946 (0.789, 1.137)
Condition:Numerical·Order:Pictorial first 1.405∗∗∗ (1.173, 1.684)
Constant 1.059 (0.919, 1.219)
Observations 144
Log Likelihood −508.063
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,026.126
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 1,040.975
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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the numerical condition is much more pronounced when the first condition was
pictorial. Specifically, switching the order of the two conditions (from numerical
first to pictorial first) results in a 40%, 95% CI [17%–68%], increase in the odds
of choosing the target in the numerical condition.
Since the order of the conditions unexpectedly modulated the strength
of the effect, we only used every participant’s first condition for our final test
of the attraction effect, as specified in our pre-registration. As expected from
the visual inspection of Figure 4.10, using Welch’s t-test, we found no difference
between the proportion of trials where the target was chosen in the pictorial (M
= 0.50, 95% CI [0.47, 0.53], N = 41) or numerical (M = 0.51, 95% CI [0.49,
0.54], N = 42) condition, t(78.87) = 0.65, p = .52.
4.2.4 Discussion
To summarise, our results are somewhat mixed. On the one hand, we have not
found evidence for the attraction effect in the pictorial condition, which was
expected. On the other hand, we found that the strength of the attraction effect
strongly depended on the order of the conditions in the numerical condition,
with a markedly higher likelihood of the target being chosen if the numerical
condition followed the pictorial condition.
We originally predicted to see the attraction effect in the numerical con-
dition, regardless of the order of the conditions. The choice pattern we found
surprised us, for several reasons. First, decades of decision-making research sug-
gests that the attraction effect is a reliable phenomenon when attribute values
are displayed numerically, yet in our experiment participants were indifferent
between the target and competitor when the numerical condition came first. In
addition, it is not immediately obvious why the order of the conditions would
have such a strong effect on susceptibility to the attraction effect. We can only
speculate about the reasons behind these puzzling results.
One obvious difference between our experimental task and the standard
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attraction effect choice paradigm is that in our task, participants had to learn
the underlying trade-off between the attribute values, as opposed to relying on a
more intuitive, preferential valuation rule. This is problematic for two reasons.
First, it might mean that our artificial valuation rule was conceptually different
from a standard preferential choice task (where valuation is more intuitive), as
the choice process involved consulting a previously learnt rule, which is unlikely
to resemble a preferential choice process. A second, related issue is that in the
practice stages, we trained participants to be experts in inferring the nominal
value of the options, while it has been previously shown that the attraction
effect tends to be stronger when the decision maker is unfamiliar with the choice
domain, and weakens with expertise (e.g., Huber et al., 2014). This is supported
by the fact that increasing the number of practice trials slightly reduces the
attraction effect, as one additional practice trial decreases the odds of choosing
the target by 5.8%, 95% CI [3%, 10.9%] (see regression results in Appendix C.1).
However, even if these concerns have some validity, they do not offer a
comprehensive explanation for our results. Specifically, they cannot accommo-
date the fact that we found a strong effect of condition order. Our results show
a strong attraction effect in the numerical condition when it follows the pictorial
condition, and no attraction effect when the numerical condition comes first.
One tempting explanation for such a strong temporal effect could be that
cognitive fatigue affected participants’ decision making in the second half of the
experiment. As mentioned before, the learning stages of the experiment proved
to be much harder than we expected and intended, illustrated by the fact that
42% of the participants did not manage to complete the experiment within 50
minutes, with 14 people giving up altogether before passing the first learning
stage. In addition, the numerical condition required significantly more cognitive
effort than the pictorial task, reflected by the much longer reaction times (see
Figure 4.9).
It has been previously suggested that depletion of cognitive resources
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(induced by a Stroop-task that preceded the choice stage) results in a more pro-
nounced attraction effect, due to higher reliance on intuitive decision processes
(Pocheptsova, Amir, Dhar, & Baumeister, 2009). This conclusion is supported
by the finding that the attraction effect is stronger for those who are more
likely to engage in intuitive reasoning (Mao & Oppewal, 2012), although a later
replication attempt failed to reproduce the same choice pattern for depleted par-
ticipants (de Haan & van Veldhuizen, 2015). The link between cognitive fatigue
and susceptibility to the attraction effect remains ambiguous in the literature,
and we cannot test the role of cognitive fatigue in the context of our choice ex-
periment, as we did not measure fatigue. In addition, the slight negative effect
of the number of practice trials on the strength of the attraction effect is not
consistent with a fatigue-based explanation.
Previous research has suggested that the attraction effect strengthens
when deliberation time increases (Trueblood et al., 2014), although cognitive
fatigue, if present, is likely to alter this relationship. While Figure 4.9 shows a
very slight tendency towards shorter reaction times when the target is chosen in
the numerical condition when it follows the pictorial condition, this difference is
not statistically significant (Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test using data from the 58
participants who completed both conditions, p = .864).
If participants got tired towards the end of the experiment, and they
are more susceptible to the attraction effect in the numerical condition after a
prolonged period of cognitive effort, then we would expect that the likelihood of
choosing the target increases throughout the choice stage. To test this hypothe-
sis, we explored how the tendency to choose the target changed over time within
a condition (numerical/pictorial), depending on the order of the conditions.
To this end, we divided the number of trials in each condition into four
equal sized blocks (in their temporal order), and calculated the corresponding
target choice proportion for each block. If the overall number of trials were not
a multiple of four, then the remainder was allocated to the fourth block.
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Figure 4.11: Mean target choice share by condition, condition order and block number. Error
bars represent 95% bootstrapped CIs, weighted by the number of trials in each block.
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Figure 4.11 shows the average proportion of trials where the target was
chosen by condition, condition order, and block number, revealing a slightly
increasing temporal tendency to choose the target in the numerical condition if
it follows the pictorial condition. Interestingly, the pattern is absent from all
other condition-order combinations. While it is likely that our findings are a
result of a complex interplay between several factors that we did not predict
when we designed the experiment, this temporal pattern suggests that cognitive
fatigue could be an appropriate candidate theory for explaining the strong link
between the strength of the attraction effect in the numerical condition and
condition order in our experiment.
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4.3 General Discussion
This study set out to investigate the extent to which the attraction effect de-
pends on the presentation format of the stimuli. Our earlier study described in
Chapter 3 had failed to replicate the effect using complex, naturalistic stimuli.
We hypothesized that stimulus presentation, and more specifically, the possibil-
ity of serial processing of the attribute dimensions might be key in explaining
the seemingly elusive nature of this decision bias.
Using insights from decades of psychological research on information pro-
cessing, we created a simplified, artificial stimulus that can be represented in a
pictorial and numerical format, to test if it is the separable nature of the at-
tribute dimensions that gives rise to the attraction effect. We expected to see
a strong attraction effect in the numerical condition, and no attraction effect in
the pictorial condition.
Somewhat unexpectedly, we found a strong attraction effect in the numer-
ical condition, but only when it followed the pictorial condition. The likelihood
of choosing the target showed an upward temporal trend in this numerical condi-
tion, consistent with a cognitive fatigue explanation, but our data did not allow
us to directly test the link between cognitive fatigue and susceptibility to the
attraction effect.
While we cannot offer a comprehensive explanation for these contradic-
tory results, we also recognise that artificially induced preferences (created by
our imposed valuation rule) are unlikely to give rise to the same decision pro-
cesses as more intrinsic preferences, where little or no cognitive effort is required
to make a decision. For this reason, we suggest that any test of the attraction
effect using perceptual stimuli should aim to use a simple rule to guide choices,
as these are more likely to resemble real-life preferential decisions, and thus are
better suited to probe the attraction effect under different stimuli formats.
A more comprehensive investigation of the link between the strength of
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the attraction effect and stimulus presentation format could explore how the
separability of the attribute dimensions alter this relationship. For example,
a purely numerical condition could be compared to a perceptual version, with
spatially separable attribute dimensions (e.g., width and height of rectangles,
Trueblood et al., 2013). Then, in another condition, the presentation of the pic-
torial stimuli could be spatially non-separable, preventing the serial processing
of the attribute dimensions. The final condition could test the strength of the
effect with integral dimensions (e.g., intensity and brightness), but with no im-
posed valuation rule. Differences in the strength of the attraction effect between
these conditions could provide us with important insights about the cognitive
processes underlying this decision bias.
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Chapter 5
Exploring the link between
football and domestic abuse –




Domestic abuse is a complex phenomenon affecting people from all walks of life.
It is increasingly recognised as a major public policy concern in many countries,
including the UK (Prpic & Rosamund, 2018). While anyone can become a victim
of domestic abuse, women are disproportionately affected, with more than 25%
of women, and 15% of men in England and Wales reported to have experienced
some form of domestic abuse since the age of 16 (Office for National Statistics,
2018).
In the UK, the definition of domestic abuse has changed over time, ow-
ing to the increasing recognition of its multifaceted nature. The initial cross-
government definition was the following: “any incident of threatening behaviour,
violence or abuse [psychological, physical, sexual, financial or emotional] between
adults who are or have been intimate partners or family members, regardless of
gender or sexuality” (Home Office, 2012). This definition was subsequently up-
dated in 2012 to include the concept of controlling and coercive behaviour and
recognise domestic abuse as a pattern of interactions (as opposed to a one-off
incident). The preferred terminology has also been changed from “domestic vi-
olence” to “domestic abuse”, to reflect that the new definition encompasses a
wider range of behaviours.
Domestic abuse has substantial mental health implications, with an es-
timated three-quarter of survivors experiencing posttraumatic stress disorder
symptoms. In addition, they and are significantly more likely to report feelings
of anxiety and depression, compared to the general population (Ferrari et al.,
2014). The long-lasting impact of domestic abuse is not limited to the direct tar-
get of abuse. Witnessing domestic abuse at home can have severe developmental
impacts on children, including an increased likelihood of experiencing mental
and physical health problems and difficulties in interpersonal relationships in
later life, worse educational attainment, and engagement in criminal behaviours
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(Callaghan, Alexander, Sixsmith, & Fellin, 2018).
As the cross-government definition reflects, one characteristic of domestic
abuse that differentiates it from other types of violent crime is its repeated na-
ture. It is estimated that on average, victims live in the abusive relationship for
2.7 years, experiencing approximately 50 cases of abuse before getting effective
help (Ending Domestic Abuse - Getting it right first time, 2015). The most reli-
able statistics on domestic abuse in the UK is the Crime Survey for England and
Wales (CSEW; Office for National Statistics, 2018), a victimisation survey that
includes a self-completion module on domestic abuse. According to the CSEW,
only 17% of those respondents who experienced domestic abuse between April,
2017 and March, 2018 reported it to the police (Office for National Statistics,
2018). This extremely high level of underreporting is another characteristic that
differentiates domestic abuse from other types of crime.
In the most extreme cases, domestic abuse can culminate in domestic
homicide. In the period between April, 2017 and March, 2018, 70 people in
England and Wales were killed by their current or former partner, and 90% of
these victims were women (Office for National Statistics, 2019), demonstrating
that domestic abuse is a fundamentally gendered phenomenon. While the per-
vasive problem of underreporting poses a significant obstacle to deriving reliable
estimates of the true extent of the problem, the economic cost of domestic abuse
in England and Wales between April, 2016 and March, 2017 was estimated to
be as high as £66 billion (R. Oliver, Alexander, Roe, & Wlasny, 2019). The
largest component of this cost is represented by the physical and emotional con-
sequences of abuse, reflected in the reduced expected quality of life for survivors.
In addition, lost economic output resulting from missed workdays and reduced
productivity, as well as costs to the health care system also significantly con-
tribute to the overall figure.
In light of these costs, substantial research efforts have been devoted to
the identification of common precipitating factors of domestic abuse. While
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causal inference is impossible due to the complexity and multifaceted nature of
the phenomenon, identifying the factors that make people more likely to become
perpetrators is crucial for designing effective interventions. Studies exploring the
risk factors of domestic abuse perpetration have found that young age, substance
abuse, low socio-economic status, and low educational attainment are all asso-
ciated with an increased risk of becoming a perpetrator (e.g., Capaldi, Knoble,
Shortt, & Kim, 2012; Costa et al., 2015; Yakubovich et al., 2018). In addition,
ample quantitative evidence shows that economic deprivation is a significant
predictor of domestic abuse victimisation, especially for women (e.g., Walby &
Allen, 2004; Khalifeh, Hargreaves, Howard, & Birdthistle, 2013; Towers, 2015;
Fahmy & Williamson, 2018), suggesting that the lack of economic independence
is a major factor preventing women escaping from the cycle of abuse (Walby,
Towers, & Francis, 2016).
In the wake of the 2018 FIFA World Cup, a powerful, chilling poster
campaign named “The Not-So-Beautiful-Game” was launched by the National
Centre for Domestic Violence, to raise awareness of the link between the upcom-
ing World Cup and the expected increases in the number of reported domestic
abuse incidents (National Center for Domestic Violence, 2018). The poster fea-
tured a picture of a woman’s face with St George’s cross painted over it with
blood, recreating the English flag. The text read: “If England get beaten, so
will she. Domestic violence increases 26% when England play, 38% if they lose”
(see Figure 5.1). The campaign has proved to be highly successful, and had
been widely discussed in the British media before the 2018 World Cup. Many
England football fans were surprised and disturbed by the association of their
beloved game with domestic abuse, in spite of the well-documented association
between team contact sports and violence.
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Figure 5.1: “The Not-So-Beautiful-Game” campaign by the National Centre for Domestic
Violence. https://www.ncdv.org.uk/the-not-so-beautiful-game/. Copyright 2019 by NCDV.
Adapted with permission.
5.1.1 Making the link between sport and domestic abuse in Eng-
land
The link between sport and violence has long been the focus of academic research.
While sporting activities have a range of widely recognised societal benefits,
violence is undoubtedly an inherent part of many team contact sports, either
within, or outside the rules of the game (Swallow, 2017). In nineteenth-century
England, modern team sports (e.g., rugby, cricket, football) were seen as “manly
sports”, and were regarded as excellent ways to masculinize and prepare young
(upper- and middle-class) boys for their future careers, through the principles
of endurance, loyalty, and respect for authority. At the same time, girls were
explicitly deterred from practising these sports, corroborating the notion that
men are “a breed apart” (Kidd, 2013). This resulted in socially accepted gender
differences in participation rates in these sports that still persist. Today, televised
sports provide easy access to the sports fan experience for everyone. However,
research in sport sociology suggest that there still exist significant differences in
the role and nature of sports fandom between genders (Sabo, Gray, & Moore,
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2000).
Traditionally masculine values, such as strength, toughness, aggression,
power and dominance are embedded in sports. If these values can be internalised
through spectatorship, then it is a natural concern that they may manifest in
the real life actions of some fans in the form of violence (Williams & Neville,
2014). Previous qualitative research has indeed suggested that televised contact
sports can serve as vehicle for the male sports fan to redefine, and express his
masculinity in a way that allows dominance, control, and can ultimately manifest
in the perpetration of violent acts, including domestic abuse (Sabo et al., 2000;
Swallow, 2017), given susceptibility to such behaviours. Below we review the
quantitative evidence for this relationship.
5.1.2 Evidence for the link between sport and domestic abuse
There exist numerous investigations of the link between sport and domestic
abuse. In the US, most studies have focused on the National Football League
(NFL). White, Katz, and Scarborough (1992) tested whether the number of
violent assaults (measured by the number of emergency room admissions) in
northern Virginia were affected by Washington Redskins football games between
1988–89, depending on the outcome of the match. Controlling for day of the
week, month, year, as well as public holidays, they found that the number of
women admitted to emergency increased significantly on the day following a
victory of the Redskins. However, a limitation of this study is that they could
not identify specifically domestic abuse related assaults.
In a later exploratory study, Sachs and Chu (2000) analysed the relation-
ship between NFL games and the number of dispatches to domestic disputes by
the Los Angeles County Sheriff Department between 1993 and 1995. They com-
pared the percentage increase in the number of dispatches from Wednesdays (no
games played) to Sundays (regular game day), and tested whether this increase
was significantly higher on football, playoff, and Super Bowl weeks, compared
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to no-football reference weeks. Surprisingly, they observed the opposite pattern
in the two football seasons, with a general increase on playoff and Super Bowl
weeks in the 1993–94 season, but a decrease in the following season, albeit both
nonsignificant compared to baseline (no-football weeks). They speculate that
this difference might stem from the fact that while 1993–94 was a winning sea-
son for the local team, a year later they made plans to move to a different city,
which might have affected fans’ engagement with the games.
In a more extensive study, Gantz, Bradley, and Wang (2006) tested
whether the number of domestic violence dispatches increased on NFL game
days, using data from 15 cities with NFL franchises between 1996 and 2002,
controlling for day of the week, month, year, and public holidays. They found
a modest increase in the number of domestic violence dispatches on days when
the local team played an NFL game.
Oths and Robertson (2007) explored the temporal pattern of crisis calls
made to a domestic violence shelter between 1997 and 1999. They found that
on average, there are fewer calls on the day of the Super Bowl, or on other hol-
idays (including Labor Day, Halloween, Memorial Day, Fourth of July, Easter,
Christmas, New Year’s Eve, and Thanksgiving), compared to other days during
the year. In contrast, their data suggest that the number of calls increase during
school holidays, and they concluded that the decision to leave an abusive rela-
tionship is likely to be guided by the timing of the school vacation, to make it
the least disruptive for the children involved.
However, their data show markedly different temporal patterns compared
to police data: for example, they report the number of calls to be the lowest
during the weekend, whereas police data consistently show that the number of
reported domestic abuse cases increase significantly during the weekend (e.g.,
Liam Bannon, 2016, Scottish Government, 2018). This stark discrepancy might
be due to the fact that abuse is more likely to occur when the victim and the
perpetrator are together (during the weekend), but the victim is more likely to
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seek shelter options when the perpetrator is not around (during the week).
Card and Dahl (2011) presented the most extensive study on the link
between reported number of domestic abuse incidents and NFL games up to
date. Using data on domestic violence reports to the police in 750 city and
county police agencies from the period between 1995 and 2006, they found that
an unexpected loss of the local football team resulted in a 10% increase in the
rate of reported male to female intimate partner violence (IPV). After controlling
for the expectations of the fans (through the pre-match betting odds), the result
of any match can be considered random, which allowed them to make a causal
inference about the effect of NFL games on the number of reported domestic
abuse incidents.
In Scotland, two studies have investigated the association between Celtic
and Rangers matches (commonly known as “Old Firm” fixtures) and domes-
tic abuse. The famous rivalry between the two Glasgow-based teams has deep
political and sociological roots, and their fixtures are known for notorious fan vi-
olence (Williams & Neville, 2014). Using data from Strathclyde Police, Williams,
Neville, House, and Donnelly (2013) have investigated whether the number of
reported domestic abuse incidents increases on days when there is an Old Firm
or Scotland International fixture in Glasgow, using data from seven days after
the match as a baseline measure. They found that the number of reported do-
mestic abuse cases was significantly higher on Old Firm match days, compared
to both Scotland International match days, and non-Old Firm fixture days.
In a later study, Dickson, Jennings, and Koop (2016) have investigated
whether the reference point behaviour observed in the context of the NFL in
the US (reported by Card & Dahl, 2011) are also present in the behaviour of
Celtic and Rangers fans. While their findings demonstrate a 28–41% increase in
the number of reported domestic abuse incidents on days when there is an Old
Firm match, they found no evidence for an additional effect of unexpected losses.
This difference highlights the importance of the cultural context when analysing
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the link between sport and domestic abuse. However, as Rangers and Celtic
fans are not geographically segregated within Glasgow, they had to assume that
the other team’s upset win does not increase the likelihood that their fans will
become perpetrators, which is a strong, untested assumption.
In England, most studies have focused on the link between national foot-
ball tournaments (such as the World Cup) and domestic abuse. Football’s history
is inextricably linked to England, and it is by far the most popular sport in the
country (Parry, Jones, & Wann, 2014), with the 2018 World Cup attracting a
record number of 44.5 million viewers (BBC Sport, 2018). England’s partic-
ipation in these tournaments are times of heightened patriotic emotions, and
a strengthened sense of “Englishness”, fuelled by media narratives that often
use war references, and a “us vs. them” rhetoric to generate and represent an
English national identity (Vincent & Harris, 2014). It can be argued that the
observation that football fandom can serve as an important tool for masculin-
ity construction is especially pertinent in the context of England’s participation
in national football tournaments, owing to the popularity of the sport in the
country, the associated media attention, and the resulting heightened sense of
national consciousness.
In line with this hypothesis, studies using data on emergency department
attendances have identified substantial increases in the number of assault atten-
dances on days when England plays in the World Cup (Quigg, Hughes, & Bellis,
2013; Bellis et al., 2012). One of the earliest examinations of the link between
football and domestic abuse by Brimicombe and Cafe (2012) used daily data
from 33 out of 39 police forces in England from the period of June–July in 2009
and 2010 (World Cup tournament year). They tested whether the reported num-
ber of domestic abuse cases increased significantly on days when the England
national football team won, lost, or drew, compared to the same days in 2009,
and other, non-match days during the tournament in 2010. The study found
that rates of reported domestic abuse increased significantly when England lost
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or won (about 33–35%), but did not change on days when they drew.
A more comprehensive investigation, using daily counts of domestic abuse
in Lancashire from the 2002, 2006 and 2010 World Cup, found a 38% increase
in the number of reported domestic violence cases when the England team lost,
and a 26% increase when they won or drew (Kirby, Francis, & O’Flaherty, 2014).
These estimates had been widely discussed in the British media before the 2018
World Cup, and the figures were also quoted on the posters in the Not-So Beau-
tiful Game Campaign.
While domestic abuse is predominantly understood as a pattern of on-
going behaviour involving a series of occurrences, rather than a one-off incident
triggered by football (Brooks-Hay & Lombard, 2018), these studies, and other
qualitative investigations (e.g., Swallow, 2017) nevertheless suggest that national
football tournaments can create an environment for abusers that is conducive
to domestic abuse. In the context of England, most studies have hypothesized
alcohol to be a significant contributing factor, but we are not aware of any quan-
titative investigation exploring the role of alcohol in the link between football
and domestic abuse.
5.1.3 Theorizing the role of alcohol in the link between football
and domestic abuse
Qualitative investigations suggest that alcohol can be a significant factor in the
link between football and domestic abuse. Alcohol has a strong association with
domestic abuse (Peralta, Tuttle, & Steele, 2010), those with alcohol-problems are
more likely to be perpetrators and, when alcohol is involved, there is evidence
that the violence might result in more serious injuries. However, it is generally
understood that the role of alcohol should be considered in the context of a range
of social, biological and psychological factors, and that alcohol is not the direct
cause of domestic abuse (Javaid, 2015; Peralta et al., 2010). One explanation for
the co-occurrence of domestic abuse and alcohol is that, for some men, drinking
141
and violence plays an instrumental role in the construction and expression of
masculinity, especially when the problem of masculine deficiency is present (e.g.,
by unemployment, Peralta et al., 2010). It has also been suggested that some
perpetrators use alcohol to deflect responsibility for their actions, using alcohol
as a “shield” that protects them from being seen as a violent abuser (Javaid,
2015).
In the US, the relationship between unexpected NFL losses and IPV
did not depend on alcohol-involvement in the abuse case (Card & Dahl, 2011),
while England-based quantitative studies did not look at the role of alcohol in
particular. Given the strong association between drinking culture and football in
England (Dixon, 2014), a relationship continuously reinforced by the marketing
practices of the alcohol industry (Gornall, 2014), we hypothesize that alcohol
play an important role in the relationship between national football tournaments
and domestic abuse in England.
To explore this hypothesis, we test if the daily number of reported domes-
tic abuse cases recorded by the West Midlands Police between 2010 and 2018
increase on days when the England national team plays in the World Cup or
the European Championship, and whether the effect, if any, depends on alcohol-
involvement in the case or the result of the match.
5.2 Data
Our dataset comprises all crimes and specific types of incidents (such as domestic
abuse) that have been reported to theWest Midlands Police (WMP) in the period
between 2010 and 2018. The WMP is the third largest police force in England
(Home Office, 2018), serving an estimated 2.9 million people in 2017 (Office
for National Statistics, 2017). The first half of 2017 has been excluded due to
missing data. The number of reported domestic abuse cases is the sum of crimes
that have a domestic abuse marker, and all domestic abuse incidents. Crimes
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that have a domestic abuse marker indicate cases of domestic abuse that meet
the criteria for notifiable offences in the UK, whereas domestic abuse incidents
refer to cases that do not qualify as a crime. For each record in this dataset,
we have information about the time and location of the incident or crime, and
the gender and age of the offender and victim. We restricted our analyses to
cases with one victim and one offender. We can also identify repeat offenders
and victims by their unique person identifier. Domestic abuse cases constitute
about 31% of all recorded crimes and incidents in the dataset, and about 23%
of all domestic abuse cases are alcohol-related. The alcohol marker for each
case in our dataset is a dummy variable (Yes/No). Therefore, in our dataset,
each day in the relevant time period has two rows: one recording the number of
alcohol-related and another recording the number of non-alcohol related cases
recorded on that day (Figure 5.2 shows their respective distributions). In the
period between 2010 and 2018, the daily rate of non-alcohol related domestic
incidents fell between 1.6–3 cases per 100,000 individuals, whereas the daily rate
of alcohol-related cases fell between 0.35–1 cases per 100,000 individuals. There
were three World Cups (2010, 2014, 2018) and two European Championships
(2012, 2016) in the period covered by our dataset. All included tournaments
took place in the months of June and July.















Histogram of the daily number 
of alcohol and non−alcohol related cases in the dataset
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Previous research has mostly focused on IPV, the largest subcategory of
domestic abuse. While IPV is more common than abuse perpetrated by family
members (Office for National Statistics, 2018), our dataset does not contain
information about the exact relationship between the victim and perpetrator,
therefore we cannot separate the two types of abuse, and we will refer to them
collectively as “domestic abuse”.
While our dataset contains all cases of domestic abuse that have been re-
ported to the West Midlands Police between 2010 and 2018, as mentioned before,
the vast majority of domestic abuse incidents in fact never get reported. This
substantial reporting bias, and its potential correlation with other contextual
factors warrant a careful interpretation of the estimates from any quantitative
study investigating domestic abuse, and highlights the importance of utilising a
mixed methods approach in exploring the factors precipitating domestic abuse.
5.3 Results
In the following regressions, each observation is a day in the period between
2010 and 2018, and the outcome variable is the number of domestic abuse cases
reported to have been perpetrated on that day. To investigate whether national
football tournaments affect the number of reported abuse cases, we classify each
day in our dataset as either a day on which England won (England win, 8
days), lost (England lost, 8 days) or drew (England draw, 6 days), a day after
an England match day (After England, 22 days), any other day during the
tournament (Tournament on, 106 days), or any other day during the rest of
the year (Non-tournament day, 2867 days). All day-level regressions presented
below include Christmas, New Year’s Eve, day of the week, month and year
controls. Since out outcome variable is a count (the daily number of alcohol
and non-alcohol related domestic abuse cases reported to the police), we used
a Poisson and negative binomial regression framework to investigate the link
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between football and domestic abuse. More specifically, the regression model we
estimated took the following form:
ln(Ci) = µi = α+ βXi (5.1)
with Ci ∼ Poisson(λi) or where Ci ∼ Negative Binomial(λiθ)
where Ci is the observed daily count of domestic abuse cases reported to
the police (either alcohol, or non-alcohol related), Xi captures the explanatory
variables, most importantly Alcohol (Yes/No), Type of day, and a set of control
variables (day of the week, month, year, Christmas and New Year’s Eve), λi is
the daily mean of the number of reported cases, whereas θ is the overdispersion
parameter for the negative binomial distribution.
5.3.1 Main results
5.3.1.1 The effect of England football games on reported domestic
abuse
Using a series of negative binomial regressions, we first compare various, in-
creasingly complex model specifications to understand the relationship between
football, as shown in Table 5.1. In the first regression, the coefficient of Alcohol
reflects the base rate of alcohol versus non-alcohol related cases in the dataset:
there are 72% fewer alcohol-related cases than non-alcohol related cases. Adding
type of day as an explanatory variable to a model with only alcohol and time
controls marginally improves the model fit (see column 2), and the results show
a 20%, 95% CI [5%–38%] increase in the number of reported domestic abuse
cases when the England national football team wins. The comparison between
column 2 and 3 reveals that this increase stems from a much more pronounced,
61% 95% CI [24%–110%] increase within the subgroup of alcohol-related domes-
tic abuse cases on days when England wins. Interestingly, we find no evidence
for comparable increases in the number of reported domestic abuse cases when
145
Table 5.1: Number of reported domestic abuse incidents by alcohol involvement and type of
day. Each day in the analysed corresponds to two observations in the dataset.
Dependent variable:
Number of reported domestic abuse cases per day
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Alcohol −0.719∗∗∗ −0.719∗∗∗ −0.719∗∗∗ −0.862∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.031)
Tournament on −0.004 0.014 0.032
(0.023) (0.027) (0.020)
England win 0.205∗∗∗ −0.037 −0.031
(0.069) (0.091) (0.063)
England draw 0.025 0.048 0.047
(0.082) (0.104) (0.072)
England loss 0.078 −0.013 0.050
(0.068) (0.089) (0.061)
After England 0.097∗∗ 0.075 0.086∗∗
(0.043) (0.055) (0.038)
Tournament on:Alcohol −0.043 −0.083∗∗
(0.040) (0.035)
England win:Alcohol 0.610∗∗∗ 0.606∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.101)
England draw:Alcohol −0.055 −0.034
(0.165) (0.129)
England loss:Alcohol 0.223 0.076
(0.135) (0.101)
After England:Alcohol 0.051 0.037
(0.084) (0.066)
Number of observations 6034 6034 6034 6034
AIC 45,539.500 45,536.770 45,530.360 41,959.280
a ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
b Estimates are from a series of negative binomial regressions (based on tests
of overdispersion) with year, month, day of week, Christmas, New Year’s eve
controls; Model 4 further includes interactions between alcohol and all control
variables; standard errors in parentheses
the England national team loses. Less surprising, and more consistent with pre-
vious findings is the lack of an increase on England draw days, probably due to
the fact that high-stake matches after the group-stage in the tournament cannot
result in a draw.
Further interacting alcohol with the rest of the time-specific control vari-
ables results in a substantially improved model fit (see column 4), but does not
alter the effect of an England win on alcohol-related domestic abuse (61%, 95%
CI [32%–96%]). The results also reveal a smaller, 9%, 95% CI [1%–17%] increase
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in non-alcohol related cases on days following an England match day, potentially
the result of a temporal spillover effect from the previous match day. We also see
an 8%, 95% CI [2%–14%] decrease in alcohol-related cases during the tourna-
ment, but not on England match days, perhaps stemming from heavy drinking
being mostly concentrated around England match (and particularly England
win) days, and relatively lower alcohol consumption on other days during the
tournament.
While this increase is proportionally high, and behaviourally important,
it is exceeded by other occasions when people are likely to drink. For example,
the increase in the number of alcohol-related domestic abuse cases on Saturdays
and during the Christmas period are 75% and 85%, respectively.
5.3.1.2 The effect by offender-victim gender group
To explore the characteristics of this increase, we investigate whether the strength
of the effect varies by offender-victim gender subgroup. Previous qualitative re-
search has suggested that the link between football and domestic abuse is a result
of violent expression of masculinity (Sabo et al., 2000), where heavy drinking is
also often present. If this was the case, we would expect football and alcohol to
only affect reported numbers of male-perpetrated domestic abuse.
Table 5.2 shows the results from four negative binomial regressions, one
for each offender-victim gender group. These reveal a pronounced increase in the
subgroup of male to female abuse (which comprises about 80% of all domestic
abuse cases in our data), where the number of reported alcohol-related cases
increase by 67%, 95% CI [35%–107%] on England win days. While we see similar
tendencies for alcohol-related cases in other gender subgroups on England win
days, these coefficients are about half the size of the male to female effect, and
are not statistically different from zero. These results can be interpreted in light
of the observation that British football fandom is prevalently male-dominated
(Parry et al., 2014), and they lend support to the hypothesis that masculinity
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Table 5.2: Number of reported domestic abuse incidents by type of day, alcohol involvement,
and gender of perpetrator and victim
Dependent variable:
Number of reported domestic abuse cases per day
Male Male Female Female
to Male to Female to Female to Male
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Alcohol −0.825∗∗∗ −0.870∗∗∗ −0.808∗∗∗ −0.858∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.034) (0.133) (0.080)
Tournament on 0.005 0.038∗ 0.053 −0.048
(0.054) (0.021) (0.062) (0.045)
England win −0.068 −0.022 0.019 −0.147
(0.165) (0.066) (0.193) (0.135)
England draw 0.080 0.038 0.043 0.107
(0.194) (0.076) (0.225) (0.169)
England loss −0.063 0.065 −0.036 0.117
(0.162) (0.064) (0.171) (0.136)
After England −0.036 0.093∗∗ 0.152∗ 0.025
(0.103) (0.040) (0.114) (0.082)
Alcohol:Tournament on −0.181∗ −0.077∗∗ −0.018 −0.215∗
(0.106) (0.038) (0.137) (0.084)
Alcohol:England win 0.334 0.674∗∗∗ 0.360 0.472
(0.285) (0.108) (0.358) (0.231)
Alcohol:England draw −0.282 0.031 0.071 −0.580
(0.411) (0.138) (0.629) (0.313)
Alcohol:England loss 0.286 0.028 0.328 −0.088
(0.279) (0.111) (0.356) (0.231)
Alcohol:After England 0.209 0.052 −0.111 −0.040
(0.185) (0.071) (0.242) (0.159)
Number of days 3,017 3,017 3,017 3,017
a ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
b Estimates are from a series of negative binomial regressions (based on tests
of overdispersion) with year, month, day of week, Christmas, New Year’s
eve controls interacted with alcohol; standard errors in parentheses
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construction and alcohol may be key to the link between football and domestic
abuse. However, it is unclear why victory-induced, alcohol-related masculinity
construction would culminate in violence only against women.
5.3.1.3 The effect on other criminal behaviours
Our unique dataset further allows us to explore whether England games have sim-
ilar effects on other types of criminal behaviours. Specifically, we are interested
in whether England match days affect the number of reported property-related
crimes (including burglary, theft and robbery), public order offences (behaviours
that cause offence to the general public), hate crimes (hate incidents and any
other racially or religiously aggravated crime), and other violent crimes (ex-
cluding cases of domestic abuse). Of particular interest is the effect of football
on non-domestic violent crimes, since it is possible that alcohol-fuelled violence
that follows an England victory is not limited to family and intimate partner
relationships.
Table 5.3 shows the results from a series of negative binomial regressions
for different types of criminal behaviours. These reveal that while there is no
evidence that England matches affect the number of reported property-related
offences, we see an increase in the number of non-alcohol related public order
offence cases on tournament days, when England wins, and on days after an
England game. Hate incidents with no alcohol involvement also increase when
the tournament is on. But most importantly, the effect of an England match on
alcohol-related cases extends to other, non-domestic violent offences, resulting in
a 55%, 95% [43%–72%] increase on days when England wins, and a smaller in-
crease on days following an England match, the exact same pattern we have seen
for domestic abuse. This result highlights that alcohol-related violent behaviour
on England win days is not limited to family relationships. Further analysis re-
veals that the increase in these alcohol-related non-domestic violent crimes also
predominantly comes from male to female cases (although male to male and
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Table 5.3: Number of reported cases for each crime type, by type of day, and alcohol
involvement
Dependent variable:
Number of reported domestic abuse cases per day
Property- Public Order Hate Other
related Offences incidents violence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Alcohol −0.981∗∗∗ −0.922∗∗∗ −0.934∗∗∗ −0.902∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.080) (0.115) (0.040)
Tournament on 0.042 0.096∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.034
(0.026) (0.036) (0.047) (0.027)
England win 0.052 0.234∗∗ 0.073 0.094
(0.074) (0.095) (0.136) (0.077)
England draw 0.100 −0.065 −0.066 0.035
(0.085) (0.128) (0.168) (0.092)
England loss −0.042 0.075 0.011 0.089
(0.078) (0.100) (0.139) (0.078)
After England 0.052 0.161∗∗ 0.141 0.108∗∗
(0.047) (0.062) (0.084) (0.048)
Alcohol:Tournament on 0.135 −0.197∗∗ −0.215∗ −0.009
(0.080) (0.101) (0.141) (0.051)
Alcohol:England win 0.259 0.020 0.310 0.507∗∗∗
(0.219) (0.256) (0.359) (0.132)
Alcohol:England draw 0.060 0.374 0.393 0.360∗
(0.264) (0.303) (0.431) (0.161)
Alcohol:England loss 0.144 0.456∗ −0.032 0.018
(0.226) (0.228) (0.393) (0.138)
Alcohol:After England 0.094 0.127 0.446∗ 0.053
(0.144) (0.158) (0.211) (0.088)
Number of days 3,017 3,017 3,017 3,017
a ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
b Estimates are from a series of negative binomial regressions (based on tests
of overdispersion) with year, month, day of week, Christmas, New Year’s eve
controls interacted by alcohol; standard errors in parentheses
150
Table 5.4: Non-domestic violent cases by gender
Dependent variable:
Number of reported other violent abuse cases per day
Male Male Female Female
to Male to Female to Female to Male
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Alcohol −0.900∗∗∗ −0.891∗∗∗ −0.864∗∗∗ −0.921∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.033) (0.080) (0.066)
Tournament on 0.037 0.050∗∗ 0.041 0.051
(0.026) (0.021) (0.038) (0.036)
England win 0.013 0.019 −0.031 0.174
(0.082) (0.067) (0.111) (0.112)
England draw 0.089 0.012 0.115 0.042
(0.094) (0.078) (0.139) (0.132)
England loss 0.018 0.028 0.088 0.118
(0.082) (0.066) (0.114) (0.108)
After England 0.085 0.070 0.181∗∗ 0.149∗∗
(0.050) (0.042) (0.071) (0.067)
Alcohol:Tournament on −0.027 −0.086∗∗ −0.077 −0.167∗∗
(0.055) (0.038) (0.087) (0.073)
Alcohol:England win 0.391∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗ 0.441∗ −0.114
(0.158) (0.109) (0.251) (0.199)
Alcohol:England draw 0.071 0.102 0.127 −0.337
(0.192) (0.137) (0.361) (0.254)
Alcohol:England loss 0.296∗ 0.057 −0.023 0.027
(0.153) (0.112) (0.237) (0.207)
Alcohol:After England 0.208∗ 0.053 −0.119 −0.158
(0.100) (0.072) (0.163) (0.136)
Number of days 3,017 3,017 3,017 3,017
a ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
b Estimates are from a series of negative binomial regressions (based on tests
of overdispersion) with year, month, day of week, Christmas, New Year’s eve
controls interacted with alcohol; standard errors in parentheses
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female to male cases also contribute, see Table 5.4). While it is possible that
a number of misclassified domestic abuse cases are reflected in this result (e.g.,
if the victim refuses to admit any relationship to the offender), but even if this
was the case, taken together, these findings only strengthen our conclusion that
football and alcohol primarily make men more violent, and direct this violence
overwhelmingly towards women.
5.3.1.4 Three-hour analysis of the effect
Next, we explore the temporal dynamics of the increase in alcohol-related domes-
tic abuse on England match days in more detail. Our previous results revealed
important differences in the effect of football on domestic abuse depending on
alcohol-involvement in the case, therefore we run two separate regressions for
alcohol and non-alcohol related domestic abuse cases to analyse the temporal
pattern of the increase. In our dataset, the end and start time of the incident,
as well as the time of reporting is recorded to the minute.
To explore the temporal dynamics of the England win effect, we divided
each day in our dataset into eight three-hour periods, the first one starting at
12am, and used these to identify specific time windows around the time of the
match. The exact time of the matches vary considerably (the earliest starting
at 1pm, and the latest at 11pm). We first identified the three-hour period of the
day into which each match falls. If the start and end time of the match did not
fall in the same three-hour period, we chose the three-hour period that covers
the larger part of the match (e.g., a 2.5 hour long match starting at 7pm will be
assigned to the 6–9pm period and not to the 9pm–12am period).
Figure 5.3 shows a plot of the estimated percentage increase from these
negative binomial regressions, revealing a stark increase in alcohol-related do-
mestic abuse on days of an England victory, starting in the three hour period of
the match, peaking in the three-hour period afterwards, and gradually declining
to its original level in the twenty-four hours following the victory.
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Note: Estimates are from two separate negative binomial regressions (based on tests of
overdispersion) with year, month, day of week, three-hour period of day, Christmas, New
Year’s eve controls. Shaded area is 95% CIs.
These results strongly suggest that the emotional effect of a win drives
the subsequent increase in alcohol-related domestic abuse, and highlight the
possibility that the effect of England victories stem from prolonged post-match
celebrations coupled with increased alcohol consumption. Interestingly, we also
see a slight increase in non-alcohol related incidents twelve hours after a loss or
a victory, probably reflecting the small increase in non-alcohol related domestic
abuse after an England match day seen in Table 5.1.
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5.3.2 Reconciling the evidence about the link between football
and domestic abuse
Our results have shown that an England victory in a national football tourna-
ment is followed by a 61% increase in the reported number of alcohol-related
domestic abuse cases. This is a large effect, translating into a 0.43 increase in
the daily rate of alcohol-related cases per 100,000 individuals, against a base
rate 0.71 cases per 100,000. The effect is entirely limited to alcohol-related
abuse, even though alcohol-related domestic abuse cases constitute only 23% of
all domestic abuse in our dataset. As such, we see this as strong quantitative
evidence for the instrumental role of alcohol in the relationship between football
and domestic abuse in England. The effect is also exclusively limited to male-
perpetrated domestic abuse, implicating masculinity and alcohol consumption
as the pathway by which football increases abuse. The temporal pattern of the
increase following an England victory is highly consistent with a causal explana-
tion, further supported by the fact that the allocation of England win days can
be largely considered random.
Our findings show both similarities and differences with results from pre-
vious quantitative investigations. Replicating the results of a previous US study,
we found that it is male to female abuse that is affected by a sporting event (Card
& Dahl, 2011). In the same study, the effect of the match did not depend on
alcohol-involvement in the abuse case, and the increase was driven by unexpected
losses. In contrast, we find that in the context of England and football, it is a vic-
tory that results in the largest increase, and that alcohol involvement is critical.
This discrepancy most likely stems from the contextual differences between the
two studies (England, football, national tournaments vs. US, American football,
NFL matches), suggesting that the effect of sports-induced emotional cues on
domestic abuse is highly sensitive to the cultural context.
Based on the pre-match betting odds, all England victories were expected
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in our dataset. This suggests that in the context of England’s participation in
national football tournaments, it is living up to the expectations of the fans that
results in the largest emotional effect. Indeed, English newspapers’ narratives
about the national team’s performance in these tournaments are characterised
with high levels of optimism, expectation and yearning for the glory of the 1966
World Cup (Vincent, Kian, Pedersen, Kuntz, & Hill, 2010). Previous research
has demonstrated how the vicarious experience of watching their team play can
increase supporter’s testosterone and cortisol levels, even when they expect their
team to win, which has been suggested to be an adaptive response to the per-
ceived threat to one’s social identity (van der Meij et al., 2012). Anecdotal
evidence suggests that alcohol consumption increases following an England vic-
tory (Davies, 2018), consistent with our findings.
The most widely-discussed England-based investigation of the link be-
tween football and domestic abuse found that an England loss results in the
most pronounced increase in domestic abuse (38%), and a win or draw have a
slightly smaller effect (26%; Kirby et al., 2014). This study used daily data on
IPV from Lancashire Constabulary (serving a population of 1.4 million, about
half the population of the West Midlands) from the two-month period of the
2002, 2004 and 2010 World Cup tournaments (June–July).
Using daily domestic abuse data from the West Midlands for the period
between 2010 and 2018, we find a markedly different pattern, with the largest
increase in alcohol-involved cases of abuse when England wins, and no evidence
for an increase when England loses. Upon re-analysing their data by treating
wins and draws as two separate variables (resulting in an improved model fit,
see Table 5.5), we see a roughly similar effect for wins (45%, 95% CI [28%–64%])
and losses (39%, 95% CI [18%–64%]), and no effect when England draws. Our
reanalysis replicates the win effect seen in our dataset, though the absence of a
loss effect remains a stark difference between the two studies. While our sample
sizes are different (92 days versus 3,017 days), and our respective samples cover
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different geographical areas and time periods, the discrepancy is still puzzling.
Table 5.5: Replication of Kirby et al. (2014) with an alternative specification
Dependent variable:
Number of reported IPV cases per day








England loss 0.382∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.085)
After England 0.111∗∗ 0.113∗∗
(0.051) (0.047)
Number of days 92 92
AIC 714.980 704.356
a ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
b Estimates are from a series of negative binomial regres-
sions (based on tests of overdispersion) with year and day
of week controls; standard errors in parentheses; data are
only available during the tournament period
To explore the underlying reason for this difference and test the robust-
ness of our results, we find it instructive to break our analysis into specific
tournament years for the two datasets (see Table 5.6). An interesting common
pattern in both samples is the large effect of England’s victory over Slovenia in
the group stage of the 2010 World Cup, which, after much anticipation, secured
their progression to the next stage of the tournament. Equally, the subsequent
loss against Germany in the knockout stage resulted in a considerable increase in
the number of reported domestic abuse incidents, which is the only tournament
in our dataset where this pattern appears. Interestingly, an earlier examination
of the 2010 World Cup found a similar pattern, using daily data from 33 out of 39
police forces in England (Brimicombe & Cafe, 2012), although our much larger
sample size (3,017 days versus 62 days) allows for a more precise assessment of

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































While the effect of a victory or loss is likely to be highly specific to the
context of a particular match (e.g., group stage or knockout stage, previous
performance of the team, weather on the day, etc.), the estimated effect of an
England victory on the number of reported domestic abuse cases is robust to
different model specifications (see Table 5.1), using data from a different geo-
graphical area (see Table 5.6), and the exclusion of specific tournament years
(see Table 5.7).
Table 5.7: Robustness of the result: sensitivity to the exclusion of specific years
Dependent variable:
Number of reported domestic abuse cases per day
2018 2016 2014 2012 2010
excluded excluded excluded excluded excluded
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Alcohol −0.862∗∗∗ −0.862∗∗∗ −0.862∗∗∗ −0.863∗∗∗ −0.867∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.031) (0.033)
Tournament on 0.018 0.015 0.027 0.030 −0.003
(0.022) (0.025) (0.025) (0.022) (0.025)
England win −0.093 −0.047 −0.029 0.019 −0.051
(0.097) (0.068) (0.062) (0.066) (0.067)
England draw 0.038 0.077 0.057 0.004 0.046
(0.072) (0.091) (0.078) (0.075) (0.088)
England loss 0.030 0.066 0.053 0.054 0.013
(0.079) (0.065) (0.069) (0.062) (0.065)
After England 0.057 0.080∗ 0.088∗∗ 0.099∗∗ 0.071∗
(0.048) (0.042) (0.040) (0.039) (0.042)
Alcohol:Tournament on −0.086∗∗ −0.037 −0.118∗∗∗ −0.092∗∗ −0.048
(0.039) (0.046) (0.047) (0.040) (0.042)
Alcohol:England win 0.884∗∗∗ 0.674∗∗∗ 0.609∗∗∗ 0.574∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗
(0.163) (0.109) (0.100) (0.105) (0.107)
Alcohol:England draw −0.046 −0.141 −0.048 0.055 −0.017
(0.130) (0.179) (0.141) (0.131) (0.151)
Alcohol:England loss 0.014 0.139 0.131 0.078 0.039
(0.134) (0.107) (0.116) (0.103) (0.109)
Alcohol:After England −0.065 0.096 0.050 0.054 0.050
(0.086) (0.073) (0.071) (0.067) (0.071)
Number of days 2,708 2,651 2,652 2,651 2,652
a ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
b Estimates are from a series of negative binomial regressions (based on tests of overdis-
persion) with year, month, day of week, Christmas, New Year’s eve controls interacted
by alcohol; standard errors in parentheses
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5.3.3 Extensions: rugby, other abusive behaviours
Does this effect generalise to other sporting events, or is it specific to football?
It has been previously suggested that other popular sports, such as rugby have
similar links with domestic abuse (Brooks-Hay & Lombard, 2018). Rugby is
the second most popular sport in England after football (Ipsos MORI, 2003).
Focusing on the Six Nations, a high-profile rugby tournament that takes place
every year with the participation of England, Wales, Scotland, Ireland, France
and Italy, we explored whether the reported number of domestic abuse cases
increase on days when the England national rugby team plays. Between 2010
and 2018, there are many more win and loss days of the England rugby union
team compared to the England national football team, providing us with more
statistical power to identify a potential effect. The results show no comparable
effects for rugby matches (see Table 5.8), possibly stemming from differences
in media coverage, audience numbers, and the role of alcohol between the two
tournaments.
We also investigated whether England match days have similar effects on
other types of abusive behaviours, including sexual offences, child and vulnerable
adult abuse. A commonality between domestic abuse and these types of offences
is the element of control and domination, although domestic abuse covers a much
wider range of behaviours and is consequently significantly more frequent in our
dataset. We find no evidence that England matches have comparable effects on
non-domestic sexual offences and other abuse cases (see Table 5.9).
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Number of days 3,017
a ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
b Estimates are from a series of negative binomial re-
gressions (based on tests of overdispersion) with year,
month, day of week, Christmas, New Year’s eve con-
trols interacted by alcohol; there was only one England
rugby match that resulted in a draw between 2010 and
2018, therefore we excluded it from the data; standard
errors in parentheses
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Table 5.9: Non domestic abuse incidents that are about power
Dependent variable:






Tournament on 0.079 0.078∗
(0.068) (0.042)
England win −0.172 −0.073
(0.217) (0.132)
England draw −0.062 0.175
(0.253) (0.148)
England loss −0.220 0.153
(0.223) (0.132)
After England −0.035 0.095
(0.134) (0.081)
Alcohol:Tournament on −0.121 −0.069
(0.157) (0.093)
Alcohol:England win 0.191 0.166
(0.462) (0.274)
Alcohol:England draw 0.781 −0.252
(0.503) (0.346)
Alcohol:England loss 0.011 −0.111
(0.483) (0.285)
Alcohol:After England 0.114 −0.172
(0.287) (0.182)
Number of days 3,017 3,017
a ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
b Estimates are from a series of negative binomial regressions
(based on tests of overdispersion) with year, month, day of
week, Christmas, New Year’s eve controls interacted by al-
cohol; standard errors in parentheses
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5.3.4 Characteristics of domestic abuse perpetrated on England
match days
Our data further allows us to explore the characteristics of alcohol-related do-
mestic abuse perpetrated on England match days. First, using a series of logistic
regressions, we investigate whether these cases are more likely to be newly re-
ported (with no earlier record for the same victim-offender pair in our dataset),
happen in a residential dwelling as opposed to a public location, or result in an
injury. We find no evidence that domestic abuse cases perpetrated on England
match days are more likely to be newly reported (see Table 5.10), compared
to domestic abuse cases occurring on non-match days. It could be argued that
since fans often congregate in pubs to watch England play, there is a higher
likelihood that domestic abuse occurs in public and get reported on these days.
Interestingly, our results indicate that, compared to non-match days, reported
cases are more likely to be perpetrated in public on England loss days, but not
on England win days, and that this effect does not differ by alcohol-involvement
in the case. Non-alcohol related cases reported on England loss days are also
more likely to result in an injury, a pattern that is absent from alcohol-related
cases.
Next, we turn to repeated cases of domestic abuse (multiple cases with
the same victim-offender pair). Domestic abuse is rarely a one-off incident, and
reported repeat cases allow us to explore the characteristics of domestic abuse
that occurs on match days in more detail. We are interested in whether the
number of days elapsed between two consecutive cases is affected by England
football matches. For example, it is possible that England match days bring
reported cases of domestic abuse forward, which would have otherwise happened
at a later point in time. We investigate this question with two negative binomial
regressions, where the outcome variables are the number of days elapsed since
the last reported case, and the number of days until the next case, respectively.
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Table 5.10: Characteristics of domestic abuse cases reported on match days I
Dependent variable:
Newly Public Results




Alcohol=Yes −0.030 0.001 0.427∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.081) (0.058)
Tournament on −0.037 0.021 0.007
(0.030) (0.037) (0.033)
England win 0.011 0.167 0.153
(0.089) (0.110) (0.101)
England draw 0.082 0.014 0.119
(0.121) (0.138) (0.117)
England loss −0.099 0.337∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.099) (0.093)
After England 0.035 0.070 0.049
(0.056) (0.068) (0.062)
Alcohol:Tournament on 0.087 0.063 −0.058
(0.060) (0.080) (0.066)
Alcohol:England win 0.093 0.104 −0.064
(0.156) (0.196) (0.165)
Alcohol:England draw −0.151 −0.016 −0.209
(0.233) (0.306) (0.237)
Alcohol:England loss 0.221 0.044 −0.413∗∗
(0.171) (0.198) (0.182)
Alcohol:After England −0.036 0.042 −0.122
(0.108) (0.143) (0.118)
Number of cases 251,976 279,777 279,777
a ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
b Estimates are log odds from a series of logistic regressions
with year, month, day of week, Christmas, New Year’s eve
controls interacted by alcohol, where every observation is a
reported domestic abuse case; cases that happened in 2010
were excluded from the first regression; standard errors clus-
tered by victim-offender pairs are in parentheses
163
Table 5.11: Characteristics of domestic abuse cases reported on match days II
Dependent variable:
Days Days Hours
since last until next until reported
(1) (2) (3)
Alcohol 0.103∗ 0.057 −0.839∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.050) (0.189)
Tournament on −0.014 −0.047∗ 0.080
(0.028) (0.028) (0.063)
England win 0.016 −0.340∗∗∗ −0.098
(0.082) (0.095) (0.162)
England draw −0.017 −0.111 0.034
(0.096) (0.105) (0.208)
England loss −0.163∗ −0.104 −0.560∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.087) (0.170)
After England 0.052 −0.139∗∗ −0.243∗∗
(0.054) (0.055) (0.108)
Alcohol:Tournament on 0.026 0.025 0.200
(0.057) (0.056) (0.197)
Alcohol:England win −0.119 0.358∗∗ 0.152
(0.146) (0.159) (0.450)
Alcohol:England draw −0.266 −0.116 −0.935∗∗
(0.231) (0.208) (0.390)
Alcohol:England loss 0.277∗ 0.114 0.552
(0.159) (0.166) (0.654)
Alcohol:After England −0.104 0.147 −0.265
(0.106) (0.102) (0.297)
Number of cases 95,091 95,091 272,793
a ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
b Estimates are from a series of negative binomial regressions (based
on tests of overdispersion) with year, month, day of week, Christ-
mas, New Year’s eve controls interacted by alcohol, where every
observation is a reported domestic abuse case; for each regression,
we excluded the upper 2.5% of the outcome variable; standard er-
rors clustered by victim-offender pairs are in parentheses
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In addition, using all reported cases, we explore whether the number of hours
elapsed before reporting the case is affected by England match days.
The results show that non-alcohol related cases perpetrated on England
loss days occur fewer days after the previous incident, 192 days, 95% CI [159–
232 days], compared to non-alcohol repeat cases reoccurring on non-match days,
226 days, 95% CI [207–248 days] (see Table 5.11). Non-alcohol related domestic
abuse cases perpetrated on England win days are more likely to be followed by
another case of abuse in fewer days, 172 days, 95% CI [138–214 days], compared
to cases occurring on non-match days, 242 days, 95% CI [223–261 days], and this
pattern is absent from alcohol-related cases. Interestingly, non-alcohol related
cases perpetrated on England loss days are likely to be reported after fewer
hours, 59 hours, 95% CI [45–78 hours], compared to non-alcohol related abuse
perpetrated on non-match days, 104 hours, 95% CI [91–119 hours].
Finally, using the sample of repeated cases, we explore whether previously
non-alcohol related cases are more likely to reoccur as alcohol-related abuse on
England match days. We investigate this question using a logistic regression,
whilst controlling for the type of the previous case (alcohol/non-alcohol related).
The results show that on England win days, there is an increased likelihood of
an alcohol-related case occurring, irrespective of whether the previous case was
alcohol-related or not (see Table 5.12). Taken together, these results indicate
that apart from the higher likelihood of alcohol-involvement, domestic abuse
that follows an England victory is not characteristically different from domestic
abuse perpetrated on other days during the year.
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Tournament on:Previous alcohol −0.051
(0.100)
England win:Previous alcohol −0.110
(0.277)
England draw:Previous alcohol −0.365
(0.372)
England lost:Previous alcohol 0.179
(0.292)
After England:Previous alcohol 0.066
(0.180)
Number of cases 97,292
a ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
b Estimates are log odds from a logistic regression with year,
month, day of week, Christmas, New Year’s eve controls inter-
acted by alcohol involvement of the previous case, where every
observation is a reported domestic abuse case; standard errors
clustered by victim-offender pairs are in parentheses
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5.4 General Discussion
Previously, a number of quantitative and qualitative studies have explored the
link between England’s participation in national football tournaments and do-
mestic abuse. To our knowledge, our analysis is the most extensive quantitative
investigation of this relationship to date. Our data, consisting of 9 years of crimes
and incidents recorded by the third largest police force in England, allowed us to
analyse various aspects of the relationship between football and domestic abuse.
To summarise, we have found that when the England national football
team wins, there is a 61% increase in alcohol-related domestic abuse, primarily
driven by male-to-female abuse. An increase is also seen in other violent crimes,
predominantly in violence perpetrated by men against women. The temporal
pattern of the increase suggests a causal mechanism, and the effect is robust to
the exclusion of specific tournament years, and using data from a different time
period and geographical area within England. The effect is specific to football,
but not rugby. Apart from the higher likelihood of alcohol-involvement, abuse
cases occurring on England win days are not characteristically different from
abuse occurring on other days throughout the year.
In contrast with this, while we found no evidence for an increase in the
reported number of domestic abuse cases on England loss days (see Table 5.1),
domestic abuse perpetrated on these days seems to be characteristically different
from domestic abuse perpetrated on other days in that these cases are more likely
to occur outside, result in an injury, and get reported sooner. Furthermore, re-
peated cases perpetrated on England loss days occur slightly sooner following the
previous case, but abuse perpetrated on England win days is followed by another
incident sooner. While these findings should be interpreted with caution due to
the pervasive problem of underreporting, the results suggest important differ-
ences in the effect of England wins and losses on domestic abuse. In particular,
while we found no increase in the overall number of cases reported on England
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loss days, incidents reported on these days are characteristically different from
abuse perpetrated on non-match days. In contrast, we observe a substantial
difference in the number, but not in the characteristics of cases perpetrated on
England win days.
It has been previously suggested that the link between football and do-
mestic abuse is not causal, and that other, alternative explanations can account
for this apparent relationship, including increased policing on England match
days, the effect of awareness campaigns before the tournaments, and other high-
profile events taking place around the time of the match (Brooks-Hay & Lom-
bard, 2018). We could expect that higher levels of policing on England match
days would result in an increase in the number of recorded cases perpetrated
outside, and that a successful pre-tournament awareness campaign would result
in an increase in the number of newly reported cases. Our results do not sup-
port either of these alternative hypotheses (see Table 5.10). In addition, it is
unclear why the effect of other events, different policing practices, or awareness
campaigns would depend on the result of the match.
In contrast, we argue that our results provide strong evidence for a causal
link between football and domestic abuse for several reasons. First, the allocation
of England match days are random, as they are determined through a draw.
In addition, the outcome of any individual match is getting increasingly less
predictable as the tournament progresses on. But more importantly, our three-
hour analysis of the England win effect (Figure 5.3) show that the temporal
pattern of the effect is highly consistent with a match-induced explanation of
the increase, making it unlikely that other events occurring on England win
days would be responsible for the increase.
Our results show that alcohol plays an instrumental role in the nexus be-
tween football and domestic abuse in England. While we are not able to quantify
how alcohol consumption changes during national football tournaments, anecdo-
tal evidence suggests a substantial increase (Gornall, 2014; Davies, 2018; Fraser
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McKevitt, 2018). We speculate that the extent of this increase is likely to depend
on the range of factors, most notably England’s performance in the tournaments,
and the weather on England match days. The importance of alcohol in the con-
text of England’s World Cup participation and its association with reported
domestic abuse cases is in clear contrast with US-based evidence regarding the
link between NFL games and IPV (Card & Dahl, 2011), which suggested that
the match-induced increase in the number of reported IPV cases does not depend
on alcohol-involvement in the case.
This difference is likely to be a manifestation of cultural differences in the
popularity and nature of sports-related alcohol consumption in the two countries.
In the UK, drinking culture is embedded in football, through the practices of
sponsorship and targeted advertising (Alcohol Concern, 2014). It is estimated
that televised top-class English professional football matches feature a visual or
verbal alcohol reference every two minutes (Graham & Adams, 2013), highlight-
ing the strong connection between alcohol and the football spectator experience.
Illustrating the strength of this link, the Home Office banned fans from consum-
ing alcohol in view of the pitch in 1985 (Alcohol Concern, 2014).
While our results show a clear relationship between alcohol consumption,
football and domestic abuse in England, it is important to stress that neither
televised football nor alcohol consumption causes domestic abuse. In doing so,
we wish to clarify that we are not using football and alcohol as a “scapegoat”
for domestic abuse (e.g., Riordan, 2018; Brooks-Hay & Lombard, 2018). Impor-
tantly, we do not suggest that football and alcohol turns previously non-abusive
people into abusers (in fact, our results show that this is clearly not the case),
or that domestic abuse only happens on match days.
However, we do believe that the patterns observed in our dataset are
strongly consistent with a victory-induced increase in the number of reported
domestic abuse cases, and are not due to other factors as suggested by Brooks-
Hay and Lombard (2018). In our view, the most likely explanation for this
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observed increase is that England football matches, and in particular, victory
celebrations serve as an opportunity for abusive individuals to be violent. Under-
standing the exact pathways of this phenomenon remains an important question
for future research.
For victims, domestic abuse does not occur once every four years follow-
ing a football match, but is a lived experience of constant fear (Brooks-Hay &
Lombard, 2018). Nevertheless, our results provide a deeper understanding of the
contexts that can be conducive to abuse. In particular, these findings illuminate
that the experience of “national success” in a highly male-dominated sport is a
breeding ground for male-perpetrated, alcohol-related domestic abuse.
From a policy perspective, it is hard to efficiently tackle such a complex
phenomenon. In addition to the UK Government’s substantial ongoing efforts
to fight domestic abuse (Home Office, 2016), leaders in football can do much
more to improve the reputation of British football fandom, and make it more
inclusive for women and minorities. For example, consciously aiming to make
football more attractive to women and increase their presence in this historically
male-dominated arena can be an effective way to fight sexist, misogynistic atti-
tudes that are too often evident amongst male football fans (Woodward, 2017),
and also underpin the world view of many domestic abuse offenders (Peralta &
Tuttle, 2013). At the same time, football clubs need to be explicit and strict in
condemning violent, abusive behaviours of their fans, and take part in raising
awareness of the dark side of the “beautiful game” (Swallow, 2017). Such mea-
sures can be important first steps towards a radical transformation of football




This thesis presented four research projects in the topic of context effects in-
fluencing human behaviour, and showcased examples from the wide range of
interdisciplinary methodological approaches used in behavioural economics. In
Chapters 2–4, we focused on violations of the rationality assumption in value-
based choice, using laboratory-based experimental methods. More specifically,
Chapter 2 contrasted various forms of context-dependent choice behaviour within
a popular process model of choice, while Chapters 3 and 4 focused on exploring
the boundary conditions of a well-known cognitive bias in choice, the attraction
effect. In contrast to these laboratory-based investigations of human behaviour,
Chapter 5 presented a statistical analysis of a large observational dataset, and
explored the link between football and domestic abuse in the West Midlands.
Below we summarize the findings, limitations, and possible future directions that
naturally follow from each of these investigations.
In Chapter 2, our aim was to compare four distinct forms of subjec-
tive valuation (range, rank, local, and global value transformation) underlying
choice behaviour. We chose to explore these four subjective value transforma-
tion rules within the modelling framework of the DDM, and its extension, the
aDDM, using data from two trinary choice experiments, Experiment 1, which
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was a value-based choice experiment (where we also recorded participants’ eye
movements during choice), and Experiment 2, which was a perceptual version of
Experiment 1. We conducted three empirical tests to compare the explanatory
power of these four subjective transformation rules. First, using an improved,
simulations-based model fitting approach and data from Experiment 1, we iden-
tified the subjective transformation rule that provided the best fit for each par-
ticipant’s choice data. Second, we repeated the same test, but instead of a
simulations-based approach, we used a novel probability distribution method to
derive choice probabilities. The results from these two comparisons were remark-
ably similar, and indicated that for the majority of participants (about 57%),
subjective valuation was guided by the absolute value of the options, while for a
smaller proportion of participants (about 20%), choice behaviour could be best
described by the relative valuation rule.
In a third comparison, we investigated the explanatory power of the four
rules by comparing their ability to predict the qualitative changes in choice
proportions in response to a set of pre-determined choice set manipulations. For
this comparison, we used data from both a value-based (Experiment 1) and a
perceptual choice (Experiment 2) experiment, to further explore the domain-
specificity of context-dependent choice behaviour. This comparison has revealed
that only the global and local maximum rules could correctly predict the effect
of three out of the four choice set manipulations, and thus strongly supported
the results of the two previous tests.
Therefore, our results have shown that choice behaviour in these experi-
ments can be best described by a hybrid valuation mechanism, where subjective
valuation is mostly affected by the absolute value of the items, and to a lesser
extent, also by their relative values. These findings were remarkably similar
across two very different stimuli domains. In addition, our novel approach to
derive choice probabilities delivered very similar results to those obtained from a
simulations-based method, alleviating concerns about employing a simulations-
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based estimation approach to derive choice probabilities in a stochastic model
framework.
These results contribute to the growing body of research investigating
economic decision making within a process model framework. A clear direction
for future research could involve estimating appropriate weights for a hybrid
subjective valuation model within the DDM framework. However, a limitation of
our study is that we only focused on one broad type of sequential sampling model
(the DDM, and its extension the aDDM), and one specific way to capture the
idea of context dependency within this modelling framework (through the items’
values in the evidence accumulation equations). Future investigations could
probe the sensitivity of the results, by exploring alternative ways to incorporate
the idea of context sensitivity within the DDM (e.g., through modelling changes
in the drift rate, or changing the relative evidence accumulation equations) or in
the framework of other sequential sampling models. Through directly measuring
neural firing rates during choice, the rapidly expanding field of neuroeconomics
will undoubtedly deliver important insights about biologically plausible ways
to incorporate context dependence within various sequential sampling models,
including the DDM.
In Chapter 3, our aim was to explore the boundary conditions of the
attraction effect, by testing whether this well-known decision bias extends to
choice scenarios with complex, naturalistic choice options. In Experiment 1, we
used movie posters and their associated summary texts as inputs to a LSA algo-
rithm to uncover the topics underlying our selected set of movies, and establish
the similarity of each movie pair. Drawing on insights from a previous debate
about the methodological challenges associated with testing the attraction effect
with real-world stimuli, we designed the first truly rigorous test of the attraction
effect with naturalistic choice options. In Experiment 1, we found no evidence
for the attraction effect, but our data has also revealed that participants did
not perceive our target-decoy pairs as sufficiently similar. In Experiment 2, we
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circumvented this problem with a more careful selection of target-decoy pairs,
but still found no evidence for the attraction effect.
One limitation of this investigation is that we only used one type of real-
world stimuli to probe the attraction effect. However, given the rigour of our
methodological approach, we see these results as sound evidence supporting the
claim that the attraction effect does not extend to choices with naturalistic op-
tions. Historically, the attraction effect played a key role in the development
of a number of very influential choice models, which claim to be able to cap-
ture context dependence in decision making. Our results cast serious doubt on
the appropriacy of relying on the attraction effect in the development of choice
models aiming to offer a realistic account of real-world decision making.
In both of these chapters, we used movies posters as choice items: they
served as an example of a preferential choice task in Chapter 1 (as opposed
to a perceptual choice task), and as an example of a naturalistic, real-world
choice item in Chapter 2 (as opposed to a choice item with numerical attribute
dimensions). Whether our findings generalise to other types of stimuli is an
important question. Our movie stimulus is visually rich, and thus superficially
similar to a lot of the everyday consumer products people choose between on
a daily basis. In addition, we obtained similar results from a preferential and
perceptual choice experiment in Chapter 2, indicating that context effects might
be insensitive to the exact nature of stimuli.
However, movie posters differ from the most common choice items people
encounter in at least two respects. First, in our experiments, we did not incorpo-
rate any price information. As movies are often priced the same, this information
is unlikely to be of crucial importance for this particular choice item, however,
price information is a fundamental attribute of everyday consumer items. Im-
portantly, if context effects are more likely to arise in choices where there are
numerical attributes (owing to the existence of one highly salient comparison
dimension), then this might mean that our results can be considered a strict
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test of context sensitivity, and could also explain why we have not found strong
evidence for context-dependent behaviour in these experiments.
In addition, our movie stimulus is highly symbolic, which is not the case
for most consumer choice items, where the specific attributes of the product
are easily accessible, thus reducing the complexity of the preference construc-
tion process. Movie posters are visually rich, and complex mental processes are
likely to play an important part in their preferential evaluation and subsequent
comparison. Given that context effects have mostly been demonstrated in choice
scenarios involving non-symbolic, simple stimuli, it is entirely possible that the
complex nature of our chosen stimulus introduced confounding factors we could
not control for, subsequently masking any context effects that would otherwise
be more apparent in choices involving simpler choice items.
Understanding how preference formation depends on the attribute prop-
erties and symbolic nature of the stimuli is an interesting avenue for future
research. It would possible to test whether preferences are dependent on the
exact representation of a complex stimuli (e.g., movies can be represented by
just their title, or by scores along genre dimensions), and explore how this might
affect susceptibility to context effects in preferential choice.
Our results from Chapter 3 posed an interesting question about whether
the attraction effect is simply the product of the cognitive comparison strategy
used in choices involving numerical attributes. We therefore decided to further
investigate this question in Chapter 4. Based on findings regarding the pres-
ence of the attraction effect in perceptual choice experiments, and our previous
findings, we conjectured that a sequential, attribute-wise comparison process is
key in producing the attraction effect. The purpose of Chapter 4 was to test
this hypothesis. Drawing on decades of psychological research on information
processing, we designed a within-subjects experiment with two versions of the
same task, one with spatially separable numerical attributes (the standard task
used in the literature for testing the attraction effect), and a pictorial version,
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where the two attributes were integral, and thus spatially non-separable. To
replicate the conditions under a value-based choice situation with our artificially
created stimuli, participants were required to learn a valuation rule in a learning
stage that preceded the choice stages, and were further instructed to rely on this
rule in the subsequent choice trials. Our results were mixed. First, we found no
evidence for the attraction effect in the pictorial condition, which was predicted.
Second, we found a strong effect of the order of the two types of tasks, such
that we only saw a strong attraction effect in the numerical condition when it
followed the pictorial version, which was in stark contrast with our expectations.
The limitations of our experiment are twofold. First, it could be argued
that our approach to include a learning stage to induce preferences over our
abstract stimuli set to study value-based choice did not manage to invoke the
same cognitive processes that underlie a natural, simplistic preferential choice
scenario. Other approaches involving stimuli that have naturally interpretable
attribute dimensions are more promising in understanding what gives rise to the
attraction effect. Second, the learning stages in our experiment turned out to be
harder and more cognitively demanding than we anticipated, further complicat-
ing the interpretation of the results. Unfortunately, we did not collect enough
data to understand the exact cognitive mechanisms driving our results, but our
findings highlight the sensitivity of the attraction effect to the stimulus domain
and task characteristics. A future research project could conduct a more compre-
hensive investigation of the link between stimulus presentation and the strength
of the attraction effect, by testing how different degrees of attribute separability
modulate the attraction effect.
In contrast with the laboratory-based, experimental approach used in
previous chapters, Chapter 5 used a real-world, observational dataset to in-
vestigate the relationship between England’s participation in national football
tournaments and the number of reported domestic abuse incidents. Our re-
sults have demonstrated a substantial, 61% increase in the number of reported
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alcohol-related domestic abuse incidents following an England victory. While it
is extremely hard to establish causality in the context of an observational dataset,
a three-hour analysis showed that the timeline of the effect is highly consistent
with a causal link between football and domestic abuse. Our results are in line
with previous, seemingly contradictory findings. Our main contribution lies in
the fact that in the context of England, our study is the first to explore the
instrumental role of alcohol in the nexus between football and domestic abuse.
Our results have demonstrated an important example of how visceral
factors and alcohol consumption can create an environment that is conducive
to domestic abuse. A limitation of our study is that we have only used data
from one county of England from a specific time period, and thus future repli-
cation attempts involving different regions and time periods will be important
in probing the robustness of this effect. We also recognise that domestic abuse
is a complex, multifaceted phenomenon, and that football and alcohol alone do
not cause domestic abuse. However, we believe that qualitative studies exploring
the complex link between football fandom, alcohol consumption and attitudes
towards women amongst domestic abuse perpetrators will be key in elucidating
the pathways of this phenomenon, and understanding its specific cultural drivers.
In addition, we believe efforts focused on increasing women’s participation and
visibility in British football fandom can be an important first step to dissociate
football from male-perpetrated domestic abuse.
Overall, the research projects described in this thesis demonstrated ex-
amples from the wide range of contextual factors affecting human behaviour, and
illustrated some of the eclectic methodological approaches used by behavioural
economics to investigate these factors. In doing so, it hoped to at least partly re-
veal what makes behavioural economics such an immensely successful and rapidly
growing academic field.
The reunification of economics and psychology in the form of behavioural
economics was necessary, if not inevitable. Human behaviour is shaped by a
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myriad of external and internal factors, and often seems inconsistent and un-
predictable. This makes the development of reliable predictive models of human
decision making extremely challenging. For a long time, economics attempted to
explain seemingly contradictory behavioural phenomena by constantly amending
its theoretical models, whilst ignoring decades of knowledge accumulated from
psychological research on exactly the same phenomena, on the basis of their
theoretical and methodological differences. The emergence of behavioural eco-
nomics has changed this disciplinary status quo, and initiated a slow revolution
within economics by moving interdisciplinary initiatives from the periphery to
the mainstream.
The key to the success of behavioural economics lies in its inherently
interdisciplinary nature. Crossing traditional disciplinary boundaries allowed
researchers to amalgamate the theoretical and methodological strengths of mul-
tiple disciplines, creating a novel field with the ability to draw on a much wider
range of scientific knowledge. Inevitably, this fusion lead to the rapid accumula-
tion of new insights about choice phenomena that had been studied for decades.
Technological developments have provided an important source of novel method-
ological tools for behavioural economics, and will continue to do so. In turn,
behavioural economics will no doubt keep delivering invaluable insights about







Table A.1: Best fitting parameter value for each participant and value transformation rule,
simulations method
Global Max Local Max Range Rank
Participant Best fitting rule θ σ d θ σ d θ σ d θ σ d
1 Global Max 0.75 0.19 0.32 0.76 0.20 0.26 0.86 0.20 0.10 0.64 0.21 0.12
2 Rank 0.57 0.24 0.71 0.68 0.23 0.32 0.61 0.22 0.18 0.58 0.23 0.20
3 Local Max 0.68 0.22 0.49 0.68 0.22 0.36 0.54 0.23 0.22 0.59 0.23 0.21
4 Global Max 0.66 0.26 0.30 0.66 0.26 0.21 0.59 0.26 0.11 0.65 0.26 0.10
5 Global Max 0.76 0.20 0.39 0.75 0.20 0.33 0.86 0.20 0.17 0.84 0.20 0.18
6 Local Max 0.63 0.24 0.32 0.48 0.23 0.31 0.65 0.24 0.21 0.60 0.24 0.22
7 Rank 0.63 0.17 0.22 0.65 0.17 0.20 0.47 0.16 0.15 0.48 0.16 0.15
8 Range 0.78 0.22 0.53 0.77 0.23 0.41 0.61 0.20 0.26 0.55 0.21 0.27
9 Global Max 0.86 0.18 0.21 0.88 0.19 0.17 0.54 0.18 0.15 0.76 0.19 0.12
10 Global Max 0.54 0.23 0.25 0.54 0.23 0.22 0.19 0.23 0.18 0.19 0.24 0.17
11 Global Max 0.67 0.13 0.26 0.64 0.14 0.18 0.64 0.15 0.10 0.59 0.15 0.11
12 Global Max 0.82 0.21 0.31 0.74 0.21 0.27 0.69 0.23 0.15 0.63 0.23 0.16
13 Global Max 0.45 0.19 0.31 0.40 0.19 0.26 0.17 0.20 0.18 0.21 0.20 0.17
14 Global Max 0.42 0.38 0.62 0.25 0.39 0.43 0.17 0.40 0.34 0.23 0.40 0.35
15 Global Max 0.63 0.14 0.18 0.53 0.15 0.16 0.52 0.14 0.11 0.48 0.15 0.11
16 Global Max 0.84 0.18 0.25 0.90 0.18 0.20 0.91 0.18 0.10 0.99 0.19 0.09
17 Global Max 0.79 0.26 0.71 0.79 0.27 0.57 0.59 0.27 0.29 0.48 0.26 0.31
18 Global Max 0.68 0.29 0.58 0.58 0.30 0.42 0.50 0.31 0.27 0.48 0.30 0.28
19 Global Max 0.62 0.19 0.32 0.58 0.18 0.26 0.57 0.18 0.19 0.51 0.18 0.20
20 Global Max 1.05 0.21 0.35 1.00 0.21 0.28 0.96 0.22 0.18 0.95 0.22 0.18
21 Global Max 0.59 0.22 0.32 0.53 0.22 0.31 0.28 0.21 0.28 0.34 0.21 0.26
22 Range 0.88 0.11 0.15 0.84 0.11 0.13 0.59 0.11 0.08 0.49 0.10 0.09
23 Global Max 0.70 0.14 0.15 0.75 0.14 0.12 0.53 0.14 0.09 0.49 0.14 0.10
24 Local Max 1.12 0.25 0.36 1.09 0.24 0.26 1.14 0.25 0.12 1.10 0.25 0.13
25 Local Max 0.22 0.21 0.12 0.20 0.21 0.09 0.22 0.21 0.07 0.24 0.21 0.08
26 Global Max 0.92 0.18 0.32 0.92 0.18 0.26 0.84 0.17 0.18 0.90 0.17 0.17
27 Global Max 0.48 0.12 0.18 0.48 0.13 0.15 0.23 0.14 0.10 0.20 0.14 0.10
28 Local Max 0.18 0.16 0.12 0.19 0.16 0.10 0.18 0.16 0.08 0.18 0.17 0.08
29 Global Max 0.27 0.19 0.28 0.25 0.20 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.16 0.20 0.20 0.16
30 Global Max 0.57 0.29 0.79 0.54 0.29 0.62 0.15 0.31 0.38 0.11 0.31 0.39
31 Range 0.25 0.22 0.01 0.30 0.22 0.00 0.26 0.21 -0.03 0.27 0.22 -0.03
32 Range 0.72 0.20 0.34 0.59 0.19 0.25 0.24 0.20 0.16 0.23 0.20 0.16
33 Local Max 0.78 0.21 0.25 0.68 0.21 0.22 0.57 0.21 0.12 0.57 0.20 0.14
34 Local Max 0.36 0.14 0.18 0.20 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.16 0.13 0.10
35 Global Max 0.36 0.32 0.41 0.49 0.32 0.30 0.24 0.33 0.24 0.28 0.32 0.26
36 Range 0.84 0.16 0.22 0.80 0.16 0.22 0.91 0.16 0.10 0.86 0.16 0.11
37 Global Max 0.73 0.16 0.31 0.79 0.16 0.22 0.80 0.17 0.11 0.89 0.17 0.10
38 Local Max 0.57 0.22 0.23 0.56 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.17 0.24 0.22 0.16
39 Global Max 0.15 0.38 0.23 0.23 0.38 0.11 0.28 0.37 -0.01 0.33 0.37 0.02
40 Global Max 0.70 0.16 0.35 0.64 0.16 0.23 0.26 0.17 0.15 0.24 0.17 0.15
41 Rank 0.97 0.17 0.21 0.97 0.17 0.19 1.03 0.17 0.10 1.09 0.16 0.10
42 Global Max 0.81 0.19 0.33 0.85 0.19 0.25 1.04 0.20 0.12 1.02 0.20 0.11
43 Local Max 0.69 0.19 0.31 0.74 0.19 0.23 0.51 0.21 0.14 0.51 0.21 0.15
44 Global Max 0.60 0.22 0.32 0.52 0.22 0.28 0.42 0.24 0.19 0.44 0.23 0.18
45 Rank 0.97 0.20 0.49 0.96 0.20 0.42 0.76 0.19 0.27 0.81 0.18 0.27
46 Global Max 0.74 0.17 0.30 0.72 0.17 0.23 0.52 0.17 0.15 0.52 0.17 0.15
47 Range 1.02 0.24 0.30 0.99 0.26 0.25 1.06 0.24 0.15 1.02 0.24 0.16
48 Global Max 0.97 0.22 0.34 1.03 0.23 0.29 1.07 0.23 0.12 1.11 0.24 0.11
49 Local Max 0.40 0.20 0.48 0.46 0.19 0.31 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.21 0.24
50 Local Max 0.82 0.18 0.31 0.76 0.18 0.27 0.68 0.18 0.18 0.86 0.17 0.17
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Table A.2: Best fitting parameter value for each participant and value transformation rule,
probability distributions method
Global Max Local Max Range Rank
Participant Best fitting rule θ σ d θ σ d θ σ d θ σ d
1 Global Max 0.78 0.19 0.31 0.78 0.19 0.26 0.57 0.20 0.12 0.53 0.20 0.12
2 Rank 0.64 0.24 0.63 0.76 0.22 0.29 0.60 0.22 0.18 0.61 0.22 0.19
3 Local Max 0.70 0.22 0.46 0.68 0.22 0.34 0.50 0.22 0.22 0.50 0.22 0.21
4 Global Max 0.75 0.25 0.26 0.71 0.25 0.19 0.59 0.26 0.10 0.53 0.26 0.10
5 Global Max 0.73 0.19 0.38 0.72 0.19 0.32 0.64 0.19 0.20 0.63 0.19 0.21
6 Local Max 0.67 0.23 0.30 0.59 0.23 0.27 0.54 0.24 0.23 0.49 0.23 0.23
7 Rank 0.67 0.17 0.21 0.65 0.17 0.19 0.53 0.15 0.15 0.54 0.15 0.14
8 Range 0.74 0.21 0.51 0.74 0.21 0.41 0.59 0.19 0.27 0.72 0.21 0.21
9 Global Max 0.83 0.18 0.21 0.79 0.18 0.18 0.70 0.18 0.13 0.68 0.19 0.13
10 Global Max 0.61 0.22 0.23 0.60 0.23 0.20 0.47 0.23 0.13 0.44 0.23 0.12
11 Global Max 0.59 0.13 0.28 0.64 0.13 0.18 0.44 0.14 0.13 0.41 0.15 0.13
12 Global Max 0.74 0.20 0.32 0.74 0.20 0.26 0.63 0.22 0.16 0.59 0.23 0.16
13 Global Max 0.44 0.19 0.28 0.42 0.19 0.24 0.08 0.19 0.19 0.07 0.20 0.19
14 Global Max 0.51 0.36 0.50 0.42 0.37 0.36 0.19 0.37 0.28 0.17 0.37 0.28
15 Global Max 0.56 0.13 0.18 0.54 0.14 0.16 0.42 0.13 0.12 0.41 0.13 0.12
16 Global Max 0.88 0.18 0.24 0.89 0.18 0.20 0.90 0.18 0.10 0.86 0.18 0.10
17 Global Max 0.77 0.23 0.68 0.76 0.24 0.53 1.14 0.25 0.18 0.57 0.24 0.28
18 Global Max 0.68 0.27 0.52 0.64 0.28 0.38 0.43 0.29 0.26 0.42 0.29 0.26
19 Global Max 0.68 0.18 0.30 0.66 0.18 0.24 0.55 0.18 0.19 0.52 0.18 0.19
20 Global Max 1.02 0.20 0.34 0.95 0.20 0.28 0.91 0.21 0.17 0.92 0.21 0.17
21 Range 0.62 0.22 0.32 0.56 0.21 0.28 0.43 0.20 0.23 0.44 0.21 0.23
22 Rank 0.82 0.11 0.15 0.83 0.10 0.14 0.71 0.10 0.07 0.69 0.10 0.07
23 Global Max 0.71 0.13 0.15 0.71 0.14 0.12 0.54 0.14 0.09 0.54 0.14 0.09
24 Local Max 1.01 0.24 0.38 1.04 0.23 0.26 1.02 0.24 0.13 1.01 0.24 0.13
25 Rank 0.27 0.21 0.10 0.24 0.21 0.09 0.00 0.20 0.09 0.00 0.21 0.09
26 Global Max 0.91 0.16 0.31 0.91 0.17 0.26 0.90 0.17 0.17 0.89 0.17 0.17
27 Local Max 0.45 0.12 0.18 0.45 0.12 0.15 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.11
28 Global Max 0.04 0.16 0.12 0.10 0.15 0.11 0.00 0.16 0.09 0.00 0.16 0.09
29 Global Max 0.38 0.19 0.26 0.35 0.19 0.19 0.16 0.20 0.15 0.17 0.20 0.15
30 Global Max 0.67 0.29 0.66 0.67 0.30 0.51 0.35 0.31 0.27 0.34 0.31 0.27
31 Rank 0.32 0.21 0.00 0.32 0.21 0.00 0.30 0.21 0.00 0.30 0.21 0.00
32 Range 0.71 0.19 0.30 0.68 0.20 0.25 0.49 0.19 0.14 0.49 0.20 0.13
33 Rank 0.70 0.20 0.24 0.68 0.20 0.22 0.43 0.20 0.14 0.43 0.20 0.14
34 Local Max 0.20 0.12 0.18 0.21 0.11 0.14 0.00 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.12 0.12
35 Global Max 0.55 0.31 0.36 0.54 0.31 0.26 0.36 0.31 0.20 0.34 0.31 0.20
36 Range 0.80 0.16 0.23 0.80 0.16 0.22 0.71 0.17 0.12 0.64 0.16 0.13
37 Global Max 0.80 0.16 0.29 0.81 0.16 0.20 0.72 0.16 0.12 0.71 0.17 0.12
38 Local Max 0.61 0.22 0.23 0.61 0.21 0.23 0.38 0.22 0.14 0.37 0.22 0.14
39 Global Max 0.01 0.35 0.20 0.00 0.36 0.15 0.00 0.35 0.03 0.00 0.36 0.07
40 Global Max 0.66 0.16 0.35 0.61 0.16 0.23 0.28 0.16 0.15 0.28 0.16 0.15
41 Rank 0.93 0.16 0.21 0.94 0.16 0.19 0.90 0.15 0.12 0.91 0.15 0.12
42 Global Max 0.76 0.17 0.33 0.77 0.18 0.27 0.72 0.20 0.14 0.73 0.20 0.13
43 Local Max 0.80 0.19 0.29 0.79 0.19 0.21 0.69 0.19 0.13 0.68 0.19 0.13
44 Global Max 0.63 0.21 0.29 0.62 0.22 0.25 0.80 0.23 0.13 0.45 0.23 0.18
45 Rank 0.95 0.18 0.47 0.92 0.18 0.41 0.81 0.17 0.25 0.79 0.17 0.25
46 Global Max 0.75 0.16 0.27 0.74 0.17 0.22 0.57 0.17 0.14 0.60 0.16 0.14
47 Range 0.99 0.24 0.29 0.96 0.23 0.25 1.00 0.23 0.15 1.23 0.24 0.13
48 Global Max 0.93 0.22 0.33 0.95 0.22 0.28 0.91 0.23 0.13 0.91 0.23 0.12
49 Local Max 0.44 0.19 0.44 0.49 0.19 0.29 0.92 0.22 0.11 0.28 0.20 0.22




Figure B.1: Pre-registration of Experiment 1 from Chapter 3.
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1) Have any data been collected for this study already?
It's complicated. We have already collected some data but explain in Question 8 why readers may consider this a valid pre-registration nevertheless.
2) What's the main question being asked or hypothesis being tested in this study?
Can we replicate the attraction effect using real-world, complex stimuli?
3) Describe the key dependent variable(s) specifying how they will be measured.
First, we will ask participants to rate 200 movies on a scale from 1 to 7 and to indicate whether they have seen the movie before. Based on the ratings, we
will create choice sets (quadruplets consisting of two triplets) for each participant to test the attraction effect. We will use an LSA solution as well as genre
information on the movies to create the choice sets (dissimilar movies with the same rating are competitors; similar movies with at least a 2 point rating
difference will be targets/decoys). There will be two types of choice triplets according to a matching criteria (based on the semantic and genre proximity
between the movies), strict (where at least one of the semantic/genre criteria are strict) and non-strict matches. The validity of the non-strict choice sets
will be checked by asking participants to rate the similarity of the movies after the choice stage. Only participants for whom we can create at least three
quadruplets with strict matching will be invited to the choice stage. Our main dependent variable will be the proportion of trials in which the participant
chooses the target which was favoured by the decoy out of all trials where participants do not choose a decoy.
4) How many and which conditions will participants be assigned to?
In the choice stage, all participants will face same attraction effect choice situation (target, competitor, decoy movies), but the exact movies will depend on
the ratings the participant gave in the screening stage. The movie pairs presented in the similarity rating task will also be specific to the participant.
5) Specify exactly which analyses you will conduct to examine the main question/hypothesis.
We will test the effect using only the quadruplets selected using the strict criteria, and using all quadruplets, we will also use the half of quadruplets for
each subject that show the best similarity scores between target and decoy. We are combining estimation and NHST approaches. For the estimation, we
will calculate a 95% confidence interval for the proportion of trials upon which the target movie is chosen (after excluding trials where the decoy was
chosen). For the NHST, we will conduct a one-sample t-test to test whether the proportion of trials upon which the target movie is chosen is higher than 0.5
(after excluding trials where the decoy was chosen). Using the trials upon which the decoy was not chosen, we will also run the following mixed effects
logistic regression model:
Target_chosen = Read_movie + Target_Competitor_distance + Target_Decoy_distance + Target_Decoy_rating_difference 
We aim to run this regression with as full a set of random effects (slopes and intercepts) as the final data allow.
6) Describe exactly how outliers will be defined and handled, and your precise rule(s) for excluding observations.
Based on our pilot data collection (using books as stimuli), we decided to exclude participants who completed the ratings task unusually quickly (fastest
5%), whose ratings were unrealistically skewed (lowest 5% of the entropy distribution) or showed a distinct (including random) time trend (lowest and
highest 5% of the autocorrelation distribution). A pilot study analysing the stability of repeated ratings confirmed that people who met any of the above
criteria were the ones who were the least consistent repeated ratings (indicating that they indeed did not pay attention to the task).
We will also exclude any trials where the subject selected the decoy.
7) How many observations will be collected or what will determine sample size? No need to justify decision, but be precise about exactly how the
number will be determined.
We will collect the data in batches of 50 until we have choice data for 100 participants.
8) Anything else you would like to pre-register? (e.g., secondary analyses, variables collected for exploratory purposes, unusual analyses planned?)
We ran a pilot study with 33 people (mostly ratings) using books as stimuli. Since most of our subjects were not familiar with the stimuli, we decided to use
movies instead but the data was still useful in helping us determine our exclusion criteria. In addition, we are in the process of data collection and was
planning to submit this registration before we started data collection, but due to a miscommunication between the researchers it has been slightly delayed.
However, we have not looked at our results yet and will not do so until we collected choice data for a 100 participants.
Available at https://aspredicted.org/9j897.pdf 
(Permanently archived at http://web.archive.org/web/*/https://aspredicted.org/9j897.pdf)
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Figure B.2: Distribution of the proportion of trials where the target was chosen in
Experiment 1 (triplets with strict target-decoy pairs plus the “better half” of the remaining




































































































Figure B.3: Pre-registration of Experiment 2 from Chapter 3.
CONFIDENTIAL - FOR PEER-REVIEW ONLY
Attraction in the wild II (#9637)
Created: 04/05/2018 08:45 AM (PT)
Shared:   11/20/2018 02:08 AM (PT)
This pre-registration is not yet public. This anonymized copy (without author names) was created by the author(s) to use during peer-review. A
non-anonymized version (containing author names) will become publicly available only if an author makes it public. Until that happens the contents
of this pre-registration are confidential.
1) Have any data been collected for this study already?
It's complicated. We have already collected some data but explain in Question 8 why readers may consider this a valid pre-registration nevertheless.
2) What's the main question being asked or hypothesis being tested in this study?
Can we replicate the attraction effect using real-world, complex stimuli? In a previous experiment (#8353), we failed to replicate this effect, and we
are interested in whether this is still the case if we use a different method to establish similarity between pairs of stimuli.
3) Describe the key dependent variable(s) specifying how they will be measured.
This is a follow-up experiment on the experiment described in #8353. Changes implemented: we are using 231 movies instead of 200; we are only
using the genre information about movies to establish similarity and dissimilarity between them; we will only include participants for whom we can
create at least 3 quadruplets; we will ask participants to rate the similarity of each decoy-target and target-competitor pair after the choice phase.
The dependent variable is still the proportion of trials in which the participant chooses the target which was favoured by the decoy out of all trials
where participants do not choose a decoy.
4) How many and which conditions will participants be assigned to?
In the choice stage, all participants will face same attraction effect choice situation (target, competitor, decoy movies), but the exact movies will
depend on the ratings the participant gave in the screening stage. The movie pairs presented in the similarity rating task will also be specific to the
participant.
5) Specify exactly which analyses you will conduct to examine the main question/hypothesis.
We are combining estimation and NHST approaches. For the estimation, we will calculate a 95% confidence interval for the proportion of trials upon
which the target movie is chosen (after excluding trials where the decoy was chosen). For the NHST, we will conduct a one-sample t-test to test
whether the proportion of trials upon which the target movie is chosen is higher than 0.5 (after excluding trials where the decoy was chosen). Using
the trials upon which the decoy was not chosen, we will also run the following mixed effects logistic regression model:
Target_chosen = Read_movie + Target_Competitor_distance + Target_Decoy_distance + Target_Decoy_rating_difference
We aim to run this regression with as full a set of random effects (slopes and intercepts) as the final data allow.
6) Describe exactly how outliers will be defined and handled, and your precise rule(s) for excluding observations.
We will exclude participants who completed the ratings task unusually quickly (fastest 5%), whose ratings were unrealistically skewed (lowest 5% of
the entropy distribution) or showed a distinct (including random) time trend (lowest and highest 5% of the autocorrelation distribution). We will
exclude participants for whom we cannot create at least 3 quadruplets. We will also exclude any trials where the subject selected the decoy.
7) How many observations will be collected or what will determine sample size? No need to justify decision, but be precise about exactly how the
number will be determined.
We will collect the data in batches of 50 until we have choice data for 100 participants (after the exclusion criteria have been applied).
8) Anything else you would like to pre-register? (e.g., secondary analyses, variables collected for exploratory purposes, unusual analyses
planned?)
We have so far collected similarity ratings from 60 people for pairs of movies (207 each) to select the stimuli for this experiment. Based on this data,
we are using 253 movie pairs in this experiment (these are the movies that had a mean similarity rating of 4.5 or above). We have not collected any
choice data yet.
Verify authenticity:http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=iw8iu9 




Figure C.1: Pre-registration of Experiment 1 from Chapter 4.
CONFIDENTIAL - FOR PEER-REVIEW ONLY
Teapot experiment I (#12526)
Created: 07/10/2018 06:32 AM (PT)
Shared:   09/13/2018 03:58 AM (PT)
This pre-registration is not yet public. This anonymized copy (without author names) was created by the author(s) to use during peer-review. A
non-anonymized version (containing author names) will become publicly available only if an author makes it public. Until that happens the contents
of this pre-registration are confidential.
1) Have any data been collected for this study already?
No, no data have been collected for this study yet.
2) What's the main question being asked or hypothesis being tested in this study?
Does the attraction effect go away when the two attribute dimensions cannot be processed independently?
3) Describe the key dependent variable(s) specifying how they will be measured.
The main dependent variable is the proportion of trials in each condition (numerical, pictorial) on which the target was chosen (excluding trials where
the decoy was chosen).
4) How many and which conditions will participants be assigned to?
There are two conditions: numerical vs pictorial representation of stimuli. Each participant will complete both conditions, but the order of the
conditions will be randomised.
5) Specify exactly which analyses you will conduct to examine the main question/hypothesis.
First we are going to test if the order of the conditions has an effect on the strength of the attraction effect. This will be tested with a mixed effects
regression where we will be including an interaction between condition and order. We do not expect order to have an effect, but if it does, we will
only analyse each participant's first condition. Then, we will assess the strength of the effect by condition by calculating a 95% confidence interval for
our key variable in both conditions. Using a one-sided t-test, we will test whether the mean of our key variable is significantly greater than 0.5 in the
two conditions. We will also test the difference between these two means with a paired/unpaired (depending on whether order will have an effect)
sample t-test. Supplementary analyses will involve testing the effect of the number of practice trials on the strength of the effect (mixed effects
model), and the effect of the target-decoy value difference on the likelihood of choosing he target (mixed effects logistic regression).
6) Describe exactly how outliers will be defined and handled, and your precise rule(s) for excluding observations.
We will exclude partcipants whose 1) accuracy on the catch trials are 2.5 standard deviations below the average 2) choice pattern is in the the lowest
2.5% of the entropy distribution 3) autocorrelation is in the upper or lower 2.5% of the autocorrelation distribution. We will exclude 2.5% of fastest
trials. We will also exclude any trials where the subject selected the decoy.
7) How many observations will be collected or what will determine sample size? No need to justify decision, but be precise about exactly how the
number will be determined.
We will collect data from a 100 participants.
8) Anything else you would like to pre-register? (e.g., secondary analyses, variables collected for exploratory purposes, unusual analyses
planned?)
Verify authenticity:http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=p7tg96 
Version of AsPredicted Questions: 2.00
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Table C.1: Odds-ratios and 95% CIs from a mixed-effects logistic model with subject-specific
intercepts, Experiment 2. (T – Target, C – Competitor, D – Decoy)
Dependent variable:
Target chosen proportion
Condition:Numerical 1.028 (0.897, 1.179)
Order:Pictorial first 0.974 (0.811, 1.172)
Practice attempts 0.942∗∗ (0.891, 0.997)
Condition:NumericalXOrder:Pictorial first 1.351∗∗∗ (1.124, 1.625)
Constant 1.038 (0.900, 1.195)
Observations 144
Log Likelihood −505.947
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,023.895
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 1,041.713
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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